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This report is the culmination of a two-semester group research project as part of the 
graduate course “Women and Politics in the Americas.” Dr. Victoria E. Rodríguez led the 
research during the academic year 2013–2014 at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs 
at The University of Texas at Austin. The report analyzes the extent of women’s engagement in 
political activities in the executive branch of government throughout the Americas, and is 
divided in two main sections. The first examines women’s representation worldwide and sets the 
international context for the Americas analysis. The second section focuses on specific case 
studies of women who have held executive power in the Americas. The report concludes by 
pulling together the main findings of the individual case studies and assessing the common 







The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs has established interdisciplinary research on 
policy problems as the core of its educational program. A major part of this program is the nine-
month policy research project, in the course of which one or more faculty members direct the 
research of ten to twenty graduate students of diverse backgrounds on a policy issue of concern 
to a government or nonprofit agency. This “client orientation” brings the students face-to-face 
with administrators, legislators, and other officials active in the policy process and demonstrates 
that research in a policy environment demands special talents. It also illuminates the occasional 
difficulties of relating research findings to the world of political realities. 
This project, which took place during the 2013–2014 academic year, is the first of its kind to be 
conducted at the LBJ School. The research builds on an extensive body of scholarly work on 
women’s political representation worldwide, but is unique in that it is the first attempt to 
systematically study the presence and performance of women in the executive branch of 
government, as the vast majority of scholarly work on gender and politics has to date focused on 
the legislative branch. This project is also unique because it goes beyond analyzing the rise of 
women to political power by tracing their career trajectories; instead, it focuses on the policy 
agendas and policy priorities of the women holding the top political office in their respective 
countries. The focus on policy agendas and policy analysis is consonant with the priorities and 
mission of the LBJ School, and we are proud to open a new avenue of policy research and 
analysis with this report. 
The curriculum of the LBJ School is intended not only to develop effective public servants, but 
also to produce research that will enlighten and inform those already engaged in the policy 
process. The project that resulted in this report has helped to accomplish the first task; it is our 
hope that the report itself will contribute to the second. 
Finally, it should be noted that neither the LBJ School nor The University of Texas at Austin 









Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the three largest countries in South America 
have elected female presidents: Michelle Bachelet governed Chile from 2006 to 2010 and 
was reelected for a second term from 2014 to 2018; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was 
elected to the presidency of Argentina in 2007 and then reelected for a second term in 
2011; and Dilma Rousseff was elected president of Brazil in 2010, then reelected for a 
second term in 2014. In Central America, Laura Chinchilla served as president of Costa 
Rica from 2010 to 2014. That these women have reached the highest and most visible 
political office in their respective countries may lead the average observer to conclude 
that women have reached full political representation and have leveled gender imbalances 
in political institutions. This research project seeks to ascertain if this is actually the case. 
This report is based on individual and group research efforts and is the culmination of a 
two-semester group research project as part of the graduate course “Women and Politics 
in the Americas,” led by Dr. Victoria E. Rodríguez during the academic year 2013–2014 
at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. 
The policy research project seeks to analyze the extent of women’s engagement in 
political activities in the executive branch of government throughout the Americas. The 
authors of this report carve out a space within the literature to answer these questions: 
How are women elected to the head executive position? And, upon being elected, do 
women govern differently than their male counterparts? The overall purpose of this 
project is to make a scholarly contribution to the literature on women in executive power. 
Structure of the Report 
The present report is divided in two main sections: the first part provides an international 
contextualization, followed by a more complex analysis of female leadership in the 
Americas. The chapters in this first part describe women’s worldwide political 
representation, examining the establishment and impact of quota legislation and assessing 
efforts to institute corporate and political parity in specific regions.  
Following the international context, the report narrows its focus to the Americas. The 
second part of the report contains the six case studies in the Americas, which support the 
conclusions reached in the final chapter. For comparative purposes, each case study uses 
the same analytical framework to examine the impact of female leadership in the country. 
Over half of the countries included in this report currently have or until very recently had 
female heads of states: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica. The case studies that 
investigate countries that do not have women as head of state or government—Canada, 
the United States, and Mexico—examine female leaders at the provincial or state level to 
assess the impact of female leadership in the executive branch in the region.  
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The final chapter of the report explores common themes in the descriptive, substantive, 
and symbolic value of female leadership in the Americas. Here the authors present the 
major findings of the report, drawing comparisons between women in executive 
leadership across the Americas. 
Methodology and Literature Review 
In the past thirty years, there has been considerable discussion and analysis in the 
academic literature of the role of women in social movements, as well as the ability of 
these movements to institutionalize or mainstream gender issues. Other scholarly 
publications have focused on the roles of individual women in power in enacting 
legislation that supports the particular needs of women, and have assessed their success 
or failure to do so as being indicative women’s ability to lead in general. While political 
biographies of contemporary female leaders are plentiful, there is little published which 
connects all three of these areas of study; this report connects women in power to their 
national context and discusses their policy agendas holistically, rather than from an 
exclusively gendered perspective. Much of the study of female leadership has 
emphasized the differences between normative male leadership and female leadership, or 
has sought to identify the transformational symbolic power of women in the executive. 
This report finds that such narrow assessments of female leadership are limiting to this 
burgeoning field of study. Ultimately, the authors hope to add substantively to the 
discussion of female leadership by redefining it within the current global context.  
Literature on Women’s and Social Movements 
This report begins by assessing social and women’s movements on the global scale, and 
evaluating the impact of popular social change on altering the gendered composition and 
agenda setting of governments and institutions. Amrita Basu’s work
 
on local feminisms is 
an essential component of this report’s framework. She discusses the challenge of 
ascribing a single notion of “women’s movements” or “feminism” by analyzing 
feminisms and women’s movements across the globe.1 This report carefully avoids 
making assumptions about the nature of women’s movements in broad terms, describing 
them on a national, as opposed to transnational, level. 
A number of scholars who focus on women’s movements in Latin America have been 
particularly helpful in contextualizing the leaders studied in this project. Miller and others 
trace the history of women’s movements in general terms,2 but the literature on the nature 
                                                 
1 Amrita Basu, ed., Women’s Movements in the Global Era: The Power of Local Feminisms (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2010); Amrita Basu, The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women’s Movements in Global 
Perspective, Social Change in Global Perspective (Westview Press, 1995). 
2 Francesca Miller, Latin American Women and the Search for Social Justice (Lebanon, NH: University 
Press of New England, 1991). 
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of women’s movements in Latin America tends to focus on women’s protest movements 
countering authoritarianism, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Social 
movements and the evolution of democracy in Latin America are the subjects of a 
considerable number of scholarly works; the authors of this report found the work of 
Escobar and Alvarez to be particularly helpful in understanding the complex social 
movements of the region.3 Other authors, like Alvarez, offer case-specific analyses of the 
role of gender and women’s movements in redemocratization processes in countries in 
which military dictatorship repressed civil rights until the 1980s.4
 
Seminal works on the role of women in democratic transformation have been essential to 
the authors’ understanding of modern women’s movements. These highly influential 
works interpret the role of women’s movements in the process of redemocratization, and 
evaluate the transformational power of those movements on the current political 
landscape. These authors link current female representation—or lack thereof—to the 
relationship between the nascent democratic state and women’s movements.5 
Literature on Women in Power 
Alongside the body of literature on women’s and social movements in the Americas, this 
report draws heavily on literature on women in governmental leadership. Bauer and 
Tremblay
 
offer a comparative regional approach to women in executive power (both at 
the national level and cabinet levels),6 and Genovese offers a global overview of the 
patterns that have characterized women’s “rise to power.”7 Farida Jalalzai’s 2013 work, 
Shattered, Cracked, or Firmly Intact? Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling 
Worldwide gives us an excellent picture of female paths to executive power in the past 
decade. Her comparative analysis and broad-stroke approach to analyzing successful 
                                                 
3 Arturo Escobar, The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy, 
ed. Sonia E. Alvarez, Series in Political Economy and Economic Development in Latin America (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1992). 
4 Sonia E. Alvarez, Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women’s Movements in Transition Politics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). See also Cecilia M. B. Sardenberg, “Contemporary 
Feminisms in Brazil: Achievements, Shortcomings, and Challenges,” in Women’s Movements in the Global 
Era: The Power of Local Feminisms, ed. Amrita Basu (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010). 
5 Jane Jaquette and Sharon Wolchick, Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern 
Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
6 Gretchen Bauer and Manon Tremblay, eds., Women in Executive Power: A Global Overview, Routledge 
Research in Comparative Politics 38 (Abingdon, UK; New York: Routledge, 2011). 
7 Michael A. Genovese, ed., Women As National Leaders (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993). 
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female presidential bids provide ample background for the in-depth regional analyses 
provided in this report.8  
Bauer and Tremblay develop a framework to analyze female heads of state (Presidents or 
Prime Ministers) and cabinet members across nine world regions: the Arab States, 
Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, South and Southeast Asia, Oceania, Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Nordic countries, North America, and Latin America. Their book 
introduces each region with an overview of historical trends in women’s political 
participation, and then presents country-specific case studies. Each case study looks at the 
nature of the political regime; the evolution of female presence within the cabinet; 
sociocultural, economic, and political factors that explain female participation in 
government; and the impact of women in setting the policy agendas. One of Bauer and 
Tremblay’s most useful insights for the purpose of this report is their warning regarding 
the utility of the “contagion effect,” evidenced by the high variance within regions and 
subregions across case studies and regional overviews.9 Such insight strengthened this 
report’s emphasis on the specific sociocultural and political histories in each country. 
Genovese’s edited volume, and particularly his chapter, “Women As National Leaders: 
What do we know?” provides an overview of common patterns of women in the 
executive, and draws parallels in national context, path to executive power, and 
performance in office.10 Genovese’s work dates from 1993 and therefore does not include 
in its analysis the high number of women in power since the early 1990s. However, it 
does provide a framework for looking at women as leaders around the globe, and informs 
this report, especially regarding useful variables for analyzing women’s ascent to power: 
country context, relations to their parents and other family members, nature of political 
regimes, and background. 
Most recently, Farida Jalalzai (2013) published a book analyzing the historical paucity of 
successful female presidential campaigns. Jalalzai develops a complex and focused 
approach on the successes and failures of the “paths to power” of female presidential 
candidates. Her work gave the authors of this report an excellent foundation for our 
policy-focused analysis of the substantive agendas of women who are elected. Although 
Jalalzai’s work is the most recent relevant literature, the political landscape shifts quickly. 
Her research ended in 2010, before the elections of either Chile’s Michelle Bachelet (for 
the second time) or Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff, two of the central case studies in this work. 
                                                 
8 Farida Jalalzai, Shattered, Cracked or Firmly Intact? Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). See also Rainbow Murray, Cracking the Highest 
Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office (Santa Barbara, CA: 
Praeger, 2010).  
9 Bauer and Tremblay, Women in Executive Power. 
10 Genovese, Women As National Leaders. 
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Genovese’s, Bauer and Tremblay’s, and Jalalzai’s works offer little in the way of 
understanding the dearth of female heads of state in Canada, the United States, and 
Mexico. While no woman has held the top executive position in any of these countries, 
some literature is dedicated to linking popular feminisms to women in public life, 
including Rodríguez’s work on Mexico. In Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics, 
she contextualizes the obstacles and struggles that women in Mexican politics have faced 
with a detailed account of the various women’s movements, their historical participation 
and struggles in the country, as well as their role in critical national and international 
events such as the student movement of 1968, the economic crises of the 1980s, and the 
United Nations’ Beijing Conference in 1995.11 The specificity of the information 
provided in this study of women in Mexican politics illustrated the need to include in this 
report an insight into each country’s women’s movements, as well as the political and 
social contexts in which the women in executive power studied here have risen to power. 
The existent literature tends to be case- or country-specific. It does not provide a 
comparative analysis of current female heads of state, female cabinet members, or female 
governors in the Americas. This report offers a methodology for comparative analysis 
between these leaders, transnationally and transculturally. While Sykes and others have 
begun to consider ways to analyze female leadership, the cultural constructions of “Iron 
Ladies” and “Mothers” are still prevalent.12 Ultimately, our research highlights a space in 
the literature that the authors hope to begin to fill. With this report we hope to show that 
women govern complex global societies, and they do so in complex ways, much like their 
male counterparts. 
Case Study Literature 
The second part of the report uses a common framework to draw parallels between 
female leaders. The case studies presented in this section are all based on the analytical 
foundation that includes information on the leader’s background and personal history, her 
path to politics, and her respective administration’s policies and controversies. This 
framework is divided into three parts which analyze different forms of representation: 
descriptive, substantive, and symbolic. 
The subsection on descriptive representation analyzes the political structure, women’s 
historical representation, and broader societal factors that affect the presence of female 
leaders in the case study countries. This subsection also incorporates the specific political 
and personal influences that aided in each female executive’s political journey. 
Substantive representation covers the major policy platforms on which female executives 
                                                 
11 Victoria E. Rodríguez, Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2003). 
12 Patricia Lee Sykes, “Women As National Leaders: Patterns and Prospects,” in Women As National 
Leaders, ed. Michael A. Genovese (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), 219–29. 
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campaigned and the major policy agendas they advanced while in office. The last 
subsection, symbolic representation, assesses the effects that women’s leadership have 
had on citizens’ perceptions of women in politics and their perception of the state of 
democracy in their respective countries.  
Krook’s 2010 work “Studying Political Representation: A Comparative-Gendered 
Approach” outlines the general framework used in this report for the country case studies. 
Krook divides the analysis of women as political leaders into the three broad categories 
of representation mentioned above: descriptive, substantive, and symbolic; each section 
looks at specific factors and dimensions related to women in political office in specific 
countries, without using a cross-national angle.13 This report moves away from this 
isolated structure by making comparisons across the case studies and exploring common 
themes. Krook also employs a gender lens in the discussion, emphasizing the concept of 
constructed gender identities as a spectrum between masculine and feminine, rather than 
a male/female binary.14 This report’s analysis of women leaders follows Krook’s 
framework and offers a comprehensive analysis of each case across all three dimensions. 
Descriptive Analysis 
As discussed above in the “Women in Power” literature, both Bauer and Tremblay’s and 
Genovese’s works call attention to key variables affecting female leaders’ access to 
power. Jalalzai’s work also describes challenges women face in their access to power, 
including the strength of the executive branch and patriarchal culture. All of these authors 
emphasize social, cultural, and institutional barriers to power. While useful for framing 
our descriptive sections in that they look into institutional and cultural variables present 
in specific countries and relate them to women’s presence in executive office, these 
works lack insight into the specific dynamics in the Americas, and into the ways in which 
each country’s characteristics interact to hinder or facilitate women’s access to office. 
The discussion of executive cabinets and their relationship with gender is well 
documented in the literature. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson affirm that there 
appear to be particular patterns to “gendered” cabinet appointments in Latin America.15 
Though the lengths of careers of both men and women are similar, disparities appear 
when examining the types of ministries men and women are appointed to. Women most 
often hold lower-prestige ministerial positions within a “feminine” policy domain. Krook 
and O’Brien continue this research, and propose that the presence of women in cabinets 
is closely correlated to gender equality on a societal level, and female participation in 
                                                 
13 Mona Lena Krook, “Studying Political Representation: A Comparative-Gendered Approach,” 
Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (March 2010): 233–40. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Maria Escobar-Lemmon and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, “Getting to the Top: Career Paths of 
Women in Latin American Cabinets,” Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 4 (December 2009): 685–99. 
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higher levels of government. They find that the presence of other women in elite 
positions accounts for the majority of observations of female cabinet appointees. In 
addition, Krook and O’Brien develop a Gender Power Score (GPS) to quantify the degree 
to which parity has been achieved in the countries studied. The GPS combines the 
gender, prestige, and gender balance of cabinet positions16 and strongly influenced the 
way in which cabinets are examined in this report. 
Mendelberg, Karpowitz, and Goedert link descriptive and substantive representation and 
evaluate female participation solely on the number of women in elected positions. As the 
numbers of women in elected government grow, so, too, does the power of women to 
give voice to topics of traditional female concern, including children and the poor.17
 
Substantive Analysis 
Genovese’s “Women As National Leaders: What Do We Know?” was key in framing the 
understanding of the substantive sections in the case studies. This work looks into the 
“policy consequences” and the “performance in office” of women in executive power. 
Firstly, Genovese finds that there are no clear patterns among the policies women have 
implemented, and that they have varied widely across ideological and political spectrums. 
Secondly, Genovese asserts that evaluating female leaders is more complex because they 
have to overcome prejudice and discrimination, and that the small sample of female 
executives available makes a holistic analysis of female leadership impossible.18 These 
key insights into women’s performance in office influenced the authors’ approach to the 
substantive section. To avoid assuming “what women in office should do” while in 
power, we assess their performance by looking at specific policy arenas. 
The methodology applied by Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter aims to analyze 
comparatively some leftist governments in Latin America, but lessons can be learned and 
applied in the context of this report. Their breakdown of policy analysis into the three 
arenas of economic, social, and political provides a solid foundation from which to 
evaluate the policy outputs of executive leaders. Furthermore, Weyland et al. ground their 
exploration of policy achievements in the culture of the countries studied, ensuring the 
analysis is not tainted by Western ideals of “good” policy.19 This report seeks to employ 
                                                 
16 Mona Lena Krook and Diana Z. O’Brien, “All the President’s Men? The Appointment of Female 
Cabinet Ministers Worldwide,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 3 (July 2012): 840–55. 
17 Tali Mendelberg, Christopher F. Karpowitz, and Nicholas Goedert, “Does Descriptive Representation 
Facilitate Women’s Distinctive Voice? How Gender Composition and Decision Rules Affect Deliberation,” 
American Journal of Political Science 58, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 291–306. 
18 Michael A. Genovese, “Women As National Leaders: What Do We Know?” (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 
1993): 211–218. 
19 Kurt G. Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, eds., Leftist Governments in Latin America: 
Successes and Shortcomings (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 26 
the Weyland et al. methodology for our own policy analysis, including providing the 
appropriate cultural context for the assessment of our female leaders’ policy 
achievements. 
Symbolic Analysis  
Genovese and Thompson provide a means by which to assess the symbolic power of 
leadership. The analysis of leadership focuses on leaders’ level of influence, or how these 
individuals are able to bring people to their cause through their use of opportunity and 
skill. Genovese and Thompson hypothesize not only that women are viewed differently 
from men in terms of leadership, but also that gender fundamentally influences the way 
in which women lead. They discover, however, that the characteristics and qualities of 
leadership remain the same regardless of gender; the difference occurs in how these 
female leaders are perceived by the public and, in turn, how public opinion might shift 
the tone of leadership.20 In subsequent sections of the report this lens is further applied to 
the discussion of women leaders. 
Sykes helps to fill in the largely empty space of analyzing women’s national leadership, 
positing the idea of a transformational feminist leader. Such a female leader, Sykes 
proposes, will not only motivate followers to take up and promote her agenda, but will 
also inspire progress in feminist causes.21 As such causes are typically partisan in most 
nations, this report cautiously uses Sykes’s framework within a broader, culturally 
competent context. In addition to the concept of a transformational, feminist leader, 
Sykes comes to another conclusion that this report seeks to explore: as researchers 
continue to search for similarities amongst women leaders, and are generally 
unsuccessful, perhaps the new approach should compare men and women simply as 
leaders, irrespective of gender.22 
Sources 
The research conducted for the present report included secondary source review and 
analysis, as well as the use of important databases, such as Latinobarómetro public 
opinion surveys and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) data on women’s representation 
worldwide. 
Latinobarómetro is a political climate survey conducted annually in eighteen Latin 
American countries. Latinobarómetro provides an online analysis tool with information 
confined to the years 1995 to 2011, which was used for this report. Some 
                                                 
20 Michael A. Genovese and Seth Thompson, “Women As Chief Executives: Does Gender Matter?” in 
Women As National Leaders, ed. Michael A. Genovese (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993), 1–12. 
21 Sykes, “Women As National Leaders: Patterns and Prospects,” 219–29. 
22 Ibid. 
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Latinobarómetro questions change over time and country. This source, though imperfect, 
provides an overarching comparison within and between countries. 
The IPU has been the most fruitful source for global data on women in politics. The 
IPU’s PARLINE offers world rankings of women in parliament, plus information on 
political institutions, leadership, statistics, and electoral systems. The Quota Project, run 
by the IPU in conjunction with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (International IDEA) and the University of Stockholm, provides overviews of 
quota legislation, political systems, and national female political participation by country. 
UN Women uses data from the IPU to report on the status of women in politics at the 
national, regional, and global level. As part of their mission to strengthen democratic 
legitimacy and increase inclusivity, the International IDEA, permanent observer to the 
UN, also provides comparative analysis on gender diversity. 
A similar type of data focusing solely on the United States is available from the Center 
for American Women and Politics (CAWP), of the Eagleton Institute of Politics at 
Rutgers University. CAWP combines quantitative information with research into 
women’s paths to power, the gender gap in voting, and the relationship between gender 
and policy concerns. The quantitative analysis team of the class project created the charts 
and tables for each section of this report. The same group created graphs depicting the 
results of the Latinobarómetro survey for each of the case studies featuring a Latin 
American country. Additionally, they compiled data and created geographic information 
system (GIS) maps illustrating trends in women’s representation and the impact of quota 






Chapter 2: The Statistics: Women Holding Political Office 
Since 1950 
At the turn of the twentieth century, women could vote in New Zealand (beginning in 
1893), and they could stand for election in the United States, but nowhere else did they 
have these rights. It was not until the late 1910s and into the 1920s that women in North 
America and Europe began securing suffrage in significant numbers. Latin American 
nations granted women this right at various points throughout the 1930s, ‘40s, and ‘50s, 
whereas female enfranchisement in Africa was concentrated in the 1960s. The global 
pattern of women gaining the right to stand for election closely mirrors the pattern of 
enfranchisement.  
Both national and regional movements and events influenced when these milestones 
occurred in different places, and when they translated into increased rates of political 
representation for women. In Northern Europe and Anglophone countries, the suffragette 
movements and World War I had an important impact on gaining these rights; then 
World War II, followed by the Women’s Movement, engendered societal shifts that led 
to increased female political participation. In Africa and Asia these developments were 
shaped by liberation from colonial rule. For Russia and the states of the former Soviet 
Union, the Bolshevik revolution and socialist movements catalyzed women’s 
introduction into political life. In Latin America, the struggle against dictatorships and the 
fight for human rights brought women into the political arena.  
Despite the gains of the twentieth century, at the beginning of the twenty-first, women 
still lag well behind men in political representation. As of January 2014, the global 
average for national legislatures was 21.8% women,23 and only 5.9% of heads of state 
and 7.8% of heads of government were women.24
 
Traditionally, women’s parliamentary representation has been used as the main criterion 
to measure women’s political participation from a comparative perspective. Using the 
2014 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) women’s representation data, Nordic countries 
lead the rankings with women constituting 42.1% of members of parliament, followed by 
the Americas with 25.2%. European women, excluding the Nordic countries, account for 
on average 23.5% of their national parliaments, while Sub-Saharan African women are 
slightly above the world average with a 22.9% representation in parliament. The Arab 
States have reached 17.8% women in parliament, a striking number that represents an 
                                                 
23 Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments," accessed February 1, 2014, 
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm.  
24 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Politics: 2014,” accessed March 11, 2014, 
http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap14_en.pdf.  
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increase of 6 percentage points in two years. The Pacific region has the lowest female 
parliamentary representation with 13.4%.25 Women’s 2014 representation in parliaments, 
it is worth noting, has increased in every region compared with the 2013 data.26 Globally, 
15% of presiding officers in parliament are women.27  
While the world average of women members of Parliament is 21.8%, some countries 
stand out with over 50% women. Women account for almost 64% of Rwanda’s Lower 
House, almost 14 percentage points more than Andorra (50%), the second country 
leading in women’s representation in parliament. The country with the third greatest 
representation of women in parliament is Cuba, with almost 49%.28 
Table 1: Women’s Political Representation Worldwide 



















Rwanda 1 63.8 38.5 39.3 13 No 
Andorra 2 50 Na 22.2 39 No 
Cuba 3 48.9 Na 22.6 37 No information 
Sweden 4 45 Na 56.5 2 No 
South Africa 5 44.8 34 37.1 16 No 
Seychelles 6 43.8 NA 23.1 35 No 
Senegal 7 43.3 NA 16.1 51 No 
Finland 8 42.5 NA 50 3 No 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments: World and Regional Averages,” accessed 




Ecuador 9 41.6 NA 22.2 39 Yes 
Belgium 10 41.3 39.4 41.7 10 No 
Nicaragua 11 40.2 NA 57.1 1 Yes 
Iceland 12 39.7 NA 37.5 15 No 
Spain “ 39.7 33.5 30.8 26 No 
Norway 13 39.6 NA 47.1 5 No 
Mozambique 14 39.2 NA 28.6 29 No 
Denmark 15 39.1 NA 45.5 7 No 
Netherlands 16 38.7 36 46.7 6 No 
Costa Rica 17 38.6 NA 25 34 Yes 
Timor-Leste 18 38.5 NA 11.8 67 No 
Mexico 19 37.4 34.4 17.6 48 Yes 
Angola 20 36.8 NA 19.4 44 Yes 
Argentina 21 36.6 38.9 17.6 48 Yes 
Portugal 32 31.3 NA 21.4 41 No 
El Salvador 47 26.2 NA 7.1 80 Yes 
Honduras 49 25.8 NA 17.6 48 Yes 
Bolivia 51 25.4 47.2 33.3 20 Yes 
Peru 66 22.3 NA 44.4 8 Yes 
Dominican 
Republic 
71 20.8 9.4 16 52 Yes 
United States 83 18.3 20 31.8 23 No 
Venezuela 86 17 NA 16.1 51 No 
Chile 90 15.8 18.4 39.1 14 No 
Paraguay 93 15 20 25 34 Yes 
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Guatemala 101 13.3 NA 26.7 31 No 
Bahamas 102 13.2 25 19 45 No 
Uruguay 103 13.1 6.5 14.3 60 Yes 
Dominica 105 12.9 NA 15.4 55 No 
Colombia 108 12.1 16 31.3 25 Yes 
Brazil 124 8.6 16 25.6 33 Yes 
Panama 125 8.5 NA 31.6 24 Yes 
Haiti 135 4.2 0 35 19 Yes 
Belize 138 3.1 38.5 13.3 62 No 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on 2014 IPU data and Quota Project. 
In the executive branch, women are noticeably underrepresented. Only 5.9% of head of 
state positions are occupied by women, and 7.8% heads of government are women. 
Women’s representation in cabinet positions varies across the globe. Only three countries 
comprise more than 50% women in ministerial positions: Nicaragua (57.1%), Sweden 
(56.5%) and Finland (50%), while eight countries do not have any women holding 
cabinet positions (among them Ukraine and Bahamas). The presence of a female head of 
state or government does not necessarily correlate with the appointment of women to 
ministerial positions. Yingluck Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand (2011—2014), 
had only 8.3% women in ministerial positions through May 2014; Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, President of Argentina (2007–present), only has 17.6% female cabinet 
appointments; Prime Minister of Norway Erna Solberg, on the other hand, appointed 
women in more than 45% of the cabinet positions.29  
Regarding the ministries these women lead, the concentration is in ministries regarded as 
“feminine”: Social Affairs (105 women in this position), Family/ Children/ Youth/ 
Elderly/ Disabled (82 women), and Women’s Affairs/ Gender Equality (71 women) 
among others. Despite this, women do occupy positions considered to be “masculine” as 
well: 45 women hold Foreign Affairs ministries, 31 lead Agriculture/Food/Forestry/ 
Fishing ministries, and 24 women are in charge of Budget or Finance ministries.30 Thus, 
women occupy a diverse range of ministerial positions, while still being concentrated in 
portfolios described as feminine. 




Regional Case Studies 
While the focus of this work is on women in executive power in the Americas, we briefly 
examine successful female political participation in other regions. Via quota laws and 
recent cultural shifts that place new importance on women’s political participation, the 
Nordic countries and Sub-Saharan Africa have reached relatively high proportions of 
women in politics. The Arab countries have had traditionally lower percentages of female 
representation, but some countries have recently passed quotas to increase women’s 
participation. An overview of regions that are leading and trailing globally is presented 
below.  
Nordic Countries 
The women of Scandinavia were some of the first to secure the right to vote and stand for 
election, and they continued to be trendsetters throughout the twentieth century. As early 
as the 1970s, Swedish political parties recognized the importance of women’s 
involvement in politics and became proactive about increasing this involvement. In 1972 
the Liberal Party voluntarily implemented a 40% quota for its candidates, and the other 
political parties all followed suit with either quotas or targets of their own.31 With the 
exception of Finland, there are quotas throughout Scandinavia. As a result, Sweden, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark all have levels of female parliamentary 
representation around 40%, and two of the five have achieved parity in their cabinets.32 
The region boasts the world’s first and longest-serving democratically elected female 
head of state: President Vigdís Finnbogadóttir (1980–1996) of Iceland, and another seven 
female chief executives since her: Iceland’s Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir 
(2009–2013); Norway’s Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (1990–1996) and 
incumbent Prime Minister Erna Solberg (2013–); Finland’s President Tarja Halonen 
(2000–2006), Prime Minister Anneli Jäätteenmäki (April–June 2003), and Prime Minister 
Mari Kiviniemi (2010–2011); and Denmark’s current Prime Minister Helle Thorning-
Schmidt (2011–). The Nordic countries’ inclusive approach to women’s political 




Traditionally, women’s political participation in Arab countries has been relatively low, 
hovering around 18% in the legislative branch.34 Some posited explanations for this trend 
                                                 
31 IDEA, Sweden: Women’s Representation in Parliament (Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2006), http://www.idea.int/news/upload/sweden_women.pdf. 
32 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Politics: 2014.” 
33 IDEA, Sweden: Women’s Representation in Parliament. 
34 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Politics: 2014.” 
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include the ’male-dominated culture in Arab countries, as well as a marked separation 
between the public and private spheres, and a low percentage of educated women.35 
Several countries have adopted quota laws, noted in Table 2, to improve women’s 
participation in their national legislatures, with some of those attempts being more 
successful than others, as in the case of Algeria and Tunisia. 
Table 2: Legislature and Ministerial Participation in Arab Countries 
World 
Rank 


















29 Algeria 31.6 6.9 12.1 66 Yes 
39 Tunisia 28.1 - 3.7 90 Yes 
53 Iraq 25.2 - 3.7 90 Yes 
“ Mauritania 25.2 14.3 13 63 Yes 
57 Sudan 24.3 17.2 16.1 51 Yes 
75 Saudi Arabia 19.9 - 0 97 Yes 
85 United Arab 
Emirates 
17.5 - 15.4 55 No information 
86 Morocco 17 2.2 15.8 53 Yes 
88 Libya 16.5 - 3.6 91 Yes 
- Palestine 14.8 - 8.3 - No information 
109 Syria 12 - 8.8 75 No information 
" Jordan 12 12 11.1 69 Yes 
119 Bahrain 10 27.5 14.8 58 No information 
131 Kuwait 4,6 - 6.7 81 No information 
138 Lebanon 3.1 - 0 97 No 
                                                 
35 Rowaida Al Maaitah et al., “Arab Women and Political Development,” Journal of International 
Women’s Studies 12, no. 3 (March 2012): 7–26. 
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142 Oman 1.2 18.1 6.7 81 No information 
143 Yemen 0.3 1.8 8.8 75 No information 
144 Qatar 0 - 5 87 No information 
- Egypt No Parliament No 
Parliament 
10.3 71 Yes 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IPU 2014 data and Quota Project. 
However, in the 2011 Arab Spring, women had an important leadership role in the 
uprisings against the region’s authoritarian regimes.36 Women’s political participation 
continued to be relatively low in 2012, with an average of 11.3% of women in 
parliament.37 Surprisingly, in 2013 and 2014, women’s legislative participation rose to 
17.8% for the region.38
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
In the past twenty years, female political representation in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
increased significantly. Women hold more than 20% of seats in national parliaments in 
six Sub-Saharan countries.39 Notably, Rwanda has more women in parliament than any 
other country in the world: 63% of members are female.40 Three countries in the region 
have elected female heads of state: Liberia’s Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (President, elected 
2006), Malawi’s Joyce Banda (President, assumed office in 2012), and Senegal’s 
Aminata Touré (Prime Minister, elected 2013). 
Women gained the right to vote and run for public office during the democratization of 
the region, which occurred from the 1950s through the 1970s. Since 1990, there has been 




                                                 
36 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in Parliament in 2011. The Year in Perspective (Stockholm: Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 2011), http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnpersp11-e.pdf. 
37 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Politics: 2012,” (Stockholm: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2012), 
http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap12_en.pdf. 
38 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments: World and Regional Averages.” 
39 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Politics: 2014.” 
40 Ibid. 
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Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. [Note: In 2003, Rwanda held democratic elections for the first time 
since the beginning of the Civil War in 1990; as such, no data is available between 1990 and 2003. 
The black lines that run perpendicular to Rwanda are Malawi.]  
The successful passage of recent quota laws in Sub-Saharan Africa is representative of a 
new attitude surrounding women’s political participation in the region: “There’s a general 
understanding and appreciation that if things are going to be better in Africa, women are 
going to have a key role,” noted Aloysia Inyumba, Rwanda’s former Minister for 
Gender.41 Women’s relatively high regional representation has been popularly attributed 
to a combination of legislative and socioeconomic factors.  
                                                 




The regional focus on female representation is exemplified in the case of Rwanda. 
Above-parity female representation is the result of successful implementation of a 30% 
quota law in all governing bodies, enforced in conjunction with a governmental mandate 
for the strengthening of gender ministries and a gender-progressive constitution. These 
policies directed at higher parliamentary representation are rooted in the success of 
women in informal community leadership roles during the 1994 genocide and subsequent 
stabilization, where they gained experience and political legitimacy. These leadership 
positions gradually lead to more formal roles in local and national government after the 
close of the conflict.42
 
The Americas: Trends, Chief Executives, Legislatures  
Women’s parliamentary representation in the Americas stands at 25.2%, the second 
highest regional average of representation in the world, next to the Nordic countries.43 
Women in North America gained suffrage in the early part of the twentieth century, and 
suffrage became widespread across the Americas during the 1950s through to the 1970s. 
The three largest South American countries, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, and three 
Central American countries, Costa Rica, Panama, and Nicaragua, have elected a female 
head of state.  
The United States and Canada 
Despite substantial developments in women’s and feminist movements in the past thirty 
years, proportional representation of women in the US government has grown slowly. In 
1979, women represented just 3% of the US Congress, and 10% of state legislatures. As 
of 2013, women occupied 24% of seats in state legislatures in the United States.44 In 
2013, the United States ranked seventy-ninth in terms of female representation at the 
national level, tied with Albania.45
 
The 2012 elections resulted in the highest level of female representation in US 
congressional history. Nancy Pelosi, the first female Speaker of the House, is now the 
minority leader. Women now occupy 18% of congressional positions on the national 
level; 20% in the Senate. This 20% representation is roughly representative of mayoral 
representation in cities over 30,000 (18%), and in statewide executive offices (23%). In 
2013, there were five female governors of US states, and thirty-five women have served 
                                                 
42 Roxane Wilber, “Lessons from Rwanda: How Women Transform Governance,” Solutions 2, no. 2 
(February 2011), http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/887. 
43 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Politics: 2014.” 
44 Center for American Women and Politics, Women in Elective Office 2013 (Center for American Women 
and Politics, 2013), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/elective13.pdf. 
45 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Parliaments: World Classification,” accessed November 30, 
2013, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. 
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as governors in US history.46 Quota laws, which have encouraged female representation 
in other parts of the Americas, have been notably absent from the US, which has not yet 
seen a female president.  
Women gained the right to vote in Canada in 1917, and the right to run for office in 1921. 
In that year, Agnes Macphail was elected into the Canadian House of Commons. It is 
worth noting that while women were granted suffrage in 1917, Treaty Indian women did 
not gain the right to vote until 1960. As of 2012, women represented 21% of elected 
positions in Canadian provincial and territorial government.47
 
Kim Campbell was briefly appointed as the Prime Minister of Canada from June to 
November of 1993, as the first and only female Prime Minister to date. In the 2011 
elections, seventy-six women (24.6%) were elected to the House of Commons, the 
highest number in Canadian history.48 Despite relatively low female representation at the 
federal level, provincial and territorial executive branch representation has nearly reached 
parity. In 2013, there were six female provincial and territorial premiers holding office. 
Canada’s four most populous provinces (Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, and 
Alberta) were governed by women. As such, a female premier governed 85% of 
Canadians.49
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Women’s movements in Latin America, specifically in countries ruled by military 
dictatorships in the 1970s, derived political and social authority from Marianist notions of 
motherhood. These movements, including the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza 
the Mayo in Argentina, the Comadres in El Salvador, and others, served as an avenue for 
women to enter the public sphere. In addition, quotas and a general move toward the 
political left have created a cultural recognition of the importance of women’s 
representation over the past twenty years. There has been significant progress on myriad 
                                                 
46 Center for American Women and Politics, Statewide Elective Executive Women 2013, (Center for 
American Women and Politics, 2013), 
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/stwide13.pdf. 
47 Catalyst, “Women in Government,” Knowledge Center, February 13, 2013, 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-government. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Fazley Siddiq, “Female Premiers: From Rita Johnston to Kathleen Wynne — and Beyond,” Vancouver 




gender and family issues, including political participation, education, childcare, and 
domestic violence laws, but abortion access is heavily restricted.50
 
Women have been elected as heads of state or government in six countries; twelve 
women have held chief executive power in the region. Notably, Argentina and Brazil 
both currently have female heads of state, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Dilma 
Rousseff respectively. Chile’s Michelle Bachelet assumed her second nonconsecutive 
term as President in March 2014, after winning a landslide victory in the runoff elections 
of December of 2013. 
Cuba and Ecuador are good examples of countries that have advanced in terms of women 
representation in the legislative branch. Cuba ranks third in the world for women’s 
representation in parliament (2013) and Ecuador reformed its electoral code (2009) and 
constitution (2010) to contain new quota laws that resulted in 39% of women being 
elected for their National Assembly in 2013. However, although women’s political 
representation in the Cuban legislature is one of the highest in the world, women are 
highly underrepresented in the highest ranks of the Communist Party and the 
government. Only 7% of the Communist Party Politburo members, 14% of the Party 
Secretariat, and 22% of the Council of Ministers are women.51 In Ecuador, the 
representation of women in the legislature is approaching proportionality, but is far from 
equal across ethnic groups: indigenous women continue to be significantly 
underrepresented. Ecuador has yet to elect a female President.  
The Americas Country Case Studies
 
Argentina 
Argentinian women gained the right to vote and stand for election in 1947. The figure of 
Eva Duarte de Perón, better known as Evita, wife of Argentinian President Juan Domingo 
Perón, is emblematic of women’s political participation. She publicly advocated for 
women’s right to vote, created the Women’s Peronist Party, and promoted women’s 
empowerment and social protection.52 In 1974 Isabel Martínez de Perón, Juan Domingo 
Perón’s third wife and Argentina’s Vice President, was appointed as the first female 
President in Argentina following her husband’s death. However, her presidency faced 
several economic and political problems, and a military coup forced her out of power in 
                                                 
50 Mala Htun and Jennifer M. Piscopo, “Presence without Empowerment?: Women in Politics in Latin 




52 Pablo Vásquez, “Evita and Women’s Participation in Politics,” July 2007, 
http://www.evitaperon.org/evita_peron_instituto.htm. 
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1976.53 During the ensuing dictatorship, Argentine women’s social movements, 
especially the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza the Mayo, increased women’s 
participation and visibility in the public sphere.  
In 1991 Argentina was the first country in the Americas to adopt quota laws to promote 
women’s participation in the legislature. The quota was established at 30% for the Lower 
House, and, given its success, a 30% Upper House quota was incorporated in 2001.54 
Current levels of representation reach 37% for the Lower House and 39% in the Upper 
House, according to the IPU 2014 data. In 2007, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who 
had a long political career, was elected President, after her husband’s presidential term. In 
October 2011 she was reelected for a second term, which will end in 2015.  
Brazil 
Brazilian women gained the right to vote and stand for election in 1932. As in Argentina 
and Chile, Brazil’s women’s movements in the 1970s grew out of other movements of 
social dissent to the dictatorship. Today, Brazilian women’s movements have been 
instrumental in encouraging female participation in the public sphere and promoting 
gender equality.  
Dilma Rousseff became the first female president of Brazil in January of 2011. A 
member of the Workers’ Party, she was endorsed by her predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva, for whom she was Chief of Staff. She has been outspoken about the inclusion of 
women in ministerial positions, and in her cabinet 26% of ministry positions are held by 
women, the highest percentage to date.55  
Lula’s administration included a large corruption scandal known as the “Mensalão” 
(literally, big monthly stipend) in which the Workers’ Party would pay members of 
congress for their votes. Rousseff inherited some of Lula’s cabinet, but she replaced 
corrupt male members of the Mensalão with female politicians during her first year in 
office. Rousseff’s administration is not focused on gender agenda issues, however. Her 
notable projects include the innovative, such as the opening of the Truth Commission, as 
well as the internationally controversial, the construction of the Belo Monte Dam. She is 
seen as a pragmatic, prodevelopment technocrat and as of this writing is preparing for a 
reelection campaign. 
                                                 
53 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Isabel Perón (president of Argentina),” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 
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While Brazilian women’s movements have enjoyed considerable success in a range of 
issues, women’s representation has been limited. The country has had a 30% quota law in 
place since 1997, but women hold only 8.6% of parliamentary seats.56 
Chile  
In 1931 women received the right to vote in municipal elections, and in 1949 they 
received the universal right to vote. In 1935 Elena Caffarena, among others, created the 
Movement for Women’s Emancipation (Movimiento por la Emancipación de las 
Mujeres) that advocated for women’s biological, political, and economic emancipation. 
In 2006 Michelle Bachelet was elected as the first female President of Chile, after 
holding two different ministerial positions in Ricardo Lagos’s government. She appointed 
the first parity cabinet in Chilean history, with ten women and ten men. Michelle 
Bachelet finished her term in 2010 and is currently serving her second term, with female 
cabinet representation hovering around 40%.57 Despite these advances in the executive, 
in 2014 Chile continues to have low representation of women in the legislative branch. 
Chile does not have legislated quotas and is currently ranked ninetieth for female 
parliamentary representation, with only 14% of congressional seats held by women.58 
 
Costa Rica 
Women in Costa Rica gained the right to vote and stand for election in 1949. In 1990 the 
country passed its first piece of legislation aimed at increasing women’s political 
representation: the Law for the Promotion of Women’s Social Equality. Due to its lack of 
specific targets, quotas, and enforcement mechanisms, however, it did little to increase 
the number of women elected. In 1995 a Costa Rican delegation participated in the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and, as a result, Costa Rica not only 
ratified the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, but also reformed its electoral 
code (1996) and established the National Institute of Women (INAMU).59 The electoral 
reform established a 40% quota for women at the candidate level, but again, the 
legislation lacked both specificity and enforcement mechanisms. Following the 1998 
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elections, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) reevaluated the quota legislation to 
increase its efficacy.  
The 2010 elections brought a surge in the representation of women: 39% of the 
Legislative Assembly (22/57) and the President, Laura Chinchilla Miranda, were female. 
Furthermore, an electoral law passed in 2009 required gender parity of candidates in the 
2014 elections.60 No data is currently available on the percentage of female candidates in 
the 2014 elections, but the resulting legislature has a lower proportion of female 
representatives than the previous one: 33.33% (19/57).61
 
Mexico  
Mexican women received the right to vote and stand for election in 1953. The country 
ranks 19th in percentage of women’s representation in government. Mexico has a 
legislated candidate quota: 40% of candidates from all political parties must be women. 
Women’s representation is nearly twice that of the United States, but the quotas have 
been criticized for being ineffective and easy to manipulate.62
 
Before becoming a National Action Party (PAN) candidate for the 2012 presidential 
elections and winning the nomination over President Felipe Calderón’s favored 
candidate, Josefina Vázquez Mota served as the Secretary of Social Development under 
President Fox and as Secretary of Education under President Calderón. She promised to 
be tough on political corruption and to fight discrimination and violence against women, 
especially violence connected to the drug trade. Vázquez Mota’s campaign promoted her 
identity as a mother as well as a leader. Notably, her campaign slogans focused on an 




The political landscape of female participation is shifting constantly, and at this time it is 
difficult to predict further trends in women’s political representation worldwide. 
Nonetheless, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the data. Recent increases 
in global female participation paint a hopeful picture. As of this publication, women lead 
the governments of the three largest South American economies, and the nascent 
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democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa have demonstrated comparatively high levels of 
female representation. 
Female leadership in the executive does not necessarily nor immediately translate to 
higher levels of female legislative participation. Nor is the reverse true; high numbers of 
women in the legislative do not necessarily predict executive-level representation. 
Following the Beijing conference of 1995, governments developed different types of 
gender quotas as the primary mechanism for increasing female political representation, 
which have been implemented to varying degrees of success. Of the ten countries which 








Chapter 3: Quotas: The United Nations, Beijing, and the 
Quota Laws 
Introduction  
Gender quotas are one proposed solution to modern-day inequalities in women’s political 
representation worldwide. A modern history of gender quotas can be derived from data 
displayed in Table 3. The table shows that reserved seats were the first type of gender 
quotas to be implemented in India in the 1930s, followed by quotas in other Asian 
countries such as Taiwan and Pakistan. The second type of gender quotas that were 
implemented broadly was voluntary quotas. These optional gender quotas are also known 
as party quotas, in which political parties internally regulate their diversity. Examples of 
this type of quota first appeared in China during the 1950s, and in Nordic countries such 
as Norway during the 1970s. In Latin America, voluntary quotas were first implemented 
during the 1980s, starting in Brazil, and then in Chile and Uruguay. In the 1990s, 
Argentina was the first country in Latin America to establish legislative quotas.  




Voluntary Quotas Legislative Quotas 
1930s Asia India    
1940s Asia Taiwan    
1950s Asia Pakistan China   
1960s Africa Ghana    
1970s Asia Bangladesh    
Africa Tanzania    
Middle East Egypt Israel   
Iran    
Western 
Europe 
 Netherlands   
Norway   
1980s Africa Uganda Senegal   
Latin America  Brazil   
Chile   
Uruguay   
North America  Canada   
Western  Austria   
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Europe  Belgium   
 Denmark   
 Germany   
 Iceland   
 Sweden   
 United Kingdom   
1990s Africa Kenya Cape Verde Namibia 
Sudan** Cameroon   
Tanzania** Mozambique   
 Namibia*   
 Senegal   
 South Africa   
Asia Nepal India   
Philippines* North Korea   
 Philippines**   
South Korea***   
Taiwan***   
 Fiji   
Latin America  Bolivia**   
Dominican Republic** Argentina 
El Salvador Bolivia 
Haiti Brazil 
Mexico*** Colombia 
Nicaragua Costa Rica 







  Turkey   
The Pacific  Australia   
Western 
Europe 
 Cyprus Belgium 
France** France** 
Greece Italy** 
Ireland   
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Italy**   
Luxemburg   
Portugal   
2000s Africa Burkina Faso Angola Burundi 
Djibouti Botswana Djibouti 
Rwanda** Cameroon Liberia 
Somalia Equatorial Guinea Mauritania 
Tanzania** Ethiopia Niger 
 Ivory Coast Rwanda** 





Asia  Thailand Indonesia 
 South Korea** 
Western 
Europe 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina* Bosnia-Herzegovina* 
Croatia Macedonia* 
Macedonia Romaina 
Moldova Serbia and Montenegro 
 Uzbekistan 
Latin America   Mexico 
Honduras 
Middle East Bahrain Algeria Afghanistan 
Jordan Morocco** Iraq 
Morocco Tunisia Occupied Palestine Territory 




  Portugal   
* Results from 2006 elections unknown 
** Quotas revoked  
*** Quotas revoked and then reinstated 





What follows is a survey of gender quotas across the globe. This overview begins with a 
history of women’s interest and lobby groups that gathered in Beijing in 1995 to celebrate 
and organize at the United Nations’ Fourth Conference on Women. This conference led 
to a critical analysis of women’s participation in the public sphere and raised global 
awareness for governments to serve the underrepresented portions of their populations. 
Next is an overview of electoral systems as they relate to the rise and integration of 
gender quotas in political systems. The main characteristics of legislative quotas are 
described to illustrate methods of effectiveness, including enforcement mechanisms. This 
comprehensive history of gender quotas concludes with an analysis of modern 
interpretations of political inclusion—through the rhetoric of “broadening” and 
“deepening” methods of reaching gender equality in leadership in the public sphere 
Viewing the Beijing Conference As a Platform for Progress 
The Beijing Conference marked a turning point in the history of women’s movements. It 
made the implementation of gender quotas a viable strategy for increasing women’s 
participation in decision-making processes, and reflected women’s efforts around the 
world to push for a full revision of gender relations. 
The path leading to Beijing started with the founding of the United Nations, as well as 
with several international conferences and conventions on women. The founding 
document of the United Nations signed in 1945 in San Francisco stated in its preamble 
that “We, the people of the United Nations reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of Nations 
large and small.”64 One year later, the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
created the Commission on the Status of Women to promote gender equality. The 
Commission started with 15 members, 5 of them from the Americas: Graciela Morales F. 
de Echeverría from Costa Rica; Sara Basterrechea Ramírez from Guatemala; Amalia C. 
de Castillo Ledón from Mexico; Dorothy Kenyon from the United States of America; and 
Isabel de Urdaneta from Venezuela. The Commission’s work and the increasing force of 
women’s movements around the world made possible the World Conference on Women, 
held first in Mexico (1975); then in Copenhagen (1980); and in Nairobi (1985).65 Of 
special importance was the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, signed in 1979 by ninety-nine countries. To date, 186 
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countries have ratified the treaty. The seven countries that have not ratified it are: the 
United States of America, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Palau, Tonga, and Iran.66 
The first three world conferences made progress on the discussion of women’s issues; 
however, it was the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 that 
recognized the need to include a gender perspective in all international, regional, national 
and subnational programs.67 The Fourth World Conference on Women took place in 
Beijing September 4 through 15, 1995. At the same time, NGOs organized a parallel 
forum in Huairou, a city just thirty-five miles from Beijing. More than 30,000 
participants from all over the world attended this forum. Together, these two events 
became the largest gathering of a UN Conference, with more than 50,000 participants.68 
The Beijing Conference has become a symbol of success for women’s rights movements 
around the world, as it called for a “transformation in human relationships as well as the 
ways we live, work, and share the planet.”69 Great expectations emerged from two 
specific sources: the unprecedented impact of civil society groups in pushing the 
conference agenda; and a statement that called for a reevaluation of all the societal and 
structural relations between women and men.70 
The documents of the Beijing Conference acknowledge an unequal share of power 
between women and men, especially in decision-making positions. The Beijing 
Declaration and Platform established that “women’s empowerment and their full 
participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in 
the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of 
equality, development and peace.”71 Furthermore, through its established “Strategic 
Objectives and Actions,” the conference called on governments, political parties, the 
private sector, unions, and international bodies to establish mechanisms to guarantee the 
representation of women in decision-making processes.72 It was during this conference 
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that gender quotas became a policy with viable implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms across the world.73 
Electoral Systems and Quotas 
Recent scholarship on women’s political participation explores the influence of electoral 
system structures on women’s representation in the legislature. In order to understand 
how interactions between electoral systems and quotas determine the quota effectiveness, 
it is essential to understand the different electoral systems around the globe. This section 
provides a brief overview of twelve electoral systems and discusses the quota types that 
are most effective in each system. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s 
Quota Project’s 2007 guide on electoral systems served as the primary resource to 
research the twelve electoral systems discussed below.74 
Electoral systems are the methods used to elect public officials. There are twelve primary 
electoral systems, which can be broken into four families: plurality, majority, 
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Figure 2: Electoral Systems and Processes 
Source: Diagram created by authors. 
Plurality systems are electoral processes in which the candidate or party that receives the 
greatest number of votes wins the election. There are four systems in this family 
including first-past-the-post, block vote, party block vote, and limited vote systems:  
 First-Past-the-Post: The candidate with the most votes is elected, even if they only 
obtained less than 50% of the total votes cast. 
 Block Vote: Voters select their top candidate for each open position. The candidates 
with the highest number of votes win.  
 Party Block Vote: Voters choose a single party. The party with the most votes wins 
all the seats in the district.  
 Limited Vote: Voters select their top candidates for a limited number of open 

























Majority systems are electoral processes in which the candidate or party that receives the 
majority of the votes (over 50%) wins the election. There are two systems in this family: 
the two-round system and alternative vote. 
 Two-Round System: The two candidates who receive the most votes compete in a 
runoff election to ensure that the candidate elected receives the majority of the votes. 
 Alternative Vote: Voters rank the candidates in order of preference. If no candidate 
obtains the majority in the first round of the election, the candidate with the least 
number of votes is eliminated. The votes for the eliminated candidate are reallocated 
to the voters’ second choices. This process is repeated until a candidate receives the 
majority of the votes. 
Proportional electoral processes used in single-member districts ensure the candidate with 
the greatest proportion of the votes is elected. In multimember districts, the proportion of 
the vote a party receives determines the proportion of seats they are awarded. There are 
two systems in this family: single transferable vote and the party list:  
 Single Transferable Vote: Voters rank candidates in order of preference. Candidates 
that reach the Hare Quota (votes cast/(number to be elected+1) + 1) in the first round 
are elected. The candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated and the votes 
for that candidate are redistributed to the voters’ second choice. The whole process is 
repeated until all seats are filled.  
 Party List: Parties submit list with the names of their party members that are running 
in the election. Voters select one party. The proportion of the seats awarded to each 
party is determined by the proportion of votes they receive. Candidates are seated in 
the order listed on the party lists. There are two types of party list systems, closed and 
open lists. Closed list systems allow parties to determine the order candidates are 
listed in on list submitted for election. Open list systems allow voters to choose the 
ranking of candidates on the list. 
Mixed electoral processes are systems that use a combination of plurality and 
proportional systems or majority and proportional systems. There are four systems in the 
family: the parallel system, the mixed-member proportional system, borda count, and 
single nontransferable vote: 
 Parallel: In single-member districts voters elect candidates using a plurality or 
majority system and in multimember districts voters use a proportional system to 
elect candidates. The seats under the proportional system are awarded independently 
of the seats awarded under the plurality or majority system.  
 Mixed-Member Proportional: In single-member districts voters elect candidates using 
a plurality or majority system and in multimember districts voters use a proportional 
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system to elect candidates. The proportional seats are awarded in such a way as to 
compensate for disproportional effects in the single-member district outcomes.  
 Borda Count: Voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the ballot. Voters’ 
preferences are assigned a value, using equal steps. The candidate with the highest 
total value is elected.  
 Single Nontransferable Vote: Voters cast only one vote among candidates for all open 
seats. The candidates are ranked by the number of votes they receive.  
No electoral system is neutral. While majority and plurality systems emphasize 
accountability from individual elected officials, mixed and proportional systems are 
intended to promote diversity in political representation.75 Allan Wall from the ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network explains in a paper summarizing electoral systems that the 
system a country utilizes will have an impact on several elements of the country’s 
political environment. These elements include: “the number of political parties, the 
internal structure of political parties, and the structure, sustainability, and functions of 
election administration bodies.”76 By analyzing how electoral systems have influenced 
these aspects of political environments in the past, scholars have attempted to determine 
which electoral systems are most favorable to women. 
Research from IDEA’s 2007 study, Designing for Equality, concluded that women fare 
best in electoral systems belonging to the mixed and proportional electoral families. 
IDEA’s Quota Project research has also provided an overview of the specific 
combinations of electoral systems and quotas that have been most effective in increasing 
women’s representation. The study concluded that the party list system matched with 
legislative quotas and the party block vote system matched with reserved seat quotas are 
typically the most successful.77 However, evidence from recent elections reveals that 
without enforcement, even these “best fit” combinations will not succeed in increasing 
women’s representation. Additionally, IDEA does not distinguish between closed and 
open party list systems when determining “best fit” combinations in their Designing for 
Equality report.78 
Open lists disadvantage women by allowing voters to change candidate list positions, 
sometimes resulting in female candidates being pushed to the bottom of the list, while 
closed lists guarantee women will stay in the positions predetermined by parties. The 
recent debate on closed versus open lists is discussed in an IDEA article that explains the 
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key question quota scholars are attempting to answer, which is whether “it is easier to 
convince voters to actively vote for women candidates, or easier to convince party 
gatekeepers that including more women on the party lists in prominent positions is both 
fair and strategically wise.”79 This report’s case study countries illustrate both these 
points and are discussed in a later section of the chapter. 
Legislative Quota Characteristics and Implementation 
Legislative quotas vary by four main characteristics. The first is the chamber to which the 
quota is applied. Legislative quotas can be applied to either the upper or lower chamber 
in a country. The second characteristic is the quota’s target percentage, which is typically 
between 15 to 40%. The third characteristic is whether the quota has a placement 
mandate. These mandates can only be implemented in countries that have party lists 
electoral systems. Placement mandates require that the nomination lists submitted by 
political parties for elections alternate by gender. For example, every other place on the 
nomination list goes to a female candidate. Quotas with placement mandates are often 
referred to as “zipper quotas.” For both closed and open party list electoral systems, 
placement mandates make a difference in the number of female candidates that are put on 
the ballot during the nomination process. However, only placement mandates applied to 
closed party list electoral systems make a difference in the number of women that are 
elected. Placement mandates cannot be applied to open party list electoral systems after 
the nomination process, because open list ballots allow voters to determine the ranking of 
candidates in the party they select. The last quota characteristic is the enforcement 
mechanism or the legislative provisions that enforce compliance with quota laws.80 
Leslie Schwindt-Bayer conducted a study examining the differing effectiveness of 
legislative quotas in increasing women’s representation across countries.81 Schwindt-
Bayer surveyed twenty-six countries that have adopted quotas in the last three decades. 
She classified each one of the country’s quotas by the four main characteristics discussed 
above. Schwindt-Bayer separated the enforcement mechanisms into three categories, 
none for quotas with no enforcement, weak for quotas with legal stipulations for 
noncompliance that did not affect a political party’s electoral participation, and strong for 
quotas with legal stipulations for noncompliance that did affect a political party’s 
electoral participation. Weak enforcement mechanisms often resulted in political parties 
opting to take the penalty rather than comply with the quota law. For example in France, 
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political parties are financially penalized for noncompliance, but are still able to run in 
the election.82 Her classification of the twenty-six countries is listed in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Characteristics of Gender Quota Laws 
Country Legislative Chamber 








Argentina Lower and Upper 30 Yes Strong 
Armenia Unicameral 05/15.  No/Yes None/ Strong 
Belgium Lower and Upper 25/33 No/Yes Weak 
Bolivia Lower and Upper 33/25 Yes Strong 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Lower 30/33 Yes None 
Brazil Lower 25/30 No Weak 
Costa Rica Unicameral 40 No/Yes None/ Strong 
Dominican Republic Lower 25/30 No/Yes Strong 
Ecuador Unicameral 20/30/35 Yes Strong 
France  Lower 50 No Weak 
Guyana Unicameral 33 No None 
Honduras Unicameral 30 No None 
Indonesia Unicameral 30 No None 
Italy Lower 30 No None 
Liberia Lower 30 No None 
Macedonia Unicameral 30 No Strong 
Mauritania Lower 20 No Strong 
Mexico Lower and Upper 30 Yes/No Strong 
Nepal Lower 5 No None 
Panama Unicameral 30 No Weak 
Paraguay Lower and Upper 20 Yes Strong 
Peru Unicameral 25/30 No Strong 
Serbia and Montenegro Unicameral 30 Yes Strong 
South Korea Unicameral 50 No None 
Uzbekistan Lower 30 No None 
Venezuela Lower and Upper 30 No Weak 
Source: Schwindt-Bayer, “Making Quotas Work.” 




From her study she concluded that, on average, when no enforcement mechanism existed, 
the percentage of seats held by women was only one-third of the quota target percentage. 
However, when the quota was accompanied by a strong enforcement mechanism, the 
percentage of seats won by women was just shy of the quota’s target percentage.83  
Additionally, Schwindt-Bayer found that, in the countries surveyed, combining a strong 
enforcement mechanism with a placement mandate ensured an increase in women’s 
representation. An analysis of the impact of quotas in the countries presented in the case 
studies of this report provides context for Schwindt-Bayer’s findings and will be covered 
in the next section.84  
Case Study Countries, Electoral Systems, and Quotas 
Several of the countries studied, including Canada, Chile, and the United States, have 
never implemented legislative gender quotas. Although Michele Bachelet, Chile’s first 
female president, is a proponent of gender quotas, a majority of Chilean legislators 
oppose the use of quotas in the political realm.85 Gender quotas are incompatible with the 
first-past-the-post electoral systems in Canada and the United States, some scholars have 
noted; those electoral systems are the major deterrent to quota implementation in those 
countries.86 Other conditions that may lead to reluctance to apply quota laws are 
discussed in later chapters of this report.  
The remaining case study countries implemented quota laws in the 1990s. Argentina was 
the first country in the Americas to pass a national gender quota law.87 Argentina, which 
has a party list electoral system, requires parties to have a minimum of 30% female 
candidates for national elections. By 1999, the majority of Argentina’s provinces adopted 
the law for provincial and municipal elections. The enforcement mechanism that 
accompanies the quota is a stipulation that if parties do not comply with the quota law, 
their nomination list will be rejected. The quota law also contains a placement mandate.88 
As a result of the quota law, women’s representation in the country rose from 5% in 1993 
to 27% in 1995. Today women hold 37% of the seats in parliament and 39% of the seats 
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in the senate.89 The increase in women’s representation is consistent with Schwindt-
Bayer’s findings. 
Brazil and Costa Rica are considered “best-fits” because they have combined party list 
electoral systems with legislative quotas. However, they differ in party list type and in the 
quota enforcement mechanism they implemented. While Brazil has an open list system 
and a weak enforcement mechanism, Costa Rica has a closed list system and a strong 
enforcement mechanism. In Brazil, if parties do not meet the target quota percent, they 
must eliminate male candidates from their lists and leave open spaces representing the 
percentage of women they failed to include.90 These open spaces cannot be occupied by 
new female candidates and are left blank on election ballots. On the other hand, in Costa 
Rica, if parties fail to meet the target quota percent, their nomination lists are rejected and 
the parties are barred from running in the election.91 
Brazil and Costa Rica are consistent with Schwindt-Bayer’s findings. Due to differences 
in the strength of their enforcement mechanisms, Costa Rica’s parliament was 39% 
female, while Brazil’s was only 9%.92 Costa Rica implemented a placement mandate in 
2001. Figure 3 below, from IDEA’s 2003 study on Costa Rica’s quota law, shows the 
increase in women’s representation after the implementation of Costa Rica’s quota law 
and after the placement mandate was adopted. Women’s representation increased from 
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Figure 3: Quota Laws and Women’s Representation in Costa Rica 
Source: IDEA, The Quota Project. 
Mexico has a mixed electoral system. Mexico’s current quota law, implemented in 2002, 
requires parties to submit party lists in which every segment of five candidates has at 
least two candidates of each gender. If party lists did not comply with law, political 
parties are given forty-eight hours to correct them. If parties fail to comply after their 
probation period, their lists are rejected by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The 
original quota law of 1996 prevented party lists from including over 70% of one same 
gender, but was not accompanied by any enforcement mechanism. The revisions to the 
law in 2002 led to an increase in women’s presence in the lower house of more than 
5%.94 Mexico is yet another example of how enforcement mechanisms make the 
difference when implementing quota laws. 
Comparing the impact of gender quotas in a number of the case study countries reveals 
that identifying the best combinations of electoral systems and quotas, as well as the 
strength of the accompanying enforcement mechanisms, are significant factors that will 
impact the quota’s effectiveness. Also, even subtle differences in electoral systems 
(closed versus open lists) can have a significant impact on the quota’s ability to increase 
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Table 5: Quota Laws in the Americas 




Argentina Closed Party List  Requires parties to have a 
minimum of 30% female 
candidates on their nomination 
lists for national elections 
30 Strong 
Brazil Open Party List Requires parties to have a 
minimum of 30% female 
candidates on their nomination 
lists for national elections 
30 Weak 
Canada First-Past-the-Post None   
Chile Binomial System None   
Costa Rica Closed Party List Requires parties to alternate by 
gender on their nomination 
lists for national elections 
40 Strong 
Mexico Mixed Member 
Proportional (First-Past-
the-Post/ Closed Party 
List) 
Requires that for each segment 
of five candidates on the list 
there must be two candidates 
of each sex, alternating 
between men and women 
candidates 
30 Strong 
United States First-Past-the-Post None   
Source: Compiled by authors. 
Three Dimensions of Representation 
The impact of gender quotas has been broadly examined through three dimensions of 
political representation: descriptive, substantive, and symbolic.95 This framework of 
analysis is appropriate for our case studies since it allows a deep understanding of the 
ways in which gender quotas transform decision-making processes and women’s 
situations in the countries in which they are implemented. 
Descriptive representation examines cross-national variations in women’s access to 
decision-making positions.96 In this facet of political representation three categories are 
taken into account: the institutional or “demand side”; the structural or “supply side”; and 
the beliefs of women’s suitability to hold leadership positions. These kind of analyses 
look into the numerical growth of women’s representation in political and institutional 
bodies; however, they also examine the attributes of the women in such positions. Studies 
of descriptive representation include statistics of women’s legislative presence, as well as 
                                                 




of women’s education and labor force participation levels. Studies carried out in this area 
have demonstrated that context has a significant impact on promoting or hindering 
women’s election.97 
Studies in this area include methodologies like the one Franceschet and Piscopo used in 
2013 to compare men and women legislators’ characteristics in Argentina.98 They 
examined the age, marital status, number of children, educational background, and prior 
experience of 531 legislators in the legislatures between 1999 and 2007. The results 
showed that family commitments structure women’s political careers (i.e., their roles as 
mothers influence their career options); that they have similar educational levels to men; 
and that men are more likely to have previous experience in the executive branch of 
government. A key finding was that women elected are just as likely as men to be drawn 
from elite groups and from upper and upper-middle class sectors.99 
Substantive representation examines the impact of elected women on the promotion of 
women’s issues. Studies on the impact of gender quotas on substantive representation 
focus on two main questions: do women in power represent women’s interests? And, do 
elected women govern differently than elected men? In other words, do women in power 
make a difference? Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo argue that the outcomes depend on 
three variables: the proportion of women that were elected; the individual characteristics 
of women elected (such as party membership and attitudes towards women’s issues); and 
institutional variables, namely party discipline and civil society support.100 
Substantive representation analyses look at the differences women can make in policy-
making processes and outcomes, especially those concerning women’s lives. An example 
of this is shown by the key role that Marcela Lagarde played on the design of laws to 
protect women in Mexico. In 2003, Marcela Lagarde was chosen to form part of the 
PRD’s (leftist political party) plurinominal candidate list to the legislature due to the 
increased enforcement of gender quotas in Mexico. Marcela Lagarde is a prominent 
feminist and anthropologist at the Universidad Autónoma de México, and was part of the 
movement that denounced violence against women in Ciudad Juárez. During her term in 
office (2003–2006), Marcela Lagarde was able to form a strong coalition of women 
legislators from different parties, as well as to obtain support from key figures of the 
main political parties to pass the General Law for Women’s Access to a Life Free of 
Violence. The tenacity and commitment of Marcela Largarde and her ability to form an 
alliance with other female legislators, as well as the willingness of political parties’ 
leaders to support the initiatives, significantly changed Mexico’s institutional framework 
regarding violence against women.  
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By examining gender quotas’ impact on the symbolic area of political representation, we 
can begin to see the effects that women’s presence in decision-making positions have on 
the population: how do people think about politics, and how is this thinking affected by a 
female presence in the political arena?101 This area of study is especially important 
because politics have been traditionally a male-dominated arena. Studies in this area have 
focused on the perceived changes of elected bodies, and politics’ nature as female 
presence increases in this arena. According to Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, results in 
this specific sphere have been mixed: women’s presence increases the “democratic” 
perception of government bodies; however, it does not change people’s perception of 
larger political dynamics such as corruption and transparency.102  
An example of a study examining the impact of symbolic representation would include 
the one conducted by Burnet in Rwanda.103 Burnet analyzed the impact of gender quotas 
in Rwanda on women’s perception of other women, on women’s roles in perceptions of 
politics, and on politics themselves. Through a twenty-four-month ethnographic study 
carried out from 1997 through 1999, Burnet showed that the impact of gender quotas was 
mediated by class, and that elite women benefited more from quota effects. Furthermore, 
she found that women did not believe that women in power were less corrupt than men; 
and the majority of the citizens did not distinguish between the impact of gender quotas 
and the impacts of other gender policy changes on women’s lives.104 
The Impact of Quotas on Representation 
The impact of gender quotas has been highly irregular across the world: while some 
countries have significantly increased women’s representation in their legislative bodies, 
others countries’ quota policies have had little or no gains for women. The impact of 
gender quotas is mediated by an array of intervening variables that are specific to each 
country; furthermore, gender quotas’ impact can be measured in different 
representational dimensions, such as the descriptive, the substantive, and the symbolic 
ones.  
Differences in the impact of gender quotas are related to the type of quota that is being 
implemented; how it is mediated by the institutional context of each country; and the 
actors supporting the quotas.105 A specific type of quota implies issues regarding certain 
language, wording, enforcement mechanisms, and sanctions. For example, Franceschet, 
Krook, and Piscopo have shown that if a quota is not designed with proper enforcement 
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and sanctions mechanisms, the probabilities of that quota’s success is significantly 
reduced.106 Furthermore, the type of quota is mediated by institutional contexts specific to 
each country that determine quotas’ effectiveness. In this domain, the electoral systems 
become essential to understand the interaction and results of quota implementation 
(discussed later in this chapter). 
The impact of quotas is highly influenced by institutional structures, and by larger 
sociocultural and political contexts that result in diverse quota outcomes. Table 6 below, 
The Impact of Gender Quotas, portrays the diverse results gender quotas have had on the 
representation of women in legislatures across the globe. As argued by Krook,107 the 
uneven outcomes observed in the table, as well as the direction and size of the impact of 
gender quotas, are determined by structural and institutional factors, and by the wording, 
design, and enforcement mechanisms included in the policy design. For example, from 
Table 6 one can see that, in the cases in which the percentage of women elected to the 
legislature decreased (Armenia and Nepal), the quotas were set at a lower level than 
previous election results. The other cases reveal significant variance among countries: 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Belgium, Afghanistan, and Rwanda gained more than twenty 
points; while Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, and the Philippines only increased women’s 
representation by two points. These outcomes are the result of different interactions of the 
quotas’ design, implementation, and enforcement mechanisms with variations in the 
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Internacional and FLACSO-Chile, 2008). 
 
63 
Table 6: The Impact of Gender Quotas 











Latin America       
Argentina 30 1991 8.7 (1989) 35 (2005) (+) 26.3 
Bolivia 30 1997 6.9 (1993) 16.9 (2005) (+) 10 
Brazil 25 1997 6.6 (1994) 8.6 (2002) (+) 2 
Colombia** 30 1999 11.8 (1998) 12 (2002) (+) 0.2 
Costa Rica  40 1996 15.8 (1994) 38.6 (2006) (+) 22.8 
Dominican Republic 25, 33 1997, 2000 11.7 (1994) 19.7 (2006) (+) 8 
Ecuador 20, 30 1997, 2000 Unknown (1996) 25 (2006) - 
Guyana 33 Unknown Unknown 29 (2006) - 
Honduras 30 2000 9.4 (1997) 23.4 (2005) (+) 14 
Mexico 30, 30 1996, 2002 14.2 (1997) 22.6 (2006) (+) 8.4 
Panama 30 1997 9.7 (1994) 16.7 (2004) (+) 7 
Paraguay 20 1996 2.5 (1993) 10 (2003) (+) 7.5 
Peru 25, 30 1997, 2001 10.8 (1995) 29.2 (2006) (+) 18 
Venezuela*** 30 1998, 2003 5.9 (1993) 18 (2005) (+) 12.1 
Eastern Europe       
Armenia 5 1999 6.3 (1995) 5.3 (2003) (-) 1 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 33 2001 7.1 (2000) 14.3 (2006) (+) 7.2 
Macedonia 30 2002 6.7 (1998) 28.3 (2006) (+) 21.6 
Serbia and Montenegro 30 2002 N/A 12 (2003) - 
Asia       
China Increasing 1955 12 (1954) 20 (2003) (+) 8.3 
Indonesia 30 2003 8 (1999) 11.3 (2004) (+) 3.3 
Nepal 3 1990 6.1 (1988) 5.9 (1999) (-) 0.2 
North Korea 20 1998 20.1 (1990) 20.1 (2003) 0 
Philippines  1986 10.7 (1992) 15.7 (2004) (+) 5 
South Korea 30 2000 3.7 (1996) 13.4 (2004) (+) 9.7 
Western Europe       
Belgium 30 1994 9.4 (1991) 34.7 (2003) (+) 25.3 
France 50 1999-2000 10.9 (1997) 12.2 (2002) (+) 1.1 
Portugal 33.3 2006 21.3 (2005) Unknown - 
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Middle East       
Afganisthan 25 2004 N/D 27.3 (2005) (+) 27.3 
Iraq 25 2004 7.6 (2000) 25.5 (2005) (+) 17.9 
Palestine Territory (occup) 20 2005 N/D Unknown - 
Africa       
Burundi 30 2005 18.4 (1993) 30.5 (2005) (+) 12.1 
Dijibouti 10 2002 0 (2003) 10.8 (2003) (+) 10.8 
Liberia 30 2005 5.3 (2003) 12.5 (2005) (+)7.2 
Mauritania 20 2006 Unknown Unknown - 
Nigeria 10, 25 2001, 2004 1.2 12.4 (2004) (+) 11.2 
Rwanda 30 2003 25.7 48.8 (2003) (+) 23.1 
** Quotas revoked 
***Quotas revoked and then reinstated 
Source: Ríos Tobar, Marcela (ed), Política y Mujer, Santiago, Chile: IDEA Internacional and FLACSO-
Chile, 2008. 
The impact of gender quotas has been uneven across the three spheres of representation. 
Costa Rica has been an example of the positive impact of gender quotas in descriptive 
representation. The number of women increased significantly due to the implementation 
and enforcement mechanisms that were put in place. However, as argued by Durrett, this 
increase has not been reflected in Costa Rica’s legislation, which has not incorporated 
gender into its processes and policies, and further, the sociocultural contexts have not 
changed.108 As a result, institutional and cultural barriers preventing women’s 
participation in the political life of the country remain.  
Similarly, Miguel, in his study about substantive representation and quotas in Brazil, 
argues that, “women in Brazil have opted to work with issues linked to their traditional 
role, and this reinforces their less prestigious position in politics.”109 Nevertheless, 
Miguel makes an important point by arguing that even though quotas may not be the 
ultimate solution for increasing substantive representation, they can make a difference.110  
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Key Arguments for and against Gender Quotas 
The use of political gender quotas is a controversial and complex issue. For example, 
contrary to expectation, both supporters and opponents of gender quotas at times wish to 
increase women’s participation in government. Political parties sometimes use gender 
quotas as a strategy to increase their numbers and power. Therefore, quotas can be used 
for party politics instead of their intended purpose of increasing women’s equality in 
public life.111 There has been a substantial increase in the number of democratic 
governments since the 1980s, and most democracies seem to agree that women should be 
present in government. However, opponents of political gender quotas find them to be 
unnecessary, and in some cases consider them a hindrance to progress by interfering with 
women’s assent to power out of their own ambition. Despite the varied personal and 
political opinions about gender quotas, an increase in women’s political representation 
has resulted from both their use, and in their absence.  
An example of women’s political representation in Latin America, without the use of 
legislative gender quotas, is Chile. Chile had the highest female participation in the 
legislative and executive branch under President Michelle Bachelet’s first term. However, 
Chile did not use gender quotas with enforcement mechanisms to achieve this level of 
female representation. Instead, Chile’s first female president, Michelle Bachelet, had a 
unique personal commitment to women’s representation, and thus, appointed many 
women to her cabinet positions. Therefore, the floor is open to debate on whether or not 
quotas are the most effective mechanism for increasing women’s representation in high 
political office. In the end, gambling on the respective head of state’s preferences to 
appoint a parity cabinet is not a practical mechanism for increasing women’s political 
participation for the long term.  
Arguments in Favor of Political Gender Quotas  
The strongest supporters of gender quotas are grassroots women’s organizations that 
believe political gender quotas increase women’s political empowerment.112 They believe 
that political gender quotas increase descriptive female representation in government and 
thus, increase the overall effectiveness of government to represent its constituencies.113 
Women’s mobilizations to advocate for quotas have historically been motivated by the 
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belief that political gender quotas will ensure them political positions they feel they have 
been denied by traditionally male-dominated “elite” political parties.114  
International organizations and nonprofit organizations that uphold progressive norms of 
equality and fairness believe that gender quotas improve substantive representation of 
populations. For example, quantitative measurements of healthcare spending from the 
World Bank’s World Development Report on Gender 2012 showed that an increase in 
spending correlated with an increase of women’s political participation.
 115 International 
organizations use evidence to support their belief that the increase in women’s political 
participation from the grassroots level to high office has a positive effect for populations 
overall. Furthermore, IOs and NGOs believe a critical mass of female representation in 
the legislative and executive branches of global governments will not only increase 
substantive representation for women, but also increase policy implemented for women, 
families, and communities.116  
Scholarship on political gender quotas focuses on the proliferation of quotas as a method 
for increasing women’s political representation. Krook calls politically experienced men, 
who have advantages in the political sphere including experience and resources, “political 
elites.”117 Although these elites at times support gender quotas, they do so for very 
different reasons than grassroots women’s groups. These elites recognize the strategic 
advantages of pursuing quotas and support them to gain various political advantages. 
Some advantages sought include gaining female voters, increasing party numbers, 
keeping a party majority and thus power, and building alliances with potential coalition 
partners in countries with reserved seats.118 Elites may also support gender quotas if they 
feel they can recruit party members who are “‘malleable women,’ meaning they will not 
challenge the patriarchal status quo.”119 Additionally, elite and other political parties 
often feel compelled to remain on par with existing or emerging international notions of 
equality and representation, and thus advocate for political gender quotas to gain or keep 
social legitimacy.120 In these examples, political parties are not advocating for increased 
female political representation, but instead are seeking empowerment for their party and 
their party’s overall agenda. Yet, political parties are important to the gender quota 
debate because strategy agendas have often been the reason for gender quotas to be 
implemented.  
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Arguments against the Use of Political Gender Quotas 
The strongest argument against political gender quotas remains that quotas for women 
discriminate against men. The people who support this position believe that political 
gender quotas, and quotas in general, recognize some groups and exclude others. Thus, 
gender quotas can be portrayed in the most extreme cases to be unconstitutional, and 
therefore illegal. Opponents of political gender quotas may also reject special provisions 
for women as fundamentally antidemocratic.121 For example, governments in transition 
from another form of rule may claim that gender quotas are contrary to the spirit of 
transition and conflict with the value of equality by prioritizing some groups over 
others.122  
Another strong argument against gender quotas is that they place unqualified women in 
political positions that could be held by experienced male politicians. Other opponents 
argue that there is not a large enough pool of qualified women to fill the places required 
by quotas. However, these same opponents often also reject the need to increase and fund 
educational opportunities for women. A more complicated issue underlies this political 
position against gender quotas. Conservative parties typically reject progressive notions 
of equality and diversity, especially when not organically proposed from within the party. 
In an effort to deal with this conservative agenda, advocates of gender quotas emphasize 
the causes of limited female candidates in their messages by pointing out the lack of 
mentorships, financial resources, and other opportunities for women who enter, or wish 
to enter the political sphere. 
Scholars have pointed out that efforts to nominate more women to political office hardly 
ever occur in the absence of women’s mobilizations. These findings mean that all male-
dominated political parties do not prioritize women’s political representation, much less 
gender quotas, to increase women’s political presence.123 Many women are also 
opponents of gender quotas. Resistance from female activists ranges from limited 
mobilizations against the necessity of quotas to active denunciations by prominent 
political figures.124 For example, Angela Merkel, Germany’s Chancellor since 2005, and 
arguably the world’s most powerful head of state, has not been an advocate of political 
gender quotas. Only recently has she spoken out in favor of increasing voluntary gender 
quotas in the private sphere, but only as a result of pressure from public demand, and her 
political interest in advancing economic output.125 Many senior-level female politicians 
and business executives have vocally opposed gender quotas in the political and private 









spheres based on the belief that women can achieve success without the use of quotas. 
Many claim that quotas for women are unnecessary. Instead, women in executive 
positions advocate for improving the opportunity pipeline for women to reach these 
positions, and claim that the rest will happen naturally.  
Positions on Political Gender Quotas Somewhere In-between 
There are some opinions that are neither for nor against political gender quotas. These 
positions are not based on party politics, and are primarily held by the electorate instead 
of public officials. These opinions are a result of the conflict of progressive politics with 
the pressures of cultural and religious norms. For example, one argument in favor of 
political gender quotas is that quotas will help to reduce voter bias against female 
representatives in the long run. But this opinion is based on the assumption that putting 
women on the ballot, and in the public eye, will increase representation until populations 
become accustomed to voting for, and being represented by women.126 Instead of being a 
clear political position, this notion is more of a hope. Others, who are in opposition to 
gender quotas, believe that implementing and enforcing gender quotas will worsen 
already shaky or negative attitudes towards female political leaders, and hurt female 
politicians’ careers by exposing them to scrutiny of disgruntled constituents.127 
To this day, some populations in Latin America and other parts of the world allow their 
religious beliefs and cultural customs to influence their voting choices and political 
perspectives. Latin America is made up of historically Catholic countries with 
traditionally culturally conservative populations. Although large countries in Latin 
America like Argentina, Mexico and Brazil have adopted political party gender quotas, 
their populations may not entertain views as progressive as their political system. 
Traditionally, Catholic communities follow a patriarchal family model that supports the 
division of gender roles between private and public spaces. Thus many traditionally 
Catholic cultures have ingrained notions of gender norms that tie women to private 
spaces including the home and church, and men to public spaces such as work and 
politics. This may be one explanation for why some voters in Latin America disagree 
with political gender quotas. However, despite cultural conservatism, gender quotas have 
been successful in many Latin American countries—producing appointments and 
elections of women to political offices, which might have been improbable before those 
countries turned to democracy. 
Women debate political gender quotas as fiercely as men do. Therefore, gender is not the 
line along which parties divide on this issue. Instead, the arguments for and against 
quotas are often tied to culture, religion, or hopeful ideals for the future.  
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Contextualizing the Debate on Quotas in the Americas 
The countries in this case study have diverse opinions on political gender quotas within 
their political systems and among their populations. For example, just because Costa Rica 
has political gender quotas with enforcement mechanisms, does not mean that the entire 
population supports or believes in their effectiveness or necessity. Even within Chile’s 
government, the secretary-general for the right wing’s opposition National Renovation 
Party, Cristian Monckeberg, called then first-term President Michele Bachelet’s support 
for implementing gender quota laws “a sickly obsession” that excludes men and creates a 
“risky and divisive discourse.”128  
Implementing legally backed gender quotas was controversial in Chile because it meant 
that some of the male legislators would be replaced with female representatives, and 
reelection for men would be more difficult. In Chile, when the quota bill was up for 
debate to require 40% female representation in 2007, the incumbent men united to make 
sure it did not pass. Congresswoman María Antonieta Saa of Bachelet’s Party for 
Democracy said that an increase in female representation would not happen without the 
political parties undergoing a “profound transformation.”129 It is still unknown if 
President Bachelet’s second administration will include another attempt to pass a 
legislative quota law.  
Although Argentina was the first country in the world to implement gender quota laws, 
its population still has segments that are in complete opposition. Jujuy, a province in 
northwest Argentina bordered by Chile and Bolivia, has a reputation for being a bastion 
of machismo and conservatism.130 María Inés Zigarán, a professor of journalism and 
member of the provincial women’s movement said that it is not by chance that Jujuy does 
not have a provincial gender quota law.131 Alicia Chabale, a lawyer for a women’s group 
that filed an injunction in 2009 to make sure that the province complied with the 
constitutional law of following the quota protocol, said that Jujuy is a “totally machista” 
province, and that women who participate in politics are described as “feisty” by male 
political leaders.132 Even in the country that pioneered gender quotas for Latin America, 
and the world, there remains resistance not only from legislators but also from the general 
public, proving that despite Argentina’s progressive quota system, divergent opinions 
endure. Despite a country’s history with gender quotas, the endurance of gender quotas is 
completely uncertain without constitutional restructuring.  
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Due to the United States’ history of conflict between federal and states’ rights, many 
conservatives perceive political gender at the federal level to be an infringement on the 
democratic process. The political system in the United States is not conducive to 
federally mandated political gender quotas, because they would infringe upon states’ 
rights and thus be unconstitutional. Therefore, the push for political gender quotas will 
have to come from the political bottom up to avoid immediate dismissal by conservative 
legislators. Both US leftist groups and some right-wing groups that insist on equality are 
currently debating how to increase women’s political representation. In November 2013, 
John Marshall, a Libertarian representative from Montana, submitted a proposal to amend 
the state constitution and require gender quotas in the Montana state legislature.133 The 
amendment calls for an equal number of women and men to serve in the state’s 
legislative body. Although still very important for the equality of representation 
movement in America, this progressive proposal came from a Libertarian politician, 
which is a minority party in the United States with very limited power and influence. 
Without the support of one of the two major parties in the United States, either the 
Democrats or Republicans, a proposal for federal gender quotas will never be seriously 
considered by lawmakers.  
Conclusions 
To date, quotas have not only been implemented in public institutions, but have crossed 
over to help increase women’s representation in corporate institutions. Franceschet and 
Piscopo examine quota diffusion in the public and private sectors through two processes 
they call “deepening” and “broadening.”134 Deepening refers to the increased percentage 
of overall gender quotas, and to a greater push to establish parity measures in democratic 
governance structures. Broadening refers to the implementation of quotas beyond the 
legislative realm. Through broadening, countries have established gender quotas in a 
myriad of public and private spaces such as judiciary systems, presidential cabinets, 
unions, and corporations. Examples of such mechanisms include Colombia’s 30% gender 
quota for national and subnational executive positions; Ecuador and Bolivia’s mandate 
for equal representation of women and men throughout the entire judiciary system; 
Argentina’s implementation of a 30% gender quota for the top hierarchy of labor unions; 
and most recently, Germany’s legislation establishing a compulsory 30% gender quota in 
the executive boards of Germany’s largest companies.135  
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As this chapter has shown, the path to equality and women’s participation in decision-
making positions has not been easy, and there is still a long road ahead. The Fourth 
Conference on Women celebrated in Beijing in 1995 was a turning point for women’s 
movements, and its call for increased women’s representation in decision-making 
positions has impacted countries around the world. To date, national governments from 
all the continents have implemented gender quotas in their legislative branches as a 
mechanism to increase women’s representation in the government. Nevertheless, gender 
quotas have not always been successful. On the one hand, the impact of gender quotas in 
different dimensions of representation has varied widely. Descriptive representation has 
substantially increased if the quota is well designed and implemented, but substantive and 
symbolic representation impacts have been more ambiguous: the increase of women in 
decision-making positions does not necessarily translate into policy gains for women, or 
change the perception women have of the political system. On the other hand, the success 
of gender quotas is determined by the quota design, enforcement mechanisms, and quota 
type.  
Electoral systems are the largest determinant of the quota design, the type of enforcement 
mechanism, and the quota type, that can be feasibly implemented. Scholars have noted 
the difficulty of designing quotas for majority/plurality electoral systems that are centered 
primarily on individual candidates. Scholars continue to draw on countries with 
proportional systems, such as Costa Rica, in order to illustrate gender quotas’ ability to 
effectively increase women’s political participation. They have concluded that closed 
party list electoral systems combined with legislative quotas and strong enforcement 
mechanisms have been the most successful in increasing women’s representation in 
countries. 
Historically, political gender quotas were championed by grassroots women’s 
movements. Today, however, women who hold high political or executive office in the 
private sphere claim that women do not need gender quotas to succeed. More interesting 
still is that more men have become advocates for political gender quotas, but not for the 
same reason that women introduced them. Many political party leaders use the structures 
of gender quotas to craft party strategies to gain political power. Overall, political gender 
quotas have not evolved to be the solution that the founding mothers of political gender 
quotas imagined them to be. Instead, political gender quotas have become another 
political bargaining chip, often bickered about, that, outside of Latin America, does not 
lead to the political empowerment of women. Within Latin America, this same political 
strategizing has led to the implementation of political gender quotas, and in some cases 
has even increased the number of female legislators. However, without the support of 
influential female heads of state, support for political gender quotas to achieve equal 
political representation will be lost in the new generation’s feminist rhetoric that argues 







Chapter 4: Parity  
The parity discussion spans a number of areas including domestic parity, corporate parity, 
and political parity. The 2012 World Economic Forum Gender Gap Report states, “[n]o 
country in the world has achieved gender equality. The four highest ranked countries—
Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Sweden—have closed between 80 and 86% of their 
gender gaps, while the lowest ranked country—Yemen—has closed a little over half of 
its gender gap.”136 In the domestic sphere, there are significant disparities in how men 
and women spend their time. In the corporate world, there are disparities in pay as well as 
representation in leadership. In the political world, campaign finance, quotas, legislative 
power positions, and political parties all impact the parity discussion. While political 
parity is the area of primary interest, it is important to review the other aspects of parity 
to gain a full understanding of the issue. The first section of this chapter focuses on 
domestic parity, the second on corporate parity, and the third on political. Then, there are 
two brief case studies, and finally, an overview of key challenges facing parity.  
Domestic Parity  
The United Nations, among others, identifies early gender socialization as one of the 
primary causes of gender inequality. Young boys and girls are conditioned, from birth, to 
fit into the predetermined mold of masculine and feminine behaviors.137
 
Though at times 
the results of socialization or stereotyping seem trivial, causing differences in toys and 
colors, gender stereotypes continue to plague society at all levels, and may impact the 
division of labor within the family.  
The way American men and women spend time has changed significantly in the last few 
decades, but traditional roles and stereotypes are still easily recognizable. Only 20% of 
men are involved in cleaning or laundry on a typical day compared to 48% of women. 
Additionally, 65% of women prepare food on an average day, compared to only 39% of 
men. Women also spend almost twice the amount of time taking care of children or other 
family members.138 With more obligations domestically, women can have less time to 
invest in their careers. Data from 2012 shows that amongst full-time workers, on average, 
women work about two hours less than men per week.139 
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The time breakdown in the United States can be seen as a symptom of a greater problem 
found around the world. Socialization at the early stages of life can contribute to defining 
the role of women in the home and to inequality in the corporate and political sectors. 
Differing desires, expectations, and allocation of time all significantly affect the amount 
and degree to which women enter the corporate workforce or pursue public service.  
Balancing professional ambitions and personal goals as a woman in 2013 can seem 
impossible. Prominent American scholar and public servant Anne-Marie Slaughter 
sparked controversy with her poignant editorial titled “Why Women Still Can’t Have It 
All.” In this article, she thoughtfully explains why women of this generation are finding 
this work-life balance exceedingly difficult to achieve. Slaughter maintains, “Only when 
women wield power in sufficient numbers will we create a society that genuinely works 
for all women. That will be a society that works for everyone.”140 
Corporate Parity 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are disparities between men and women’s pay as 
well as their representation in private sector leadership positions. In the United States, 
women’s earnings were 76.5% of men’s in 2012 and 77% of men’s in 2011. As a note, 
the gap widens when looking specifically at minority women.141 
Within leadership positions, women hold about 4.2% of Fortune 500 CEO positions.142 
This is especially interesting given data on men and women’s career ambitions and 
choices after graduating from MBA programs. Following a group of high potential 
graduates, one study found that women and men were equally quick to lead projects 
eighteen months after getting their MBAs. However, men were given more important 
projects that had larger budgets, more employees, higher visibility, and overall, more 
risk.143 Within corporate boards, about 17% of seats are held by women.144 Catalyst.org 
has a useful graphic showing women’s corporate participation, as seen in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Women’s Corporate Participation 
Source: Catalyst, Pyramid: U.S. Women in Business.  
Discussions have suggested that childcare considerations impact some of the disparity in 
women’s corporate participation. OECD countries have taken different approaches to 
address this. The measures tend to focus on paid leave, preschool education, or 
encouraging part-time work. For example, Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, and 
Hungary provide up to three years of paid leave for mothers. New Zealand and the 
Nordic countries encourage children to be placed in preschool and women to go back to 
work. Britain, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the Netherlands all encourage part-time 
work for mothers.145 
Ultimately, there is room for progress on parity in the corporate world. Despite the 
number of women working and the number of women working in the private sector 
specifically, there is a lack of representation at the higher levels of power. There have 
been moves to address this, both internally with company-wide initiatives as well as 
externally with debates about bringing quotas into boardrooms.  
Political Parity 
The definition of political parity used in this research has two parts: 1) having an equal 
number of men and women involved in the political system at all levels, and 2) having an 
                                                 




equal distribution of power between men and women in the political system at all levels. 
There are a number of ways to look at political parity including campaign finance, 
quotas, representation in positions of power, and the role of political parties.  
Though more women are entering the political arena, financing primary and election 
campaigns remain difficult. In the United States, the average House race costs $1.7 
million and the average Senate race costs $10.5 million.146 Given that women generally 
have fewer personal resources and less extensive networks, raising this money is a 
barrier. One survey of legislators showed that 41% believed fundraising is harder for 
women because women lack the networks that men have. The second most common 
reason identified was that women are less comfortable asking for money for 
themselves.147 
Solutions to address this challenge have focused on financial assistance, capacity 
building, and party reform. Within the financial assistance options, ideas range from 
providing early money for nomination campaigns to providing public funding and 
limiting campaign expenditures. Capacity building includes training on fundraising and 
campaigns, mentorship, communication and leadership training, etc. Internal party reform 
can include allocating funding for women candidates, for women’s capacity building, and 
implementing voluntary quotas. There has been a fair amount of variation in 
implemented solutions. In the United States, there are a number of political action 
committees focused on capacity building and financing for women candidates (for 
example, EMILY’s List and Annie’s List). In Costa Rica there have been calls on 
political parties to set aside funds to train women and promote their participation, and 
several parties have committed a specific percentage of their training budgets to women. 
In Panama, parties use at least 25% of public funds for capacity development, and of that, 
10% goes to women. Finally, in El Salvador, the FMLN party has created a specific fund 
for the promotion and training of women in the party.148 
Quotas were discussed in depth in the previous chapter; however, it is worth noting that 
there are only two countries, France and South Korea, with parity quotas at the moment. 
Both of them have either weak or no enforcement mechanism. Additionally, Ecuador 
enacted a 2000 reform to their quota law that changed the quota to 30% with a 5% 
increase at each subsequent election until the quota reaches 50%.149 
Looking at women’s power within parliaments, women hold just over 14% of the most 
senior positions in parliament, that of speaker, and women hold approximately 22% of 
deputy speaker positions. The higher representation of deputy speakers is likely due to a 
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couple factors. First, there are more deputy speaker positions than speaker positions. 
When there are multiple positions, parliaments can more easily divide them between men 
and women. Second, the position of speaker often requires significant political 
experience, which, compared to men, women often do not have.150 
In committee leadership, women hold roughly 21% of chair positions and 22.5% of 
deputy chair positions. In committee representation, women generally have more 
representation on socially focused committees. For example, in one survey, researchers 
found that women legislators made up 40% of family, youth, and the disabled focused 
committees, 30% of education focused committees, and 35% of health focused 
committees. Of the other committees, women generally make up between 16 and 20%.151 
In reviewing how committee representation is decided, in some parliamentary structures 
individual members choose their committee membership; in others, parties have a 
stronger role to play. The ability to control committee membership is one of the many 
potential sources of political party power. 
Generally, party structure is less transparent than the parliamentary structure, which 
makes it more difficult to analyze. In many proportional representation systems, party 
leaders control candidate selection. In these cases, legislators’ freedom can be 
constrained as they balance their future electoral ambitions with present day votes.152 
Parties’ power also comes from their ability to enforce discipline and sometimes sanction 
noncompliant members. In one study, a majority (over 70%) of parliamentary 
respondents described party discipline as fairly strict or strict. In the cases where parties 
can sanction, these powers can range from suspending/expelling the member from the 
party, sending the member’s case to a disciplinary committee, or applying economic 
sanctions.153 This can be a significant problem for gender-focused bills because with 
stricter party discipline (having electoral and sanction consequences), there is less 
opportunity to build cross-party support for bills or to cross party lines in votes.154  
Countries that have successfully used some of the measures mentioned above to move 
closer to parity include Croatia and Rwanda. In Croatia, the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), one of the two major parties, instituted a women’s wing, internal party quotas, and 
a training program, and has taken political stances to achieve more parity. The SDP 
Democratic Women’s Forum was formed in 1995 to advocate for women within the 
party. They successfully instituted a 40% internal party quota, which is supplemented by 
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a training program for their women members. The party as a whole supported a number 
of woman-related legislative issues including equal pay, childcare, and reproductive 
rights. Their efforts have corresponded to a greater representation of women in 
parliament and influential party positions for women. For example, in 2010, over 40% of 
the SDP’s executive committee were women.155 
In Rwanda, women’s political participation has been closely related to the process of 
democratization. Rwanda’s constitution references the Convention to Eliminate All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and requires a 30% quota for women 
in all decision-making bodies (parliament, the executive cabinet, the judiciary, and local 
government). In addition, political parties decided on voluntary quotas that required 30% 
of their listed candidates to be women. This was a key factor in the women-held seat 
percentages of 2003 (48.8%) and 2008 (56%).156 
Another method of measuring equality in government is by examining the appointees and 
subsequent power given to members of a presidential cabinet. Parity cabinets have been 
achieved by widely differing nations, including Bolivia, France, Chile, and Spain. 
Though each nation achieved an equal balance of men and women, some of the cabinets 
were more successful than others. The parity cabinet in Chile was largely seen to be a 
personal agenda of the president, Michelle Bachelet, while José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero’s cabinet in Spain represented a larger social change.157 
Politically, parity goes beyond numbers in cabinets or in parliament (although there is 
rarely parity in those milieu), and into power parity. Campaign finance, training, and 
quotas work to advance number parity, but to explore power parity, it is important to also 
consider legislative leadership and party involvement.  
Case Study: Sweden 
Sweden is one of the countries identified as the closest to closing the gender gap. To do 
so, they enact educational, cultural, domestic, corporate, and political policies. Beginning 
at the preschool level, the education system works to challenge gender stereotypes both in 
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the classroom and in instructional material. Culturally, there is a movement to introduce a 
gender-neutral pronoun, ‘hen,’ into the lexicon.158 
Domestically, there are a number of initiatives for parents. After having a child, sixty 
days of leave are allocated to each parent and then one of the two parents can receive 
almost a full salary for a year before returning to their job. To encourage men to take 
paternity leave, in 1995 “Daddy Leave” was introduced. Daddy Leave initiated penalties 
for not taking advantage of paternity leave, and these measures have been successful. 
More than eight in ten men took leave after it was introduced. Additionally, the state 
assists in both childcare and elder care. There are highly subsidized preschools for 
children over twelve months, and older citizens are eligible for state-sponsored elder 
care.159 
In the corporate realm, there are specific gender benchmarks for businesses to reach and 
strong pay-differential legislation. Politically, there is a 40% quota in place. Sweden also 
had the distinction of surpassing their quota in 2010, with women occupying 45% of 
parliamentary seats.160 Overall, Sweden actively pursues gender equity with 
comprehensive policies in multiple areas.  
Case Study: France 
Historically, France has been behind its European neighbors in women’s rights. Women 
did not receive the right to vote or run for office until 1944, though movements 
promoting women’s suffrage began decades before. As late as the early 2000s, women’s 
political participation was still lagging. In fact, the 2012 National Assembly was only 
12.3% women, and was ranked sixty-sixth in the world.161 
However, recently the nation has garnered international attention as it instituted laws to 
equalize male and female representation and participation in politics. This pursuit of 
parity in France stemmed from the argument that in order to achieve a true democracy, 
women must be equally involved. The movement championed the slogan “a democracy 
that excludes half the population is not a democracy.162 
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The foundation of the coming “parity laws” was established in July 1999 when France 
legalized affirmative action. Since then, France enacted the parity law, which dictates 
“equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and electoral positions.” The 
reforms require each party in an election to have 50% of each sex on electoral lists, 
allowing a 1% margin.163  
Since the implementation of the parity law in 2000, the results from subsequent elections 
have been mixed. The most success has been in municipal elections for municipalities 
with 3,500 people or more. Though the reforms have been criticized for not creating 
automatic equality, they have made huge strides. In 2012, 26.9% of the parliamentary 
seats were occupied by women, more than doubling the percentage of 2002.164 
Another area of progress for gender equality in France can be seen in the growing 
number of women who have been appointed to cabinet positions. In the current 
presidential administration, France has witnessed a growing number of women included 
on the president’s cabinet. François Hollande achieved parity when he announced that 
seventeen of the thirty-four cabinet members would be female. Though the figure itself is 
encouraging, some have argued that the actual power given to women has decreased 
since the previous administration, under President Nicholas Sarkozy.165 Sarkozy’s first 
cabinet included women appointed to many of the prominent positions including Finance, 
Justice, Health, and Defense. In Hollande’s cabinet, appointed in 2012, none of those 
positions were occupied by women. Instead, women were appointed to more 
stereotypically female positions including: Social Affairs and Health, Culture and 
Communication, Senior Citizens, Families, and Disabled People. Though France 
continues to trail behind its European neighbors in terms of gender equality, they are 
making impressive strides forward.  
Criticisms of Parity  
There are a number of criticisms of legislating parity. A primary one is that some women 
say that they do not desire government intervention and desire women to gain political 
support on their own. Another argument against legislating parity is that it forces change 
while incremental progress is more representative of cultural change. The institutional 
reforms in France, as discussed above, illustrate that legislation alone will not change the 
attitudes, or voting patterns, of a society instantaneously. Another criticism of parity 
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initiatives, and quotas in general, is that they are undemocratic. One writer asserts that by 
creating laws about the number of individuals of a certain gender that must be included 
displays distrust in voters and broadly generalizes that it is unfair to select women based 
primarily on gender.166 
Though the goal of achieving worldwide political party is far from reached, important 
strides are being made across the world, signifying that attitudes are changing and 
progress, though slow, is occurring. 
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Chapter 5: Argentina Case Study 
Descriptive Representation 
Political Structure  
The Executive 
The Argentinian Constitution of 1853 established that a democratic government, which is 
representative, republican and federal, rules the country. In this context, the executive 
power is vested in the president, who is both the chief of state and head of government. 
The president is also the chief of the country’s armed forces. The president and vice 
president are elected on the same ticket by popular vote for four-year terms. Presidents 
may serve only two consecutive four-year terms, but unlimited nonconsecutive terms.167 
The constitutional reform of 1994 introduced a runoff system for presidential elections. If 
one candidate receives more than 45% of the votes, or more than 40% with a 10% 
advantage over his or her closest rival, there is no need for a runoff election. Otherwise, 
there must be a runoff election between the two most voted tickets in the first round. In 
the runoff, a simple majority wins. 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (CFK) was elected President in 2007 and then reelected 
to a second term in 2011 with 54% of the vote. Her term will end in 2015, as she cannot 
run for president again without a constitutional reform. At times during her second term 
the possibility of a constitutional reform was discussed, but it no longer appears to be a 
feasible option. Fernández de Kirchner is the country’s first elected and reelected female 
president, and the second female ever to serve as President (the first was Isabel Martínez 
de Perón, 1974–1976). She is the widow of former President of Argentina Néstor 
Kirchner (NK), who ruled the country from 2003 to 2007. From 1989 until her election to 
the presidency, Fernández de Kirchner held various legislative positions, being both 
Senator and deputy for Santa Cruz and later for Buenos Aires province.  
According to the Argentinian constitution, the President is in charge of designating the 
ministers that comprise the cabinet. As of March 2014, only three out of fifteen ministers 
were female (20%). Women then ran the ministries of Social Development, Industry, and 
Security. This is consistent with the historical trend, which only started to change during 
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Néstor Kirchner’s presidency. From 2003 to 2007 three female ministers joined the 
cabinet as ministers of Defense, Finance, and Social Development.  
Among the developments during Fernández de Kirchner’s presidency, the election of 
Fabiana Ríos of the Partido Social Patagónico as Governor of Tierra del Fuego province 
stands out. She became the first woman to be elected provincial governor in the history of 
the country. Afterwards, Lucía Corpacci of the Frente para la Victoria followed Ríos’s 
lead, when she was elected Governor of Catamarca province. As of December 2013, 
Claudia Alejandra Ledesma Abdala de Zamora served as Governor of Santiago del Estero 
province. She replaced her husband, Gerardo Zamora, who had served as Governor since 
2005. She ran for Governor for the Frente Cívico por Santiago, after the Argentinian 
Supreme Court banned her husband from running for a new term. She won the election 
with almost 65% of the vote.168 Out of the twenty-three Argentinian provinces plus the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, in 2014 only three (13%) have female governors. 
This stands out as the highest percentage of governorships held by women in the 
country’s history. 
Néstor Kirchner’s presidency also brought an important improvement regarding the role 
of women in the higher ranks of the judiciary. For the first time in the country’s history, 
two women were appointed to the Supreme Court during his administration. First, Dr. 
Elena I. Highton de Nolasco was appointed as a Supreme Court justice in June 2004, 
becoming its Vice President in 2005. Later, Dr. Carmen María Argibay became a 
member of the Court on February 2005. Her appointment as Supreme Court justice was 
significant because she was a founding member of the International Association of 
Women Judges and was president of that organization from 1998 to 2000. Additionally, 
she was the founder of the Argentine Association of Women Judges. Both Dr. Highton 
and Dr. Argibay played critical roles in the creation of the Supreme Court’s Office of 
Domestic Violence (OVD) and its Office for Women, which Dr. Argibay headed until 
her death in May 2014. Before Dr. Argibay’s death, the two female justices constituted 
29% of the Supreme Court; however, a recent modification to the Supreme Court will 
reduce the number of judges from seven to five, so she will not be replaced. President 
Néstor Kirchner complemented his appointment of these two female justices with 
Presidential Decree No. 222/03 (Official Bulletin No. 30175, pg. 2), which made explicit 
the notion that the composition of the Supreme Court of Justice should reflect gender 
diversity. 
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The Argentinian Legislature consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The 
Chamber of Deputies is composed of 257 members who are elected for four-year terms, 
with half the seats being renewed every two years. Each one of Argentina’s twenty-three 
provinces plus the City of Buenos Aires is an electoral district. Chamber seats are 
distributed among the districts in proportion to their population. Parties and electoral 
alliances submit closed lists of candidates. The citizenry may not choose individual 
candidates from the lists or alter their order. Voters cast a ballot for a single list. The seats 
in each constituency are apportioned according to the largest average method of 
proportional representation (PR), conceived by the Belgian mathematician Victor 
D’Hondt in 1899. To participate in the allocation of seats, a list must receive at least 3% 
of the electoral register in the respective district. 
The Senate’s seventy-two members are elected for six-year terms, with one-third of the 
seats being voted on every two years. Each province and the City of Buenos Aires choose 
three Senators. The party or electoral alliance with the largest number of votes receives 
two seats, and the party or electoral alliance in second place receives one seat. 
In Argentina, women attained the right to run for election in 1947, but this did not 
immediately translate into increased participation of women in the political sphere. From 
1947 to 1983, women’s ability to participate in politics was limited by the military 
regimes that interrupted democratic rule in the country. With the country’s return to 
democracy in 1983, women began to participate more actively in the country’s political 
scene, but their presence in Argentine politics did not really take off until 1991, when 
Congress approved the gender quota law (Law No. 24.012). This law mandated that 30% 
of candidates nominated by the political parties for the Chamber of Deputies (the lower 
house of Congress) be women. In 2000, President Fernando de la Rúa signed a decree 
extending application of the quota law to the Senate as well. It was applied for the first 
time in October of 2001. 
Quotas: The Ley de Cupos 
Argentina was the first country in the Americas to pass a law allocating a share of 
political parties’ candidacies for elected office to women. The original law was not 
perfect, though; three decrees, issued in 1993, 2000, and 2005, were necessary to clarify 
the criteria for the law’s applicability.169
 
A reform adopted in 1994 enshrined the quota 
law as Article 37 of the Constitution. It states that affirmative action is required when the 
ultimate goal is to achieve real equality for all groups. 
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The law’s sanctions against the parties for noncompliance have facilitated its 
enforcement. Additionally, the electoral system is favorable to its implementation, 
because the electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies are multimember, and as 
mentioned before, parties have to present closed and blocked lists of candidates.170  
The implementation of the quota law brought about important changes regarding 
women’s participation in the Argentine legislature, including a jump in women’s 
participation and sustained high levels (with such high percentages as 38% in the 
Chamber of Deputies and 39% in the Senate, Argentina now ranks among the highest in 
the world in women’ representation in national legislatures); marked access to leadership 
positions in committees; an increase in legislative activity (women’s signatures on 
legislative projects); and a growing inclusion of issues related to women in the legislative 
agenda, as well as greater weight to gender projects.  
The Female Quota Law, or Ley de Cupos, was passed in 1991 and was first implemented 
in the election of deputies in 1993. Given early failures to comply with the law, it was 
necessary to revise the law’s criteria by regulatory decrees, first in 1993, then again in 
2000, and finally in 2005, the revision that remains in effect today. It was not until after 
the 2000 revision, in the 2002–2003 legislative session, that the 30% threshold 
established by the law was finally reached. In subsequent years, the share of women in 
the legislature grew past the threshold, reaching 40% in the 2008–2009 session, during 
the first presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Since the peak in 2008–2009, 
there’s been a slow decrease in the share of women in the Chamber of Deputies. These 
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Source: “Fundación Directorio Legislativo,” accessed November 20, 2014, 
http://www.directoriolegislativo.org/. 
Figure 5: Relative Gender Representation in the Chamber of Deputies, 
1992–1993 to 2014–2015 Legislative Sessions 
Source: Legislative Directory Foundation. 





































The Female Quota Law was not applied to positions in the Senate until the election for 
the 2002–2003 legislative session, which explains the jump from 3% to 35% from the 
2000–2001 session to the 2002–2003 session. The highest share of female representation 
in the senate, 43%, was reached in the 2004-2005 session and repeated in 2006-2007. 
After dropping in subsequent sessions, the share of women in the Senate returned to 40% 
for the 2014-2015 session. These data are illustrated in Table 8 and Figure 6 below. 
Table 8: Percentage of Women in the Senate by Legislative Session 









Source: Legislative Directory Foundation 
Figure 6: Relative Gender Representation in the Senate, 2001–2002 to 


























Source: Legislative Directory Foundation. 
Of the three branches of the federal government, the legislative branch is the arena where 
the role of women has been most significant. Even so, there are some proposals to further 
increment the participation of women in the legislature—the aspiration is to achieve 
gender parity, which is seen as an improvement over the quota law, which was always 
considered a temporary corrective measure. 
On a symbolic level, the Female Quota Law seems more like a concession than 
recognition of equal rights: this would not be the case with parity, which would guarantee 
equal representation and equal rights of men and women. Nevertheless, this objective is 
not broadly shared among Argentine society. The focus has shifted from quantifying the 
share of women in the legislature to the empowerment of female legislators and the 
opening up of access to more powerful roles within the legislature. Ideally, this would 
manifest itself in more women functioning as “block authorities” to preside over 
commissions in either of the two chambers. 
Women perceive the quota law as an affirmative action that has helped to promote their 
participation in decision-making in the legislative bodies. However, in attempting to 
assess the true advancement of women legislators in Argentina, several authors argue that 
to assess the real power of the women who are national deputies and senators, one has to 
evaluate their real access to positions of authority—such as chairs and vice-chairs—in 
their respective legislative bodies, as well as in their intraparty blocs and committees.171 
In this realm the assessment turns out to be less positive. Women have been excluded 
from the presidencies of both houses and from the leadership of the political blocs or 
coalitions. Additionally, studies continue to show that women are always selected to lead 
those committees related to issues that are perceived as more proper for women’s 
interests, such as the family, women’s issues, environment, and culture, while men are 
concentrated in those of perceived greater weight, particularly those focused on 
economics and taxation. 
Broader Societal Factors 
Feminism and Women’s Movements in Argentina 1900–Present  
Advances in women’s rights and women’s political participation in Argentina came in 
fits and starts over the course of the twentieth century. In an effort to succinctly describe 
the history of women’s movements and feminism in Argentina, we rely on the work of 
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Dora Barrancos,172 in which she lays out three distinct periods of activity: the first 
encompasses the turn of the century through 1932 and marks the dawn of feminism in 
Argentina and (unsuccessful) struggle for universal suffrage; the second is the period 
from 1946 to 1955, which saw the achievement of franchise and participation in elected 
office (also coincided with the advent of Peronism); and the third is from 1976 to the 
present. 
Women’s movements in Argentina follow from the rise of feminism that occurred around 
the turn of the century. This rise culminated in the holding of the first International 
Women’s Congress of Argentina in 1910. Participants spoke out on a range of issues, 
demanding political rights for women, equality in civil and legal rights, the right to 
divorce, mixed and secular education, improved labor conditions, and the suppression of 
all forms of servitude. Suffrage, with its potential to influence outcomes across the range 
of these issues, became a central focus of this period.  
The end of the first World War brought about changes in the role of women in European 
society; these changes were reflected in Argentina as well. In this period, three figures 
stand out in the struggle for women’s access to suffrage: Julieta Lanteri, Alicia Moreau 
de Justo, and Elvira Rawson de Dellepiane. While there may have been different 
interpretations of how suffrage should be pursued among early feminists (essentially, 
either incrementally or universally), these differences disappeared at the end of the first 
World War. Opinions coalesced around fighting for universal suffrage, just like that 
enjoyed by men.  
The 1920s saw an increase in activity in the struggle for suffrage, with a greater number 
of women’s associations expressing support for the cause. The movement had originated 
in the middle class, but by the 1920s, women form the highest levels of Argentine society 
were joining, albeit with more moderate attitudes. Lanteri launched the National Feminist 
Party in 1920, with the announced intent that it would cease to exist the day women’s 
suffrage was achieved. 
After three decades of recurring demands from women’s groups, the Argentine Chamber 
of Deputies finally began debate on the Law on Suffrage in 1932. The Chamber approved 
the female vote that same year, but the bill was ignored by the (more conservative) 
Senate and did not advance. There was a significant lapse in activity from this point until 
the mid-1940s, as demands for advancement of women’s issues took a back seat to the 
dominant concerns of that period in world history and domestic political instability (in 
Argentina the 1930s are known as the “decade of infamy”).  
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The election of Juan Domingo Perón in 1946 marked a swift turning point in women’s 
efforts to obtain these rights. While Eva Perón herself may not have been a feminist, she 
was an inspiring figure who was able to mobilize women. Suffrage was obtained in 1947: 
the law was passed on September 9 and implemented into law on September 23 of that 
same year.173 
The Peronists’ efforts were well rewarded: women voted in national elections for the first 
time in 1951, and voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Peronist party, contributing 
heavily to the party’s victory. At that same time,women in Argentina were elected to an 
unprecedented 30% of seats in both houses of Congress. Unfortunately, the music 
stopped in 1955 when General Perón was deposed by a coup d’etat. In the brief intervals 
of democratic governance over the next 30 years, there were almost no women in 
Congress. 
The next critical appearance of a strong women’s movement in Argentina was a product 
of the worst dictatorship in Argentina’s history, the so-called “Process” of 1976–1983. 
These women—the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo—were key 
protagonists in the struggle against the military dictatorship, publicly and forcefully 
demanding the return of their “disappeared” family members.  
The return to democracy in 1983 brought with it the return of the feminist movement, 
though with a marked change of positions and an updated agenda, including two central 
issues: political recognition and domestic violence. The struggle for political recognition 
took shape in the efforts of women to achieve passage and implementation of the Female 
Quota Act, which sought to establish thresholds for women’s access to elected office. 
Quota legislation was enacted in 1991 thanks to the efforts of a broad coalition of women 
working from across the range of political parties. The law changed the composition of 
party lists used to present candidates for election: it requires that a minimum of 30% of 
listed candidates be women, and furthermore that they be listed in positions that ensure 
the possibility of listed women being elected.174 As already mentioned, Argentina became 
the first country to enact women’s participation quotas, and was later followed by a group 
of other Latin American countries.  
There have also been significant achievements on the other central issue on the feminist 
agenda, the fight for protections against domestic violence. Among these, several laws 
have been passed, as listed below: 
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 National Law No. 26.364 (2008)175 —Law on Prevention and Punishment of Human 
Trafficking and Victims’ Assistance. 
 National Law No. 26.485 (2009)176—Law on Integral Protection to Prevent, Punish, 
and Eradicate Violence against Women in Areas in Which They Develop 
Interpersonal Relations—and its regulatory implementation via decree 1.011 (2010). 
 National Law No. 26.842 (2012)177—Modification to National Law No.26.364 
(2008), Law on Prevention and Punishment of Human Trafficking and Victims’ 
Assistance. 
 National Law No. 26.791 (2012)178—Incorporation of the concept of femicide in the 
National Criminal Code by amending Article 80 of the same. 
In addition to these important advances, two fundamentally important pieces of 
legislation in civil rights with significant implications for women also merit notice: 
 National Law No. 26.618 (2010)179—Marriage Equality Act. This law made it legal 
for people of the same sex to marry, making Argentina the first country in Latin 
America to recognize this right at the national level.  
 National Law No. 26.743 (2012)180—Right to Gender Identity Law. This is another 
pioneering law, allowing individuals to establish their civil identity in accordance 
with their personal gender identity, which may differ from their biological sex.  
The support and activism of feminists, regardless of political party, played a fundamental 
role in the passage of these laws.  
Today in Argentina, the issue that unifies the entire spectrum of feminist activism is the 
legalization of abortion. While the past thirty years have seen numerous advances on 
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women’s issues, many feminists consider legalized abortion to be the unfinished business 
of democracy. Since 2005, the National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe and Free 
Abortion has brought together a diverse array of feminist women, the women’s 
movement, and women who participate in different political and social movements to 
campaign for this cause using the slogan: “Sexual education to decide, contraception to 
not abort, legal abortion to not die.” 
In early November of 2014 the campaign resubmitted a proposal for the legalization of 
abortion to the Chamber of Deputies, marking the fifth time they have submitted the 
proposal (the previous versions all having lost parliamentary status due to lack of 
advancement). This most recent proposal included the signatures of sixty-four members 
of the House, including members from almost every legislative block and significant 
representation from the ruling party. The debate to decriminalize abortion was thus 
reinstalled in the Chamber of Deputies; however, the proposal again did not succeed, as it 
lacks the necessary support to become law, beginning with the fact that the project does 
not have the support of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. 
Factors of Underrepresentation 
Women’s Participation in the Argentine Labor Market (2003–2013)  
Although women have made significant improvements in education and access to the 
labor market, it is important to mention that the participation of women in the Argentine 
labor market continues to be much lower than that of men, as shown in Figure 7 below. 
Not only do Argentine women lag behind men in the rate at which they engage with the 
productive economy, whether in terms of economic activity, employment rate, 
unemployment rate, or the degree to which they are subjected to unregistered 
employment, those women who do obtain salaried positions in the formal economy also 


















Source: Observatory on Employment and Business Dynamics (Argentine Ministry of Labor, Employment 
and Social Security), based on the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) of the National Survey 
and Census Institute (INDEC).181  
Informal Labor 
A substantial portion of employment in Argentina is informal or unregistered.While the 
share of persons informally employed is decreasing, as shown in Figure 8, informality 






                                                 












Source: Labor Statistics Bulletin (Argentine Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security), based on 
the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) of the National Survey and Census Institute (INDEC).182  
Figure 8 also shows that women depend more heavily on informal employment than men. 
While the nonregistered employment rate among women has fallen faster than that of 
men since 2003 (from about 54 to 36%), it still exceeds the rate at which men are 
informally employed by about 5%.  
The reduction in the share of informally employed women is at least partly attributable to 
specific efforts to discourage informality in certain sectors and to encourage registration 
of domestic employees. This is an accomplishment of the Kirchner-Fernández de 
Kirchner governments.  
Policies in Support of Higher Female Labor Force Participation 
One of the main obstacles to increasing female labor force participation is that women 
take more responsibility for caring for their families (both children and the elderly). The 
domestic responsibilities of women who enter the labor force do not change significantly, 
resulting in the “double workday” of their paid work plus the unpaid domestic work. 
These are the primary drivers behind their higher turnover rate in the labor force and 
greater preference for part-time work. Women are also more likely to require extra time 
off to take care of their children. Knowing they have to balance home and work 





responsibilities, women are more likely to turn down promotions or take on additional 
responsibilities at work than are men. 
These competing responsibilities have different effects on women in different social 
strata. Families in higher income strata can resolve many of these problems by taking 
advantage of the childcare and domestic services available to them. In lower income 
groups, women of reproductive age have little choice but to exit the labor market when 
they start families. 
In sum, the data show that the Argentine labor market is significantly divided along 
gender lines. Not only do women perform most unpaid work, when women are employed 
in paid work, they are overrepresented in the informal sector. In terms of salaried labor, 
stratification is both horizontal—in terms of the sectors in which women are most likely 
to be employed—and vertical, with women less likely to advance to executive or middle 
management positions in both private and public companies. The result of this 
stratification is that women earn lower wages than their male colleagues. Although there 
has been a clear trend towards gender equality in the last decades, the overall result is that 
there is still a long way to go to achieve full equality between women and men in the 
Argentine labor market.  
Networks and Personal History 
Cristina Elisabet Fernández de Kirchner was born in Riguelet, La Plata (Buenos Aires 
Province), on February 19, 1953. Her father was Eduardo Fernández and her mother, of 
German descent, was Ofelia Wilhelm.183 While it does not seem that Cristina’s family 
had significant prestige or political ties, her mother was an early influence. She was a 
union representative and was important in Cristina’s initial passion for politics. This 
passion further manifested when Cristina began to study law at Universidad de la Plata 
and met her future husband, Néstor Kirchner. Both of them were very active in university 
politics and in youth Peronist organizations (Cristina in the Frente de Agrupaciones Eva 
Perón [FAEP]; Néstor in the Federación Universitaria por la Revolución Nacional 
(FURN]).184 They married in 1975, established a law firm in Santa Cruz, and made 
several real estate investments that became the basis of their wealth. They had two 
children, Máximo (born in 1977), and Florencia (1990). The personal and political 
partnership of Néstor and Cristina has a place etched in Argentina’s modern history, right 
alongside Evita and Juan Perón. Following in their Peronist footsteps, the Kirchners 
developed a powerful marital political alliance and even a political philosophy known as 
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Kirchnerismo (or simply K). Néstor was a significant influence in Cristina’s political life, 
but was a partner rather than a mentor. 
After the 1976 military coup, Cristina took a hiatus from her political activism. Even on 
hiatus, her political bent was still present: she worked as a lawyer focused on human 
rights,185which likely further influenced her political trajectory. After the fall of the 
dictatorship and the return to democracy in 1983, Cristina reengaged in politics and 
became a militant in the Partido Justicialista (Peronist block). In 1989 she was elected to 
the House of Representatives in Santa Cruz, and then reelected in 1993. Thus began 
Cristina’s famed political career and a new chapter in her political partnership with 
Néstor. He was elected Governor of Santa Cruz in 1991, and in 1995 Cristina became 
Senator of the province of Santa Cruz, returning for another term in 2001. In between, 
she was elected Representative to the national Congress (1997).  
With the national spotlight on her, Cristina quickly began to garner attention for her 
strong positions as well as for her articulate and fiery discourse. She became a fixture in 
the national and international media, with a great deal of attention and commentary 
focused on her makeup and expensive clothes. Her increased visibility as an orator (she 
can speak for hours without a single note in front of her) and her performance on 
powerful committees in the Senate and in the House (Constitutional Affairs, Budget, 
National Defense, International Affairs) not only demonstrated her political skills, but 
also led to increased controversies because of her firm and uncompromising political 
style. Cristina had become a real force on the national stage as a legislator, and her force 
increased substantially with the election of Néstor as President of Argentina in 2003. 
Although Cristina now bore the shared spotlight of her husband’s new national role, she 
carried on with her own political career, becoming Senator of the Province of Buenos 
Aires in 2005. She refused to be called First Lady and insisted instead on “The First 
Citizen.” The political partnership of Cristina and Néstor became stronger and more 
dynamic during his presidential term. Even though she continued to shine as a senator, 
she also became closely engaged with his presidency and his policy initiatives. She was 
present in all the Cabinet meetings and was directly involved with Parliamentary Affairs 
and Human Rights issues (e.g., the Memory Museum, and the Mothers and Grandmothers 
of the Plaza de Mayo). She was also the first senator to have an office in the presidential 
palace.186 
One of Néstor Kirchner’s most significant accomplishments as President was handling 
the economic crisis that had shaken Argentina since 2001. During his administration 
(2003–2007), the economy stabilized, with an annual growth of 8% to 9% and a fiscal 
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surplus that was the highest in Argentina’s recent history. His popularity soared. In a 
surprise move, rather than seeking reelection for a second term, he announced he would 
not seek reelection and that Cristina would be the candidate for the presidency for their 
party (Frente para la Victoria). Interestingly, the frontrunner of the opposition was 
another woman, Elisa Carrió, but Cristina won handily as she rode on a combination of 
his presidential coattails and her own distinguished career as a legislator. Now that the 
presidential spotlight was fully on her, there was a role reversal as Néstor became “The 
First Citizen” and was a key player in her administration. Thus the Kirchners 
strengthened and advanced their powerful political team (K), which was abruptly shaken 
when Néstor died unexpectedly on October 10, 2010.187  Nonetheless, he continues to be 
an influence in Cristina’s political life, and she still references him in her political 
discourse. 
In the midst of mourning her lifetime political and personal partner, Cristina ran for 
reelection for a second presidential term in 2011, winning with 54% of the vote. Her 
second term has had some significant economic and political turmoil, as will be discussed 
in the following section.  
Substantive Representation  
Introduction 
This section examines the substantive aspect of President Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner’s legacy as a female chief executive by focusing on her key campaign promises, 
policy initiatives, and political choices. This case study provides a discussion of her 
pivotal actions in the economic, social, and foreign policy realms. In economic policy, 
the important political themes have been income redistribution, boosting consumption, 
and strengthening the labor market. Fernández de Kirchner has implemented these policy 
priorities through a renewed commitment to state intervention in the economy following 
a decade of neoliberalism. With the exception of a few isolated initiatives, the 
administration has not established investment incentives. The development of a 
comprehensive infrastructure program has also been notably absent. In social policy, 
Fernández de Kirchner’s administration has expanded the country’s social protection 
system, targeting various vulnerable groups.  
During her presidency, Fernández de Kirchner has enacted a number of laws promoting 
women’s rights. Among these, two are particularly noteworthy: the 2009 law instituting 
                                                 




protections for women in their interpersonal relationships,188 and the 2008 human 
trafficking law.189 She also passed two important pieces of gender-related human rights 
legislation: the legalization of same-sex marriage through the 2010 Marriage Equality 
Act (Law No. 26.618) and the 2012 Right to Gender Identity Law (Law No. 26.743), 
which grants the individual the right to determine his or her gender. Fernández de 
Kirchner’s government has also implemented an aggressive human rights policy, 
especially regarding the human rights abuses and violations that occurred during the last 
dictatorship.  
Strong political activism has marked the President’s foreign policy in South America 
within the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) and the UNASUR (Union of South 
American Nations). She also maintained a solid political partnership with Venezuela and 
its controversial leader, the late Hugo Chávez. The President’s nationalism is reflected in 
her strong rhetoric around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and her pursuit of 
international support for their reclamation. Weak relationships with the international 
financial community and key multilateral organizations (IMF, World Bank) have 
subverted these other efforts.  
Campaign Promises 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s first presidential campaign was primarily based on her 
husband Néstor’s record of reducing poverty and unemployment following the 2001 and 
2002 economic crisis.190 Néstor had successfully presided over the Argentine economic 
recovery, taking advantage of the cost competitiveness that resulted from the currency 
devaluation and the concurrent world commodities boom of the early 2000s. He also 
restructured Argentina’s debt and paid off outstanding International Monetary Fund 
loans. During his administration, Fernández de Kirchner was a very active First Lady and 
Senator, working as a key collaborator in crafting his policies. Like Néstor, she believes 
in the need for strong state intervention in markets.  
While Fernández de Kirchner’s campaign portended general continuity with Néstor’s 
governing model, her campaign did not provide details of her plans for her time in office. 
Campaign posters said simply, “We know what is missing. We know how to get it 
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done.”191 Overall, she positioned herself as a candidate who would continue current 
policies and, as discussed below, she has kept that promise. Nevertheless, during her first 
term as President, Fernández de Kirchner was forced to broaden her political alliances in 
order to guarantee the Kirchner model’s survival. She did so by appointing Julio Cobos, a 
former governor of the province of Mendoza and member of the Unión Cívica Radical 
(the primary opposition party), as her Vice President.  
Economic Policy  
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s economic policy essentially continued the regime 
established under Néstor, which sought to achieve three objectives in recovering the 
Argentine economy from the 2001–2002 crisis:192 first, the restoration of national 
autonomy in determining economic policy; second, reindustrialization via diversification 
of the economy’s productive structure, with a particular focus on exports; and third, 
bolstering employment, in terms of both quantity and quality. To facilitate these goals, 
Néstor’s administration took advantage of the prior currency devaluation to establish a 
stable and a competitive real exchange rate (SCRER), which became a key pillar of his 
macroeconomic policy. The SCRER was a crucial component underlying Argentina’s 
success at sustaining high growth rates during this period while reducing unemployment, 
labor market informality, and poverty. Along with the SCRER, the Kirchners pursued a 
suite of additional economic policy measures: public sector deleveraging; fiscal 
sustainability; increased public spending; controls on the entry and exit of speculative 
capital; regulation of key sectors via negotiation of price and compensation agreements; 
state support for collective bargaining processes; sustained increases in the minimum 
living wage; and increased coverage and benefits in the social protection system. 
The macroeconomic program’s primary achievements were high growth rates through 
stimulation of domestic markets (more consumption than investment); twin surpluses in 
the fiscal and current accounts; a marked accumulation of international reserves; 
increased production of nontraditional goods and services with high added value; 
improvements to the national financial system; and deleveraging from foreign-
denominated debt.  
In 2008, just one year after Fernández de Kirchner’s election, the world financial crisis 
set in. However, the financial crisis did not negatively affect Argentina’s relations with 
global markets. Much to the contrary, it represented something of an opportunity, as the 
crisis resulted in low interest rates and massive liquidity surplus in world markets. 
Unfortunately, the administration was unable to avail itself of the opportunity to promote 
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increased investment in energy, infrastructure, transport, and communications. 
Throughout the crisis, the world kept demanding Argentina’s raw materials (e.g., soy), 
and the Argentine automotive industry continued its rapid integration with its 
counterparts in Brazil and Mexico. Despite this, the twin surpluses slowly dwindled for 
entirely endogenous reasons. On the one hand, steady growth in inflation cut into the 
competitiveness created by the original devaluation,193 while on the other hand, public 
spending, particularly on subsidies and transfers, grew at an unsustainable rate.  
Over the course of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s two terms, her administration’s most 
significant challenges have been inflation and its consequences of reduction in acquisitive 
power, and increased costs in both the public and private sectors. The government’s 
underreporting of official inflation rates reflects the gravity of this challenge. Beginning 
in early 2007, the official inflation rate estimates of the Argentine statistics institute, 
INDEC, began to diverge from those emanating from the private sector. Such 
discrepancies have continued into 2014, and unofficial estimates are generally two or 
three times greater than those reported by INDEC.194 
In 2011, increasing distrust in the Argentine economic model provoked a massive exit of 
private capital. This exodus has further increased another pressure for the economic and 
financial systems, which is the need to maintain dollar reserves in the Argentine Central 
Bank. Argentina is a net importer of specific dollar-denominated commodities, primarily 
energy but also other items, such as paying service on outstanding public debt. Fernández 
de Kirchner’s government has implemented a number of measures to maintain the level 
of Central Bank reserves. The most important measure has been the cepo cambiario, 
established in 2012. This measure consists of severe restrictions on private individuals’ 
ability to purchase dollars (whether they are for savings, investment, or foreign travel),195 
and on companies’ ability to obtain dollars with which to purchase imported goods and/or 
send dividends outside of Argentina.  
Despite these measures, dollar reserves in the Central Bank have dwindled. At the end of 
2013 they fell to US$30 billion, down from $52.6 billion in 2010. This is their lowest 
level since 2006.196 In the first part of 2014, the government took action to respond, at 
least partially, to these realities. In January 2014, the Central Bank briefly withdrew its 
support for the peso, effectively devaluing the currency by 20%. The baseline interest 
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rate (corollary to the US Federal Funds Rate) was increased,197 and some of the 
restrictions in the cepo have been lifted or eased. 
The Kirchner government’s approach to handling inflation remains controversial. Despite 
these small concessions, with two years left in her presidency, Fernández de Kirchner 
shows no indication of plans to dramatically change the structure of her economic policy.  
Social Policy 
Social policy has been a core pillar of the Kirchner model, both for Néstor and Cristina. 
Protections for the retirement age population and other vulnerable groups (mainly low 
income) have been core elements of Fernández de Kirchner’s social policy model. While 
these policies have been fairly popular among the working classes, critics label them as 
Kirchnerist political clientelism (clientelismo). 
Néstor took the first steps in expanding benefits for the elderly with the Pension Inclusion 
Program (Programa de Inclusión Previsional o Moratoria Previsional).198 Fernández de 
Kirchner furthered this reform by implementing the Retirement Mobility Act (Ley de 
Movilidad Jubilatoria) in October 2008, which established two annual adjustments based 
on pension income and wages. Toward the end of 2008, the government also 
renationalized the retirement system. 
Those most critical of the Kirchner economic model assert that it was their need to 
finance their significant expansion of public expenditures that drove the most audacious 
actions undertaken during their tenure, for example, the  renationalization of the 
retirement system, renationalization of the state oil company, and increasing public debts 
with state entities. 
The other key component of the expansion of social protections to vulnerable populations 
during Fernández de Kirchner’s presidency has been the 2009 implementation, by 
presidential decree, of the Universal Child Allowance (Asignación Universal por Hijo, or 
AUH). The AUH is a conditional cash transfer program that extended the family 
allowances from the contributory system to additional persons not covered under that 
system. Specifically, it was created for the children from unemployed families, families 
working in the informal sector, or whose parents are domestic workers earning less than 
the minimum wage. The AUH provides a monthly cash allowance to these families, 
subject to health and school attendance checks. Beginning in May 2011, coverage was 
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further extended to pregnant women (from the third month of pregnancy) working in the 
informal economy. 
Finally, under President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s leadership, Argentina has 
passed two very progressive laws: one on same-sex marriage and the other on 
transgender rights. Argentina legalized same-sex marriage in 2010. The law gives same-
sex couples inheritance and adoption rights. Fernández de Kirchner strongly supported 
the law, which put her government at odds with the Catholic Church. She and Néstor had 
had disagreements with the Church before, and some political observers considered the 
same sex-marriage legislation to be a continuation of the same dispute.199  
The right to self-identification allows individuals to change their gender on official 
documents. The law applies not only to those who undergo sex reassignment surgery and 
hormone treatments but also to those who live as members of the opposite sex without 
undergoing medical procedures.200 This makes the law one of the most liberal in the 
world, as it requires neither a psychiatric diagnosis nor surgery.201 Néstor began the push 
for the right to self-identification, and Fernández de Kirchner continued advocating for it 
when she came to power.202  
Social policy has been a fundamental element of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s 
political project. She believes in using the power of the state to provide support for 
vulnerable groups, and has implemented policies to that end. The key social policies 
advanced during her presidency may not have arisen from a specific gender rights agenda 
(with the exception of the right to self-identification); nonetheless, her policies help 
achieve feminist policy objectives, particularly with respect to economic stability for 
women and their families at all stages of life. 
Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy under Fernández de Kirchner has centered on the promotion of economic 
integration with Argentina’s South American neighbors, and management of the 
unwinding of debts and payment of creditors in the wake of the 2001 default. In 2006 
(still under Néstor’s leadership), Argentina attempted to end the country’s relationship 
with the IMF by paying off outstanding debts. Both her and her husband’s 
administrations avoided formulating proposals to resolve outstanding debts with the Paris 
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Club until resolving that issue in May 2014. While Argentina has lost its appeals and 
been ordered by a US Federal Judge in New York to make full repayment to creditors 
still holding the original bonds on which the country defaulted, there is no clear course of 
action for resolving these outstanding claims.  
One foreign policy issue that has made headlines outside of Argentina is the Falkland 
Islands (Islas Malvinas). Argentina and the United Kingdom both claim sovereignty over 
the Falklands, which are currently a British territory. While there have been past 
referendums showing that the islanders want to remain British, Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner has strongly advocated for Argentina’s claim,203 which is not based on the 
island’s population, but on a territorial and historical justification. After her reelection, 
she sent an open letter to British Prime Minister David Cameron, stating that Britain was 
violating a 1960 United Nations’ resolution to end colonialism, and she sought 
negotiations to recover the islands. As part of the dispute, the Argentine government 
began to prohibit British ships from docking in Argentine ports. While sovereignty is not 
a new issue, recently the British oil company Rockhopper Exploration allegedly found 
offshore reserves of at least 450 million barrels in waters for which jurisdiction is 
determined by sovereignty over the Falklands.204 This has the potential to raise the stakes 
of the debate. 
Beyond the Falklands issue, Fernández de Kirchner seems to be more interested in the 
international community than Néstor, who paid little attention to international relations. 
In contrast, she traveled to the United States and Europe during her first campaign, and 
has engaged more with foreign audiences.205  
Political Strategy 
As Presidents of Argentina, the Kirchners have deployed what might best be termed 
“guerrilla” tactics to achieve their political agenda. Theirs was and is a very closed 
operation with decision-making concentrated in their hands. They receive input from 
trusted advisors, but retain absolute control over both decision-making and messaging. 
The Kirchners have closely controlled the flow of information from their administrations, 
which has allowed them to be very effective in their use of surprise. This tactic has 
reduced the opposition’s ability to mobilize against specific political projects before it is 
too late to stop them. This guerrilla approach derives from the Kirchners’ perception of 
the political struggle in which they are engaged, which itself derives from their political 
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initiation in the struggle against the dictatorship of the 1970s and early 1980s. Conceptual 
support comes from respected members of the Argentine and international academic 
communities, perhaps most notably figures such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. 
Within Argentina, a group of intellectuals organized under the name Carta Abierta 
(“Open Letter”) have provided particular support and political cover for Fernández de 
Kirchner’s political project.  
Fundamentally, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s political strategy is populist. Her appeal 
is to the masses, and she has maintained it throughout her presidency through her 
commitment to the expansion of the social support network and the constant undertaking 
of public political acts. Populism permeates her discourse, for which she has made ample 
use of the public airwaves.  
Symbolic Representation  
In the symbolic section of the case studies, it is critical to look at female leaders’ impact 
in a number of areas: their adherence to or transgression of traditional notions of 
leadership; the transformational quality of their leadership; and the symbolic effects of 
their leadership. These three analytical lenses offer complementary views of female 
leaders’ legacies. They illuminate how the women behave in relation to gendered 
leadership expectations; the women’s level of impact; and the effect they are likely to 
have in years to come.  
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner—Cristina, as she is popularly known—is a polarizing 
figure in Argentina and Latin America. Internationally, much of this polarization is 
related to controversial actions in the economic arena and a general association with 
populism and the “new left” in Latin America. Within Argentina, the population is 
strongly divided: the breakdown in popular sentiment begins with politics and is 
exacerbated by her leadership style, which is authoritarian and confrontational. Her style 
is the opposite of a consensus-builder; rather, she seems to actively seek controversy 
through political actions that create conflicts and divisions.  
In exploring the various facets of Cristina’s leadership in the context of her status as the 
first directly elected female President and the first woman reelected in Argentine 
history,206 it is difficult to separate her from her husband and predecessor in the 
presidency, Néstor Kirchner. Although “Kirchnerismo” carries his name, it should be 
understood as a shared project.207 As stated earlier, their political activism dates back to 
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the 1970s, when they met and married as law students at the University of La Plata. It 
began with their militancy against the dictatorship, and grew into a joint construction of 
power in the southern province of Santa Cruz. This political project was always a 
partnership, with both holding different offices at the local, provincial, and national 
levels. Cristina’s contributions to this partnership included the discourse, the conceptual 
framework, and the central ideas of the story. Néstor offered skill in political negotiation, 
executive management, and the ability to build a political base for sustaining the Kirchner 
model.  
Leadership Style—Authoritarian, Confrontational 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is a strong leader, who is determined to execute her 
policy priorities. As President, her primary characteristics have been concentrating power 
in herself, controlling decision-making in her administration, and governing with a firm 
hand. This is an authoritarian leadership style. With a few exceptions, she has displayed 
little effort at dialogue and consensus-building: Fernández de Kirchner makes decisions 
and then communicates them. These decisions are not up for discussion or debate. When 
Néstor Kirchner was alive, he and Fernández de Kirchner made decisions jointly, and it 
was well known that he maintained a strong role in her presidency. Since becoming a 
widow, she is more resolute, governs with a firm hand and makes all decisions alone.  
Fernández de Kirchner does not avoid controversy and has in fact provoked it on multiple 
occasions during her administration. Some examples of this behavior include those listed 
below:  
 “El Campo”—Early in her first presidency, she engaged in a significant power 
struggle with the agricultural sector over taxes imposed on exports. This primarily 
amounted to the retention of dollars passing through the Central Bank from the export 
of agricultural commodities, in particular soy.  
 “Los Medios”—Since Néstor’s first term in the presidency, the Kirchners have been 
engaged in a bitter dispute with the country’s two largest media groups (Grupo Clarín 
and La Nación), which culminated in their passing a law revising the regulatory 
policy for the national media. The most significant aspect of this law was the 
imposition of specific limits on the share of Argentine media outlets that can be 
owned by a single entity. Such regulation would require Grupo Clarín to divest itself 
of some of its holdings, but implementation of the law has been held up due to legal 
challenges. 
 Nationalization/Renationalization of Various Enterprises—During their presidencies, 
the Kirchners have nationalized the state airline (Aerolíneas Argentinas), pension 
funds, and the state oil company (YPN).  
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 Economic/Macroeconomic Policy: Cristina has exhibited unwavering commitment to 
the Kirchnerist economic model. In addition to domestic controversy, this has led to 
international confrontations over such tactics as manipulation of official statistics on 
economic indicators (most significantly the inflation numbers reported by the national 
statistics agency, INDEC) and nonpayment of certain creditors related to the 2002 
default (Paris Club, vulture funds). 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has had a turbulent relationship with the media. She 
generally declines media interviews and prefers instead to interact directly with the 
public. In her public appearances, Fernández de Kirchner proves to be an extraordinary 
orator who never reads her speeches. She can, however, come across as didactic and self-
referencing. Although Fernández de Kirchner avoids direct interaction with the media, 
she is a fixture of the domestic media.  
Fernández de Kirchner takes strong stances and holds to them, despite the significant 
political costs. As a result of some of these battles, she has lost popularity, particularly 
from the fight with the agricultural sector at the onset of her presidency. Her approach 
has generated division among the citizenry, which is divided into those who ardently 
support her and those whose opposition is every bit as fervent.208  
Recently she has shown a significant change in her leadership style. This is presumably 
due at least in part to the results of the October 2013 election, in which her party suffered 
significant defeats in the City of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires Province, and in other 
politically important jurisdictions.209 Other causes may include the allegations of 
corruption in contracting for public works projects (as well as corruption scandals 
involving people close to her) as well as the worrying signs emanating from the 
economy, forcing her to pivot and focus on closing out her presidency in an orderly 
fashion.  
Background/History—And how this Explains her Leadership Style 
The 1970s were a period of intense turmoil in Argentina. The decade saw the country 
descend into armed warfare, an undercover civil war, and the emergence of a military 
dictatorship that established a campaign of state terrorism greater in both depth and 
breadth than any of the other dictatorships of the region. This was a formative period in 
the young political militancy of both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández. 
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Both the authoritarian and confrontational elements of Cristina’s style have their roots in 
the struggle against the dictatorship. CFK (along with Néstor) studied law at the 
University of La Plata in the 1970s, at the height of Argentina’s Dirty War. Their 
personal experience as political activists in this period involved brief imprisonments—
and the fear of much worse—and ultimately a self-imposed “domestic exile” to Río 
Gallegos, the capital city of the southern province of Santa Cruz. As discussed elsewhere, 
the turmoil of this period had several consequences for the Kirchners that directly 
affected elements of their political style. 
First, it radicalized them. While they were never actually part of the armed Peronist 
factions (the FAR, the FAP, or the Montoneros), they functioned as public faces for both 
the university and professional fronts for the causes for which these groups fought. This 
explains the “radicality” of their political behavior and, above all, some aspects of their 
political management, such as the tight organization, the organizational discipline and 
centralized decision-making, the strategic use of both surprise and silence in daily 
administration, the concealment of information and the frequent need to engage with the 
masses through daily political acts. Second, they understood the significance of the 
struggle for human rights and the quest to bare all complicity with the dictatorship—from 
the collaborationist politics of many politicians to the behavior of the mass media (Clarín 
and La Nación). They have been particularly fierce in taking on the two major media 
outlets, against whom they organized one of the largest campaigns of attacks and 
allegations ever seen in Argentine politics. Finally, they took advantage of the fractured 
nature of the Peronist movement, which they divided with their creation of the Front for 
Victory. They exposed the right-wing elements within the movement personified by the 
figure of Carlos Menem, who they always linked with the conservative and conventional 
Justicialist Party (PJ). 
In synthesis, in their rise to power they put into daily political practice the idea of 
conflict, of confrontation, of dividing the waters between parties, and even within 
political and social organizations. They supported the emergence of the new social and 
economic structure of Argentina, which today features social movements with neither 
employment or formal work that are heavily dependent on subsidies. In this manner, the 
Kirchners built a strong political support structure for settling political disputes.  
“Masculine” Style of Governing Contrasted with Feminine Self-Presentation 
Applying the gendered notions of leadership discussed by Genovese in Women As 
National Leaders,210 Fernández de Kirchner’s authoritarian and confrontational style 
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clearly puts her on the “masculine” side of approaches to leadership, as conventionally 
perceived. While she is not known for the “soft influences” approach that might typically 
be identified with female leadership, it is interesting to contrast her “masculine” approach 
to leadership with her very feminine self-presentation, and how her political identity is 
directly tied to her gender. Throughout her career as a public figure, and particularly in 
her presidency, she has clearly maintained her femininity, in contrast to some of her most 
prominent contemporaries (Bachelet, Rousseff, and Merkel), whose approaches to 
elements like dress and hairstyle play down their femininity and take on more masculine 
or gender-neutral self-presentations.211  
Her femininity has also been politically beneficial at key points in her presidency. 
Following Néstor’s death she has played two roles—that of the strong woman capable of 
enduring the death of her political partner and maintaining firm control, and that of the 
weak widow who needs the compassion and understanding of the Argentine people. 
From her husband’s death in October 2010 through the end of 2013, she mourned 
publicly by dressing in black. This undoubtedly evoked empathy at a point when her 
political popularity had taken a significant hit.  
In early 2014 a blood clot was discovered in Fernández de Kirchner’s brain, for which 
she had surgery and was conspicuously absent from the public eye for some 50 days 
while she recovered. This coincided with the economy exhibiting troubling signs of a 
lack of confidence in her economic program. Cristina took this opportunity to present a 
much more human public persona. When she reappeared, it was in a video filmed by her 
daughter and distributed through social media. She chose this moment to finally end her 
period of mourning, no longer appearing in black. She has cut back on her direct 
engagement with the public, giving fewer speeches, appearing at fewer events, and 
choosing to allow other individuals (most significantly her cabinet chief, Jorge 
Capitanich) to represent the administration in the media. 
Transformational Leadership  
Patricia Lee Sykes discusses women as transformational leaders, defining them as leaders 
who “seek to change individual citizens, their states, their societies, and the relationships 
among these.”212 Two areas of transformation under Cristina’s leadership include, first, 
her early alliance with labor, which produced a shift in the balance of power between 
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capital and labor. She describes her politics as “national and popular,” referring to efforts 
to promote national interests and industry, and to put in place policies that reach out to 
the masses. Discourse on this front focuses on national sovereignty, and is manifested in 
a resurgence of the national productive apparatus. The “national and popular” frame 
provides a useful way of viewing the battles in which Fernández de Kirchner has 
engaged. She aggressively uses state power in service of what she perceives as a national 
interest. In each of the above-mentioned political battles in which she has engaged, she 
has been able to characterize her opposition as powerful parties whose interests were at 
cross purposes with those of the state. She framed the agricultural interests as traditional 
oligarchs.213 Fernández de Kirchner justified nationalizing private entities by framing the 
past privatization of these previously public entities as part of the failed legacy of the 
neoliberal model and not sufficiently serving the public interest. 
A second area in which both Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner have been 
transformational is in the construction of a power base among young people: not only did 
their electoral success depend heavily on construction of a base of party activism among 
young people, they also made a strong push to reward these young militants by putting 
them in politically powerful positions during their presidencies. In short, they brought 
back political militancy among the youth, organizing and rewarding young people who 
were just growing into political life. 
Here the principal actor is the Cámpora, a political unit created by Máximo Kirchner (son 
of Cristina and Néstor) in 2003, whose role in the Kirchnerist project began expanding 
after the 2008 dispute with the campo (the agricultural sector). Since that time, the 
Cámpora has taken on significant political responsibilities, with its members obtaining 
appointments to political positions throughout the executive branch and its ministries and 
in state companies. Others have become deputies or legislators. While Máximo founded 
Cámpora, its undisputed leader is Cristina.  
Symbolic Effects of CFK’s Presidency 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s election has generated a significant cultural change 
through the symbolic effect of a woman occupying a position at the highest level of 
power. In particular, the effect is one of women seeing other women in this role. It is a 
very important way to demystify these spaces that are considered masculine by 
definition.  
Fernández de Kirchner’s presence sends a lasting message that it is possible for women to 
reach the pinnacle of political power. For young women, in particular, successful 
women’s images become powerful models. They represent critical sociocultural changes 
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that affect not only the representation of women in politics, but also have the potential to 
impact the balance and distribution of power between women and men. 
While it is tempting to state that Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s mere presence in the 
presidency, as a woman, represents some kind of transformation in the society, it is 
important to ask if this was a product of a real social transformation that allowed a 
woman to be elected President for the first time in Argentina. Was this actually the case, 
or was it simply the result of a favorable confluence of economic and political factors 
specific to her life and political trajectory, including her political partnership with her 
husband, his election prior to hers, and the success of the economic model implemented 
in bringing Argentina back from the crisis of 2001–2002, among other things? Her 
presidency coincides with a period of significant changes, with a considerable expansion 
of civil rights, reforms of the civil and possibly criminal (penal) code, nationalization of 
strategic sectors of the economy (the airline, the pension funds, and the oil company), and 
the expansion of the social protection system to benefit the most vulnerable sectors of the 
population (e.g., universal child allowance, increased access to noncontributive pensions, 
and so on). This expansion coincides with a populist view of public administration, with 
poorly conceived public policy and a return to the Argentine economy’s old vices of 
inflation, devaluation, and the loss of value of the Argentine currency. In this way, the 
Kirchner decade has seen the economic bonanza necessary to sort out the challenges of 
the moment, but the reforms that could have altered the structural conflicts of the 







Chapter 6: Brazil Case Study 
Descriptive Representation 
Introduction 
Dilma Rousseff’s presidency (2010–present) marks the first time Brazil has elected a 
female head of state. The following descriptive analysis of the Rousseff administration 
includes a discussion of the Brazilian political landscape beginning with the 1985 
transition to democracy and ending with the current administration. This case study 
contextualizes the Rousseff administration within historical and social descriptions of 
female participation in Brazil’s legislative and executive branches. This case study 
includes events from the end of the dictatorship and the beginning of redemocratization 
in Brazil in 1985 to women’s mobilization and high political leadership. Broader social 
factors are examined to show the extent of opposition to the military dictatorship and the 
simultaneous rise of women and democracy in Brazil.  
An Overview of Brazil’s Political System 
With 190 million people214 and an electorate of 111 million,215 Brazil is Latin America’s 
largest and most populous country. Following two periods of dictatorship (1937–1945; 
1964–1984) in the twentieth century, it returned to democracy in 1985 and since then has 
been a federative, presidential republic, as established formally in the Constitution of 
1988. This notably progressive document enshrined the population’s legal, civil, social, 
economic, and human rights and also “weakened the executive and strengthened the 
legislative and judicial branches of the government.”216
 
Executive Branch  
In Brazil, the President is elected to a four-year term and may only be successively 
reelected once. A presidential candidate must receive an absolute majority in order to 
assume office, thus if no candidate wins over 50% of the popular vote, runoff elections 
are held.217 In October 2010 Brazil elected its first female President, Dilma Vana 
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Rousseff of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT), with 46.91% of the 
popular vote in the first round and 56.05% in the second.218 
Legislative Branch 
Brazil has a bicameral parliament consisting of a lower house, the Chamber of Deputies 
(Cámara dos Deputados), and an upper house, the Senate (Senado Federal), known 
collectively as the National Congress (Congresso Nacional). The lower house consists of 
513 legislators elected to serve for four-year terms, with seats being allocated to the 
twenty-six states proportionately based on the size of their electorate. Elections use an 
open list proportional representation system. The eighty-one senators serve eight-year 
terms and are elected by block vote. 
Electoral and Party Systems 
In this open list system, the Brazilian electorate votes for individual candidates; list 
formation is regarded as somewhat of a formality. Political parties tend to be weak and 
candidates campaign fairly independently. In fact, a politician might switch parties 
several times over a career.219 There is generally high fragmentation and low 
institutionalization among political parties, with the PT (now in its fourth consecutive 
presidential term) held up as the exception to this rule. There are roughly thirty official 
parties, twenty-one of which presently hold seats in the National Congress.220 Due to the 
multiplicity of parties, governments must rule by coalition. Rousseff currently heads a 
ten-party coalition that holds a majority in Congress and includes the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), Progressive Party (PP), the Party of the Republic 
(PR), and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), among others. Suffrage in Brazil is 
universal and compulsory.  
Quotas 
Quotas on female parliamentary representation first entered the political discussion in 
Brazil in the 1980s, during the redemocratization following the end of the military 
dictatorship. Deputy Marta Suplicy of the Workers’ Party (PT) introduced a quota law for 
local elections, which was passed in 1995 (in the wake of the Fourth World Conference 
on Women in Beijing), and a federal quota law was adopted in 1997.221 The current lei de 
cotas (Article 10 (3) of Law 9.504 of September 30, 1997) stipulates a minimum of 30% 
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and a maximum of 70% of each sex in both chambers of the Congresso Nacional. A 2009 
amendment to this law also reserves 10% of state-allotted broadcast time and 5% of 
public campaign funds “to promote the participation of women in politics.”222 Despite 
this legislation, female congressional representation has yet to reach 10%.  
Brazilian quota laws apply at the candidate list level, however, unlike in many other 
countries, voluntary quotas within political parties did not precede this law and have very 
little party “buy in.”223 This is just one of the factors considered to be contributing to the 
low impact of Brazil’s quota law. Other factors include the mismatch of a candidate 
quota with a highly individualized, open-list system in a context of undeveloped political 
parties. Kristin Wylie contends, “the preponderance of weakly institutionalized parties in 
Brazil has instilled a norm of non-compliance, facilitating an environment in which 
formal laws such as quotas are regularly flouted.”224 This is exacerbated by the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms included in the law, which states that if the quota is not met, 
candidates from the over-represented sex may be withdrawn but candidates from the 
under-represented sex may not replace them. And even this mechanism only applies 
above a threshold of 150% of seats per constituency.225  
As of the 2010 elections (the first since the 2009 quota amendment) women constitute 
8.8% or 44 out of 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 16% or 13 out of 81 
members of the Senate.226 As seen in Table 9, the level of female political participation in 
the legislature has only grown incrementally since the return to democracy, and the first 
federal election after the quota was implemented actually saw a slight decrease in the 
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Table 9: Female Representation in the Chamber of Deputies Since the 
Return to Democracy (1987–2015) 




Total number of 
deputies 
Percentage women 
1987–1991 26 460 485 5.36 
1991–1995 30 473 503 5.96 
1995–1999 32 481 513 6.24 
1999–2003* 29 484 513 5.65 
2003–2007 42 471 513 8.19 
2007–2011** 45 468 513 8.77 
2011–2015** 44 469 513 8.58 
* First election with federal quota law in effect  
** Lines added by the report authors using IPU data 
Source: Table translated from: Jutta Marx, Jutta Borner, and Mariana Caminotti, Las legisladoras: cupos de 
género y política en Argentina y Brasil. Buenos Aires: UNDP, 2007, 102. 
Political Biography: Dilma Rousseff  
Dilma Rousseff was born in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, on December 14, 1947, to a 
Bulgarian lawyer and a Brazilian schoolteacher. She attended private schools until high 
school, when she decided to attend a liberal public institution. Still a very young woman, 
Rousseff joined the Command of National Liberation (Comando de Libertação 
Nacional—COLINA),
227
 a faction of the Brazilian Socialist Party, in 1967. As a member, 
she learned about the methods and ideology of armed struggle against dictatorship 
deployed by Cuban revolutionaries Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.228 
In 1969, the police arrested some members of the COLINA for a bank robbery and 
subsequently raided the home of COLINA members. The home invasion ended in a 
shootout that left two policemen dead and another injured. Rousseff has not confirmed if 
she was present or involved in the incident, but she does not deny her association with the 
COLINA at the time. To distance herself from police speculation after the shootout, 
Rousseff left for Rio de Janeiro. In Rio, Rousseff met Carlos Araújo, a member of the 
                                                 
 




Brazilian Communist Party. Rousseff and Araújo, along with other Marxist-Leninist 
leaders, merged COLINA with the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard. They created a 
group called the Palmares Revolutionary Armed Vanguard (VAR Palmares). As the 
organization became progressively more militant in their activism, Rousseff began to 
encourage VAR Palmares on the mobilization of the working class in opposition of the 
dictatorship.229  
In 1970, police arrested VAR Palmares leader José Olavo Leite Ribeiro along with other 
members of the organization, including Rousseff and Araújo. She was arrested and 
tortured for twenty-two days by various methods including electric shock, and was 
subsequently imprisoned for twenty-eight months for her known association with militant 
antistate groups.230 Rousseff and Araújo managed to continue their relationship 
throughout their sentences and reunited once they were both freed.231 After Rousseff’s 
release from prison in 1972, she continued her studies. She received a degree in 
economics from Rio Grande de Sul Federal University in 1976. That year, she and Araújo 
had a daughter, Paula Rousseff Araújo. While they were never formally married, the two 
held a common-law marriage for thirty years.  
Rousseff’s formal political career began in 1980, when Brazil ended the mandatory two-
party political system, enabling multiple parties to return to the political landscape. 
Rousseff and Araújo reformed the Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Democrático 
Trabalhista, or PDT), which had been overthrown in 1964 by the military dictatorship. In 
1986, she and other members left the PDT and joined the Workers Party (PT) because 
they felt that the PDT had formed neoliberal alliances with the right-wing parties and 
strayed from its foundational principles.  
As a member of the new PT, Rousseff was appointed Municipal Secretary of Treasury, 
where she solidified alliances within the PT and served until 1988. As a result of her 
experience and her loyalty to the Worker’s Party, Rousseff was appointed to her first 
ministerial office, the State Secretary of Energy and Communication, in 2003, under the 
Lula administration. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva mentored Rousseff and 
promoted her to be his Chief of Staff in 2005.  
Dilma Rousseff ran for President in 2010 as the Worker’s Party candidate. During her 
campaign, Rousseff promised to continue popular Lula-era social programs to alleviate 
poverty and further economic growth. Rousseff did not get an absolute majority in the 
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2010 primary elections. However, she won the runoff election against the Social 
Democracy Party’s (PDSB’s) candidate, José Serra. She was sworn into the presidential 
office in January 2011. Rousseff is the third female head of state to govern Brazil, 
although she is the first to be democratically elected after the end of monarchic rule.  
Rousseff’s post-election agenda has focused on alleviating poverty, increasing social 
welfare and economic stability, and combating corruption. Rousseff has been criticized 
for not supporting a gender agenda during her election and presidency. Rousseff has not 
explained her agenda-making decisions, but it may be that she has chosen to emphasize 
her strong political interests in socialism over feminism. Another possible explanation is 
that President Rousseff is disinclined to split her political and public support over 
controversial issues like abortion.  
President Rousseff ran for reelection in October 2014, winning a second term in office. 
Obstacles for her reelection campaign included overcoming public dissatisfaction with 
her administration’s management of the preparations for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 
Olympics. The disproportionate amount of money spent on these sporting events conflicts 
with her socialist rhetoric and poverty-alleviation initiatives. Massive protests among 
students and the working class in the past two years have negatively affected her approval 
ratings, and cast doubts on a second term.  
Rousseff in Context: Brazilian Women in Executive Power 
After Dilma Rousseff’s 2010 election, Marta Suplicy, the Minister of Culture, claimed 
“the greatest change in Brazil since the right to vote was the election of a woman 
president.” Suplicy predicts that Rousseff’s leadership will influence public and private 
institutions to place more women in leadership roles. Most importantly, she notes, 
Rousseff’s symbolic significance as a female President will impact the way in which 
young girls imagine their future.232 The election of Rousseff is a significant marker for 
female political representation, but she is not the first woman to rise to executive 
leadership in Brazil. Her presidency should be understood against the historical backdrop 
of other female leaders in Brazilian politics. The PT (Worker’s Party) in particular has 
focused on enlisting the participation of women since redemocratization.  
Marta Suplicy understands the symbolic value of being the first woman to hold a position 
in Brazilian politics. She was the first female elected to the Federal Senate from São 
Paulo. After running a failed gubernatorial campaign in 1998 as the PT candidate, 
Suplicy served as the mayor of São Paulo from 2001 to 2004. One other woman, Luiza 
Erundina, also of the PT, has served as the mayor of the municipality. São Paulo selected 
Luiza Erundina Mayor in November of 1988, with Erundina taking office early in 
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January of 1989. Her election and the victory of the Worker’s Party (PT) came as a 
surprise to the party, which had only minimal success in the 1982 elections. 233 The 
mayoral leadership of the city of São Paulo is a critical position in the Brazilian political 
landscape. São Paulo is one of the largest cities in the world, the nation’s largest 
municipality, and the business center of an emerging BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) economy.  
Outside of São Paulo, women have risen to the executive branch from parties other than 
the PT. Roseana Sarney (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, or PMDB) served as a 
senator from 2003 to 2011, and is currently the Governor of Maranhão, the first woman 
to hold the position. She is the product of a political legacy; her father, José Sarney, 
served as the President of Brazil from 1985 to 1990.  
During Lula’s first year in office (2003), he appointed two women of color to ministerial 
positions.
234
 He appointed Benedita da Silva, a black woman and PT politician, as the 
Minister of Social Assistance and Promotion. Da Silva was born into a poor urban family 
in one of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. As a teenager and young woman, da Silva organized 
around gender issues, building informal women’s groups in the favelas. Self-educated 
and ambitious, she graduated from college at the age of 40. Da Silva was elected into 
Congreso Nacional in 1986, and into Senate in 1994; the first Afro-Brazilian woman 
elected to either of these positions, and the first woman elected to the Senate. In these 
positions, she advocated for policies that benefited poor and working class women of 
color. Elected with Anthony Garotinho to the vice-governorship of Rio de Janeiro state in 
1998, she succeeded him in the governorship when he retired in 2002. She is the only 
woman to hold this position.  
Marina Silva, an environmental activist and recent addition to the Brazilian Socialist 
Party, has had a successful career as a prominent political figure in the PT and the Green 
Party, serving as the Minister for the Environment under Lula from 2003 until she 
resigned from the post in 2008, citing environmental activism as her reason for leaving 
the Party. After leaving the PT, she ran against Rousseff for the presidency in 2010 as a 
member of the Green Party, and was seen as a likely Vice Presidential candidate in the 
2014 election. 
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Social and Feminist Movements in Brazil 
Women’s and feminist groups in Latin America represent a wide range of women’s 
interests, and have had varying levels of success. A more complete portrait of these 
diverse groups, their relationship with each other, and with the state is discussed in the 
first section of this report.  
Mobilization: Prior to 1985 
Just as it is difficult to generalize the history of women’s movements in Latin America at 
large, characterizing Brazilian feminism as a single movement is equally problematic. 
Brazilian women’s movements have developed a wide array of diverse and sometimes 
conflicting interests, and are often referred to as a set of feminisms, rather than a single 
agenda.235 Despite this, women’s movements in Brazil are regarded as being some of the 
most influential and effective in their ability to influence political institutions and to 
inform new cultural understandings of women’s roles in the public sphere. 
While the effectiveness of these movements is indeed notable, female representation in 
elected political office remains comparatively low. As mentioned above, female 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies has never risen above 9%. Sardenberg and 
Costa note that "this has resulted in a major paradox for Brazilian feminists: on one hand, 
there is the presence of a wide and well-articulated women’s movement and, on the other 
hand, a notorious absence of women in decision-making positions."236 The disparity 
between informal and formal political capital for women continues to define Brazilian 
feminist political discourse. Moreover, despite a contemporary effort to “mainstream” 
gender issues, deep divides in both class and race complicate visions of a cohesive 
feminist agenda. 
Organized efforts to represent women’s issues in the public sphere have a long history in 
Brazil. Female mobilization in the suffrage movement, along with an application of 
political pressure for the right to education in the 1930s, brought women’s interests into 
the public sphere two generations before widespread women’s mobilization against the 
dictatorship. When the right-wing military coup of 1964 overthrew João Goulart’s 
populist government, the Right appealed “to women’s ‘innate’ commitment to family, 
morality, and social order . . . . enjoin[ing] the ‘women of Brazil’ to organize against the 
democratically elected government.”237 The dictatorship appealed to conservative 
middle-class women by touting feminine purity, faith, and maternity. These appeals 
worked; Christian housewives founded groups such as the Women’s Campaign for 
Democracy (Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia) in support of the regime. Ironically, 
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this same Marianist image, and female mobilization through motherhood, became the 
basis for protests against the repressive dictatorship in the following decades. 
The social movements of the 1960s through 1980s formed in opposition to state 
repression, censorship, and economic crisis. These protests provided the framework out 
of which contemporary women’s movements developed. Alvarez notes, “the articulation 
of gender interests is crucially shaped by the specific political-economic environment in 
which women’s movements arise.”238 The first and most enduring forms of women’s 
activism in the 1960s were groups of poor and middle-class women in the periphery of 
urban centers who organized as neighborhood groups, or clubs, to protest poor living 
conditions and defend practical gendered needs, such as childcare.239 During the 1970s 
and early 1980s, diverse women’s movements in Brazil continued to focus both on 
human rights issues at large and on women’s issues, such as gendered violence. While 
North American feminists in this time period were mobilizing around specific questions 
of reproductive rights and sexuality, these issues were not central to the objectives of 
most contemporary Brazilian women’s groups, who were aligned with the Catholic 
Church. 
The 1982 election of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) led to the 
creation of a Women’s Council. Despite objections from feminist groups that a political 
representation of women’s interests would restrict the movement, the Women’s Council 
became the first formal platform for addressing gender issues in the public sphere. As this 
study focuses particularly on women’s leadership within political institutions, as opposed 
to less formal models of collective action, the distinction between feminist mobilization 
and state-adopted gender legislation is particularly salient.  
The redemocratization in 1985 included reforms that formally installed women’s 
movements into the new state and created specific projects and policies to benefit 
Brazilian women. Among the most significant of these projects was the creation of 
women’s police stations to combat violence against women. To this day, these police 
stations are staffed exclusively by female officers, a policy which affords women the 
opportunity to enter a typically male-dominated profession. In establishing these police 
stations, the government legitimized domestic violence as a public issue rather than a 
private concern. Women began to use these stations both to confront the taboo issues of 
sexual assault and domestic violence, and as a place to address other community 
                                                 




conflicts. The project is widely regarded as the most significant success for Brazilian 
women’s movements of the mid-1980s.
240
  
Institutionalization: 1985 to Present  
In the almost three decades since redemocratization, women’s movements have 
mobilized for a diverse range of issues, including poverty, sexual orientation, and 
reproductive rights. As transnational feminist movements have developed in the last 
twenty-five years, supported by international women’s treaties and conferences, the 
Brazilian government has placed more emphasis on mainstreaming a gendered agenda. 
Much of this emphasis comes from the professionalization and successful 
institutionalization of women’s movements. In the 1990s Brazil stabilized and the nation 
moved toward neoliberal economic policies. This shift indirectly amplified tension 
already present in the fragile coalition between popular women’s movements and middle-
class feminist groups.  
In the wake of neoliberal reform, NGOs and professional feminists sought to fill the gap 
in social services left by the state. As private funding for NGOs is generally project-
oriented, and is tailored to more formal models of social support, funding streams became 
tied to middle-class feminist issues, as opposed to popular, informal models of feminist 
action. This shift toward professionalization alienated popular movements socially as 
well as economically and exacerbated the ideological divide between middle-class 
feminists and popular women’s movements,241 a divide that, despite Lula-era economic 
reforms, remains today.  
The move toward neoliberal economic policy forced women’s movements to adopt an 
emphasis on diversity in order to remain relevant to broad populations. Some 
organizational efforts were more successful in developing member diversity than others. 
The Feminist Health Network, founded in 1991, represents a growing coalition of NGOs, 
rights councils, feminist activists, and health care providers.242 It is a diversity-focused 
coalition, which has supported women’s health-based policies in a wide range of 
geographic and political areas. The network’s political success and longevity have largely 
been the result of an attitude of inclusion and pluralism. Even with this emphasis on 
pluralism, the Network has been met with criticism that it has not done enough to involve 
popular women’s groups outside of the more developed city centers, echoing the 
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sentiment of disconnect between institutionalized feminism and popular women’s 
movements. 
Regardless of the persistent tension, which arose from the professionalization of 
feminism, institutional women’s groups have had moderate success in pushing gender-
based policy under both Lula and Rousseff.  
The Brazilian Cabinet 
Brazilian Presidents appoint their cabinets after assuming office, creating new positions 
as they deem necessary. The presidential cabinet in Brazil is made up of both ministerial 
positions and secretarial positions; more women have served in the secretarial level. 
There have been few exceptions to this trend. Rousseff’s appointments to Minister of 
Energy and Mines, and later Chief of Staff are among the few.  
As of this report, no single political party is dominant in the Brazilian cabinet. The 
number of PT party members in Rousseff’s presidential cabinet is not a significant 
majority, nor does that group lend political weight to the legislative agenda or power as a 
whole.  
Historical Appointments of Female Cabinet Members  
The historical imbalance in gendered representation in Brazil is consistent with globally 
low levels of female representation in the cabinet. João Figueiredo, President of Brazil 
from 1979 to 1985, was the first President to appoint a woman to an executive cabinet 
position. Esther Figueiredo Ferraz, the first female appointee, was a professor before 
Figueiredo appointed her Minister of Education and Culture. It is important to note that 
the first female executive cabinet appointment occurred during the last administration of 
the dictatorship in Brazil. Perhaps, her appointment was reflective of the changing 
political climate. Since then, however, the Ministry of Education and Culture has been 
divided into two separate ministries. President Fernando Collor, who served from 1990 to 
1992, appointed Zélia Cardoso de Mello as the first female Minister of Economy. 
Collor’s appointment of a female cabinet minister preceded the Beijing Conference on 
Women’s call for an increase in women’s political representation by five years. As shown 
in Table 10, the number of female cabinet appointments in Brazil has increased since the 







Table 10: Presidents and Female Cabinet Appointments 
Brazilian President  Terms Female Cabinet 
Appointments  
Percentage of Women 
in the Cabinet 
Joao Figueiredo  (1979–1985)* 1 N/A 
José Sarney  (1985–1990) - - 
Fernando Collor (1990–1992) 1 N/A 
Itamar Franco  (1992–1994) 3 N/A 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso  (1995–1998) 
(1999–2002) 
1 10.7 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva  (2003–2006) 
(2007–2010) 
3 14.8 
Dilma Rousseff  (2011–2014) 9 26.3** 
*The dictatorship in Brazil lasted from March 31, 1964, to March 15, 1985.  
**The percentage was calculated including the Office of the President.  
Source: CEPAL website, accessed February 18, 2014, http://www.cepal.org/es. 
Rousseff’s Cabinet  
Rousseff’s cabinet appointments have been instrumental in supporting important 
legislation. The current presidential cabinet (Gabinete Ministerial do Brasil) consists of 
twenty-four ministries of state and fourteen cabinet-level offices. Rousseff appointed nine 
women to the executive cabinet after her assumption of power in January 2011. Including 
President Rousseff, a record ten women currently serve in the executive cabinet, making 
up 26% of the total cabinet members, the highest percentage ever. Table 11 lists the 








Table 11: Rousseff’s Cabinet 
Executive Cabinet Position Executive 
Minister of Culture  Marta Suplicy 
Minister of Environment Izabella Teixeira 
Minister of Planning, Budget, and Management  Miriam Belchior 
Minister of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation  Tereza Campello 
Secretariat of Institutional Relations  Ideli Salvatti 
Secretariat for Social Communication  Helena Chagas 
Special Secretariat for Human Rights  Maria do Rosário 
Special Secretariat for Promotion of Racial Equality  Luiza Bairros 
Special Secretariat for Women’s Rights  Eleonora Menicucci 
Source: Rousseff’s Cabinet: Women’s Bureau  
While creating her executive cabinet, Rousseff created a cabinet position titled “Special 
Secretariat for Women’s Rights.” Creating this new position increased both female and 
PT representation in her cabinet. She appointed fellow PT member Eleonora Menicucci 
to the new position. Menicucci is a feminist, lesbian, and a liberal, and was Rousseff’s 
former cellmate.  
In this position, Menicucci has championed access to abortion, and supported Rousseff in 
legislative moves to improve women’s access to healthcare in general. Abortion 
continues to be illegal as well as a contentious topic in Brazil; Menicucci focuses on 
promoting policies that will limit the number of women undergoing risky illegal 
abortions. In 2013, President Rousseff signed legislation allowing the sale of the 
“morning after pill” to women who reported being raped. Menicucci defended the 
President against media and political attack by saying the decision to sign the law was 
made out of “respect for Congress and for women.” Menicucci and the Office for 
Women’s Rights are also advocates for the prevention of sexual violence against women.  
Gender Analysis of Rousseff’s Cabinet  
Traditionally, the most prestigious appointments in the Brazilian cabinet have been: the 
Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, Minister of External Relations, and Minister of 
Defense. Maria Escobar-Lemmon and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson (2009) suggest that 
presidential cabinets can be “gendered” cabinets, aside from being divided by prestige, if 
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there exist differences in career length, continuity, and mobility between the men and 
women appointed to cabinet positions. They studied cabinets throughout Latin America 
and coded cabinet positions as either “feminine” or “masculine” depending upon their 
perceived level of prestige. Men dominantly hold prestigious cabinet positions in Latin 
America. These scholars conclude that a presidential cabinet is “gendered,” if women 
receive “feminine” domain posts, and men “masculine” domain posts. The cabinet is 
further “gendered” if “masculine” ministry appointments offer greater potential for 
upward mobility.243 As of this report, female ministers fill none of these positions in 
Brazil.  
Rousseff appointed female ministers to lead the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of 
Social Development and Hunger Alleviation, both which are considered to be ministries 
in the “feminine policy domain.”244 The President appointed male ministers to the most 
prestigious positions in the executive branch, the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
Finance. Thus, based on the theory of “gendered” policy domains, by Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson, Rousseff appointed a “gendered” executive cabinet.  
In contrast to the “gendered” cabinet appointments made by President Rousseff, 
President Lula appointed Rousseff to be Minister of Mines and Energy and then later 
appointed her as his Chief of Staff. In the theoretical framework of Escobar-Lemmon and 
Taylor-Robinson, both cabinet positions that Rousseff was appointed to were in neither 
the feminine nor masculine political domains. Therefore, the framework of gendered 
policy domains can be used to support the idea that President Lula paved the way for 
increasing women’s political representation past the point of tokenism, and challenged 
previously held norms of women’s capabilities in Brazil’s policy domain.  
The international feminist community was disappointed that President Rousseff did not 
diversify her cabinet to defy gendered policy norms. She was also criticized by regional 
feminists for not prioritizing parity the way the first female President of Chile, Michelle 
Bachelet, did in her first term. This report shows that Rousseff regressed from her 
mentor’s progressive distribution of prestigious cabinet appointments to women. The 
women currently in Rousseff’s executive cabinet may not gain as much political capital 
as the men will from their time spent in her administration. Moreover, the men and 
women that succeed her in office may continue to appoint gendered cabinets. According 
to the theoretical framework of gendered cabinets, Rousseff’s gendered appointments 
could potentially limit the political advancement and overall political representation of 
women in Brazil in the long run.  
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Dilma Rousseff is celebrated as Brazil’s first democratically elected female head of state, 
and for appointing a record number of women to the presidential cabinet. However, the 
international community has been disappointed that she did not support a “gender 
agenda,” to prioritize women’s issues above all else. Like her predecessor, Lula, she 
concentrated on social development policy and poverty alleviation, but also developed 
innovative anticorruption and economic development plans.  
A baseline for public satisfaction with policies created by the Rousseff administration can 
be determined by analyzing responses by Brazilian citizens to questions about the state of 
democracy in Brazil, a year after her election. On the one hand, 39.8% of Brazilians 
surveyed claimed they were “not very satisfied” with Brazil’s democracy in 2011, and 
12.2% said they thought democracy in Brazil had “worsened” since Rousseff took office. 
On the other hand, 22.9% of Brazilians believed that Rousseff had “improved” 
democracy in Brazil, while 53.7% thought that democracy “remained the same.” This 
data shows Brazilians thought President Rousseff had not made a significant change after 
a year in office.245  
Rousseff has expanded Lula-era social policies and built a new policy agenda countering 
corruption and supporting industrialization. This section investigates how successful she 
has been in implementing her campaign promises and navigating current policy 
challenges. Finally, this report examines President Rousseff’s presence on the global 
stage.  
Rousseff’s Campaign Agenda  
Dilma Rousseff’s campaign strategy was to remain as true to the policies of her 
predecessor, President Lula, as possible. As Lula’s successor, her platform focused on 
continuity with his administration’s goals. She also promised to bring interest rates and 
taxes down gradually and proposed industrial development to pay for social programs 
and to redistribute income to bring millions more Brazilians out of poverty.246 The 
official campaign slogan was “Para o Brasil seguir mudando,” meaning, “So that Brazil 
will keep changing.” Rousseff’s commitment to social programs showed the electorate 
that she was dedicated to continuity with her predecessor. In fact, Lulismo was so popular 
that Rousseff’s main competition from the Center Right Party, José Serra, also promised 
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to continue supporting Bolsa Família, a grouping of several conditional cash transfer and 
social services programs.  
Rousseff’s role as Lula’s successor kept public opinion in her favor until public 
dissatisfaction with her grew in regards to government spending and the management 
policies of the World Cup and Olympic Game projects in 2012. Specifically, working-
class citizens and youth groups were enraged that fiscal spending had reached a point in 
2013 where public transportation costs had to be raised to compensate for an increasing 
deficit.  
Continuity with the Lula Administration 
When Dilma Rousseff entered office she was stepping into the shoes of a man considered 
to be “o politico mais bem-sucedido do seu tempo,” the most successful politician of his 
time.247 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was the PT’s first candidate to win the presidency and 
he was the first working-class President in a nation with a strong class hierarchy. Lula’s 
popular Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento or PAC (Growth Acceleration Program) 
succeeded in both improving the living conditions of millions of Brazil’s most vulnerable 
as well placing poverty reduction at the center of the political conversation.248 Despite his 
high approval ratings, Lula was constitutionally unable to seek a third term, thus he chose 
to use his political capital to help elect his former Minister of Energy and then Chief of 
Staff, Rousseff. This choice of a successor “revealed the personal power of the President 
(Lulismo) over the collective power of the party he led,”249 and in this context Rousseff 
campaigned and won on an agenda of continuity with her predecessor. Since her 
inauguration, continuity has certainly defined Rousseff’s approach to Lula’s trademark 
social programs, which she has maintained and even expanded. However, Rousseff is by 
no means Lula’s proxy, and inevitably, her administration has evolved its own character 
and made significant breaks with the past. 
Policy Overview from the Administration’s Perspective  
The nine official policy areas of the Rousseff administration include Health, Education, 
Economy, Environment, Social Development, Foreign Relations, Labor and 
Employment, Public Safety, and policies related to the “World Cup.”250 The following are 
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policies that the Rousseff administration has implemented or continued from the Lula 
administration to satisfy each policy area.  
The Rousseff administration has highlighted health care policies on its website that 
celebrate the implementation of policy for early cancer detection and increased efforts to 
make mammograms more accessible to the public. Policies supporting Brazilians with 
disabilities have been among the social policies implemented by Rousseff to fulfill her 
campaign promises, along with antidrug policies, and policies to improve the quality of 
healthcare. Despite her successes in social policy, President Rousseff has been at the 
center of scandal surrounding her position against the legalization of abortion in Brazil. 
The President famously refused to support legislation to make abortions legal in 2012, 
but then signed into law legislation that would allow victims of rape to gain access to 
emergency contraception the following year. 
The Rousseff administration announced March of 2011 to be “Women’s Month,” in 
conjunction with International Women’s Day. The designation was coupled with several 
new policies that focus on improved access to health care and childcare for poor Brazilian 
women, along with new provisions for neonatal care. These programs are not formally 
designated as part of the PAC umbrella, and they tackle poverty alleviation with a 
specifically gendered focus. Other Women’s Month policies include provisions that 
mandate governmental reporting in cases of suspected domestic violence.251
 
Policies for education implemented by the Rousseff administration include the 
construction of 3,000 kindergartens throughout Brazil, and the implementation of the 
“Pact for Literacy at a Certain Age.” Rousseff has committed to investing in educational 
infrastructure to make upward mobility possible for younger generations.  
President Rousseff implemented policy to boost economic growth in Brazil in her first 
administration. Economic policies such as the Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My 
Life) initiative, has built one million affordable homes for low-income families. Other 
economic policies reduced taxes for exporters, and lowered interest rates for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Rousseff’s priorities are divided between economic 
policies on which to build a sustainable democracy and social policies that deploy the 
power of the government for the people. Skeptics of Rousseff’s economic agenda warn 
that allowing the private credit bubble to grow will inflate Brazil’s currency, possibly 
causing a recession. However, it should be noted that Rousseff has kept Brazil out of a 
recession despite the general slowing in international trade, resulting from the recession 
in the United States of 2007–2009 and the European debt crisis.  
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Rousseff has managed Brazil’s foreign trade policies to show a trade surplus during a 
trying economic time, increasing trade with the European Union and proving to other 
regions that Brazil is a significant world trade partner. Macroeconomic policy has been 
well managed by the administration, and the international media often presents Rousseff 
as an effective economic leader. Additionally, as a result of the Mais Emprego portal 
policy, the Rousseff administration created 1.2 million jobs in 2012, proving that social 
policy and economic policy can be a positive dual policy agenda. However, the Brazilian 
public is often critical of her domestic economic policies, because of the increase in 
public spending since the beginning of her administration.  
Environmental policy achievements of the Rousseff administration have gained her both 
domestic and international praise. Her administration has reduced deforestation of the 
Amazon by 23% and cracked down on illegal logging. “Green Grants,” which use the 
same conditional cash transfer incentive structure used in her popular social program 
policy agenda, have helped fund sustainable development in Brazil. The global media has 
castigated Brazil for excessive amounts of pollution in its coastal and inland waterways. 
As a result, the administration has committed to cleaning up millions of tons of pollution 
for the 2016 Olympics.  
President Rousseff implemented public safety policies to combat drug trafficking and 
reduce crime and violence by limiting the circulation of firearms. These policies went 
hand in hand with the increased public safety measures for the 2014 World Cup 
tournament. The Lula administration won the honor of hosting the 2014 World Cup in 
Brazil from FIFA in 2007, and the Copa (World Cup) proved to be a steady source of 
construction and contracting jobs for working-class Brazilians during President 
Rousseff’s first term.252 When the Copa kicked off in summer 2014, jobs were in highest 
demand in the tourism, hospitality, security, entertainment, and food industries.  
Rousseff’s reelection campaign strategy targetted the communities that her social policy 
has helped. Rousseff expanded the “Water For All” program to provide impoverished 
communities in Amazonian northern Brazil with sustainable fresh-water sources. 
Likewise, the “Harvest Plan for Fisheries” policy started by the Rousseff administration 
plans to lift 100,000 fishing families out of poverty by the time of its completion. 
Although many poverty-alleviation policies were started in Lula’s administration, 
Rousseff has shown that she has a strong commitment to helping the poorest Brazilians.  
Development  
The Lula administration’s most significant policy reform was the restructuring of the 
Brazilian government’s approach to economic development. From the redemocratization 
of Brazil in 1985 to the end of the Cardoso administration in 2002, economic 




development followed the neoliberal model common among democratizing Latin 
American states at the time. The election of Lula and the PT in 2002 signaled an end to 
free market economic policy in Brazil.  
Lula and the PAC 
Under Lulismo, moderate leftist policies for development and poverty alleviation brought 
millions out of poverty in the emerging BRICS economy. At the center of Lula’s 
development policy was the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC)—the 
Growth Acceleration Program. The PAC balanced an inviting climate for private industry 
investment with conditional cash transfer programs for the poorest Brazilians, such as the 
Bolsa Família, implemented in 2003, which promoted access to education, nutrition, and 
health care by providing supplemental income and school grants. This multilateral 
approach worked; millions of Brazilians moved into the middle class, and policy 
observers suggest that it also helped keep Brazil relatively protected from the 2008 global 
economic crisis. Unlike the neoliberal approach of the Cardoso administration, which 
offered little state support for Brazil’s poor, or other leftist Latin American governments, 
which rejected capitalism as a mode of industrialization, the PAC brought a poverty-
alleviation focus to development. Investment in infrastructure generated jobs, along with 
lower rates of regional inequality, and created better sanitation and new health projects, 
which improved the living situation of millions of poor Brazilians.253 
As Lula’s Chief of Staff during his second term in office, Rousseff managed the direction 
and implementation of these sweeping social programs. Dubbed “a Mãe do PAC” (the 
Mother of the PAC) by the Lula administration, she spearheaded new development 
initiatives and oversaw the disbursement of conditional cash transfer programs. Since her 
election to the presidency, Rousseff has expanded these economic development and 
social service policies as the PAC-2. 
Poverty Alleviation and the PAC-2 under Rousseff 
The substantial budget of Rousseff’s PAC-2 is divided into six development initiatives. 
The first four of these policies are poverty alleviation measures that focus on building 
safer and healthier communities for the poorest Brazilians. Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My 
House, My Life), Cidade Melhor (Better City), Comunidade Cidadã (Citizen 
Community), and Agua e Luz para Todos (Water and Light for All) aim at solving many 
of the endemic problems associated with Brazil’s notorious urban slums, or favelas. 
Respectively, these initiatives (1) give low-income families a path to homeownership, (2) 
build sanitation, safety, and roadway infrastructure along with (3) community centers, 
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schools, and daycares in low-income communities and (4) provide clean water and 
electricity. Planned expenditures to build two million homes from 2011 to 2014 are 
R$278.2 billion,
254
 with the bulk of allocations designated for the Minha Casa, Minha 
Vida homeownership initiative.255
 
In the summer of 2011, the Rousseff administration announced the new Brasil Sem 
Miséria (Brazil without Poverty) plan. This plan, directed at Brazil’s absolute poorest, 
built on Lula’s Bolsa Família and other PAC conditional cash transfer programs. Brazil 
Sem Miséria falls under the PAC-2 umbrella. Like Lulismo, these CCT social programs 
offer support to the poor while integrating them into the formal workforce:  
Brasil Sem Miséria Plan has three main axis of action. The income guarantee axis, 
which refers to transfers for the immediate relief of the extreme poverty situation; 
the productive inclusion axis, which offers job and income opportunities to the 
Plan’s target public; and the access to public services axis, for the provision or 
expansion of actions of citizenship and social welfare.256  
Social programs do represent a significant investment, but the bulk of the PAC-2 budget 
is focused on larger scale economic development projects in transportation and energy.  
The growing BRICS economy needs new sources of power and new infrastructure for 
electricity transmission. Brazilian urban centers have experienced energy shortages and 
blackouts, which are of growing concern to the Rousseff administration as the 2016 
Olympic Games near.257 The emphasis on new energy development is clearly reflected in 
the budget: from 2011 to 2014, R$465.6 billion is divided between renewable energy 
initiatives, fossil fuels, mineral research, maritime industry, and efficiency.258 One of the 
largest and most controversial energy projects included in this budget, the Belo Monte 
Dam, is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The transportation component of 
the PAC-2, budgeted for approximately R$105 billion from 2011 through 2014,259 
includes improvements to highways and airports. Transportation and energy 
infrastructure are at the center of development plans for the 2014 World Cup and the 
2016 Olympics. 
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Corruption and Transparency Reform 
Brazil has long been a country where corruption thrives and politicians behave with 
impunity. Situational anthropologist Roberto DaMatta believes this corruption is rooted 
in the “profoundly negative relationship between a state that is considered above society 
and a society that wants to be insulated from the state that rules it.”260 As democracy 
continues to be consolidated and more Brazilians enter the middle class, the public’s 
tolerance for these abuses and their economic consequences is decreasing. However, 
those in power have yet to adjust their behavior to the shifting climate: in 2013 Brazil still 
scored only 42 (out of 100) on the Corruption Perceptions Index and was ranked 72 out 
of 177 countries.261 Lula’s presidency represented a rupture with tradition in many 
respects, but his administration did not change the status quo regarding corruption. 
Rousseff, however, has taken significant steps towards transparency that have earned her 
an unusual level of respect and trust from the Brazilian people.262 Rousseff’s multiple 
initiatives include a Truth Commission and an Open Data Portal which allows the public 
to query raw data from government agencies. She has also signed legislation such as the 
Freedom of Information Act, Clean Companies Act, and Tax Transparency law. She has 
shown a lack of tolerance for corruption within her Cabinet and has stepped in a 
coleadership role of the Open Government Partnership. Rousseff needed considerable 
skill and strategy to enact these reforms, as they are “anathema to much of the country’s 
political and bureaucratic elite.”263 The President made considerable progress in this 
arena, and many analysts see this as the most defining achievement of her 
administration.264 
A Faxina: Cleaning House 
During Rousseff’s first year in office (2011), there were repeated upheavals in her 
Cabinet, with four ministers leaving following allegations of corruption. Chief of Staff 
Antonio Palocci, Transport Minister Alfredo Nascimento, Agriculture Minister Wagner 
Rossi, and Tourism Minister Pedro Novais all had to step down from their posts despite 
their power and connections. For a Brazilian President to force out multiple members of 
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her cabinet due to corruption was a noteworthy departure from past precedent and 
indicative of Rousseff’s firm stance on the issue of corruption. This no-tolerance policy 
combined with the choices made in refilling these positions demonstrated Dilma’s 
“courage to exercise her power.”265 This sequence of events also displayed Rousseff’s 
independence from Lula, given she inherited both Rossi and Nascimento from his 
administration and further, that Palocci had close ties to Lula as well. 
Clean Companies Act  
In the wake of massive antigraft protests in June 2013, Rousseff pressured Congress to 
pass legislation tackling corporate corruption. On August 1, 2013, she signed Brazil’s 
Clean Companies Act (Federal Law 12.846/2013, Lei Anticorrupção Empresarial), which 
imposed sanctions on corporations found to be bribing either Brazilian or foreign public 
officials. The law also created incentives for corporations to establish compliance 
protocols and cooperate with investigations. Unsatisfied with some of the loopholes 
present in the act when it reached her desk, Rousseff used her line-item veto to strengthen 
the legislation.266 Unlike in the United States, where perpetrators of corporate bribery can 
be criminally prosecuted, under Brazilian law they are only subject to civil and 
administrative proceedings. Nonetheless, the Clean Companies Act is actually a broader 
statute than the United States’ Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and it brings Brazil 
in line with the OECD Convention, to which it is a signatory. 
Mensalão Scandal  
Brazil’s biggest corruption scandal since the restoration of democracy, the Mensalão, 
happened during the Lula era (coming to light in 2005) but the trial and sentencing have 
taken place under Dilma. This “big monthly stipend” consisted of high-level members of 
the PT paying coalition members in Congress around R$30,000 (US$12,000) per month 
in exchange for their favorable votes on government projects.267 Those indicted include 
Lula’s Chief of Staff José Dirceu, PT treasurer Délubio Soares, and former President of 
the PT, José Genoíno. 
Due to the positions of power held by the defendants, the case was heard by Brazil’s 
Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) in late 2012 and of the forty indicted, thirty-eight were 
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tried, twenty-five were found guilty, and twelve were imprisoned.268 However, these 
verdicts will not necessarily stand because Brazilian law allows for sentences to be 
reexamined on appeal. Some have already been overturned.269  
Rousseff’s mentor Lula has not been charged with any involvement in the Mensalão and 
claims he was “betrayed” by his colleagues,270 but he is under investigation and the 
public is skeptical of his claims of ignorance regarding the scheme. Dilma herself is not 
implicated; she became Lula’s chief of staff only after the Mensalão became public 
knowledge and José Dirceu stepped down.  
The Brazilian judiciary is not under the purview of the executive branch, thus Rousseff is 
not responsible for the STF’s handling of this case. However, because the STF is holding 
lawmakers accountable under the law, it contributed to her anticorruption agenda by 
showing the nation that power does not grant immunity. However, if these sentences 
continue to be overturned, the status quo will be reaffirmed.  
Unlike Lula, who has spoken out against the judges’ rulings, Dilma distanced herself 
from the trial and respected the Court’s verdicts. When asked for her opinion on the 
STF’s rulings, she replied, “enquanto eu for presidenta não faço observação, críticas ou 
análises da Suprema Corte do meu país.”271 [As long as I’m President, I will not make 
observations, critiques, or analysis of the Supreme Court of my country.]  
Freedom of Information  
President Rousseff’s first attempt to pass a freedom of information law occurred in 2009 
when she introduced legislation to Congress while she was President Lula da Silva’s 
chief of staff. This proposal failed, but as President, she backed broader, stronger 
legislation. On November 18, 2011, she finally signed a law implementing this 
constitutional right granted to the Brazilian people in 1988. According to transparency 
expert Gregory Michener, the strengths of the Lei de Acesso à Informação (Federal Law 
12.527/2011) reside in its wide scope (it applies to all branches of government and at all 
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levels), its “active transparency obligations,” and its exceptions and protections. 
However, the law has significant weaknesses and Michener is critical of the lack of an 
independent oversight agency and the “three-tiered secrecy scheme” that protects 
ultrasecret information for at least twenty-five years.272 Without an independent agency 
to regulate and enforce the law, requests must be directed to an eleven-person team at the 
National Comptroller General (Controladoria General da União, or CGU), located within 
the executive branch. Despite the significance of the law, its potential efficacy has been 
thwarted by the scarce resources for implementation, low public awareness, and lack of 
media buy-in.273 If properly enacted, freedom of information is an important step in 
advancing democracy and combating political impunity, but for Brazil this is still a work 
in progress. Nonetheless, Rousseff’s personal commitment to improving transparency is 
evident, and she has combined her support for the Freedom of Information law with the 
Tax Transparency law (Federal Law 12.471), the creation of a new Open Data Portal 
(Portal Brasileiro de Dados Abertos), and leadership (alongside President Barack Obama) 
of the Open Government Partnership.  
Truth Commission  
The same week that she signed the Freedom of Information law, Dilma Rousseff also 
approved a law creating the National Truth Commission (Comissão Nacional da Verdade, 
or CNV).
 274
 Inaugurated in May 2012, the CNV is tasked with investigating the human 
rights abuses perpetrated on thousands of Brazilians during the period 1946–1988, which 
includes the military dictatorship in power from 1964 to 1985. No matter the findings, no 
one will be prosecuted for these crimes due to a 1979 amnesty, but according to Rousseff 
“Brazil deserves the truth, new generations deserve the truth, and—above all—those who 
lost friends and relatives and who continue to suffer as if they were dying again each day 
deserve the truth.”275 The right to historical truth has significant personal resonance for 
the President, as she herself suffered as a prisoner of the dictatorship for three years in the 
1970s. Prior to Rousseff’s tenure, President Lula da Silva broached the creation of a 
similar commission, but he was stopped by pressure from the military. Enabling the 
country to confront the legacy of the dictatorship is an important achievement for 
Rousseff. Taking this step also adds legitimacy to Brazil’s voice on the international 
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stage of human rights protection.276 By establishing the CNV, Brazil now joins the ranks 
of Chile and Argentina who have also undertaken quests for truth and reconciliation. 
Brazil differs significantly from is neighbors, though, because it will not be repealing its 
amnesty. The CNV is required to submit its final report in December 2014.  
2014 World Cup  
Brazil hosted the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The opening ceremony occurred on June 12, 
2014. This contract was awarded to Brazil during Lula’s term, but it is Rousseff who 
presided over the majority of the preparations and who oversaw the event itself. Brazil is 
a major force in the soccer world, having won five World Cups, and it previously hosted 
the event sixty-four years earlier, in 1950.  
Hosting a mega-event like this brings international attention to the competition itself, 
attracts tourists to the country, and spurs development. Brazil’s tourism board, Embratur, 
predicted that 600,000 tourists would visit the country during the World Cup
277
 and spend 
R$25 billion (US$11 billion).278 President Rousseff declared this the copa das copas (the 
cup of all cups) and pushed Brazil’s image as a sunny, energetic, fun-loving, 
multicultural country—a natural home for the event. In her social media she called it the 
copa pela paz (cup for peace), and the copa contra o racismo (cup against racism). 
However, peace and equity were not part of the World Cup experience for the poor, 
primarily Afro-descendant residents of Brazil’s favelas.  
Infrastructure 
When Lula pitched the World Cup to the Brazilian people, he sold them a vision of 
income and infrastructure development that would benefit them directly. Instead, as the 
kickoff date approached and the project was over budget and behind schedule, the 
administration concentrated on the needs of tourists rather than the needs of the local 
population when it came to developing infrastructure. In fact, poor residents often paid 
the price for this kind of infrastructure as they faced forced eviction and relocation to 
make way for the new construction.279  
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FIFA requires that the host nations have eight stadiums in which to hold the matches, but 
Brazil decided to go beyond the requirement and designate twelve host cities to display 
the variety of people and places contained within its borders.
280
 As a result, total 
investment in the Copa was expected to reach at least R$16 billion, including the 
construction of stadiums in cities that are unlikely to use them after the event.  
FIFA wanted all twelve stadiums to be ready in December 2013, but many were not 
ready until May 2014. As popular support for the event waned in response to corruption 
and mismanagement, host cities became reluctant to do everything they were 
contractually obligated to because public spending on the World Cup became a political 
liability.281  
When Brazil got the Cup, it came with a strict contract and arrangements from FIFA that 
were ultimately passed as legislation in the World Cup General Bill (Federal Law 12.663 
of 2012). These provisions included excluding street vendors from a two-kilometer radius 
around stadiums, protecting FIFA’s trademark, permitting the sale of alcohol at match 
venues, and exempting the World Cup from the Brazilian law entitling students and 
pensioners to half-price tickets for sporting events. It was clear how stipulations would 
benefit FIFA and its business partners, but it is hard to discern how they helped local 
businesses.  
PRONATEC Copa  
In October 2011 President Rousseff approved the creation of the National Program for 
Access to Technical Education and Employment (Programa Nacional de Acesso ao 
Ensino Técnico e Emprego, or PRONATEC)
 282
 to broadly reform Brazil’s vocational 
education program. In preparation for the country’s role as host of the FIFA World Cup 
in the summer of 2014, PRONATEC Copa was created specifically to offer free training 
courses in many areas of tourism and hospitality as well as English, Spanish, and sign 
language to both individuals and companies. This joint effort between the Tourism 
Ministry and the Education Ministry sought to prepare Brazil’s workers for the influx of 
foreign visitors and leave them with a good impression.  
Protests  
In the summer of 2013, mass protests against corruption erupted in Brazil.  These 
protests, which coincided with the country hosting the Confederations Cup, were 
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demonstrations against the 2014 World Cup. Hikes in transportation fees in São Paulo 
served as the catalyst for the protests, but the source of the protestors’ motivating anger 
stemmed from the “high taxes, poor services and high World Cup spending” that were all 
interwoven with government corruption.283 An estimated total of 250,000 people gathered 
in cities around the country to demonstrate, and violent encounters with the police 
occurred in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, and Belo Horizonte, among other 
cities.284  
At a time when Brazil needed investment in schools, hospitals, and public transportation, 
the country instead spent billions of dollars on World Cup–related projects that even 
prominent soccer stars resented. The beneficiaries of these mega-projects were the large 
construction companies who are also powerful campaign donors.285 Brazilians were 
outraged at the corruption associated with these projects and also the reported US$2 
billion that FIFA earned from the event without having to bear any of the costs.286 These 
realities dramatically decreased popular support for hosting the World Cup, with only 
52% of Brazilians holding a favorable opinion in 2014, compared to 79% in 2008, 
according to Datafolha.287  
After the initial protests in June, President Rousseff responded by recognizing the 
legitimacy of the protests and acknowledging the need for better public services and 
government responsiveness.288 In a televised statement, she described plans to improve 
funding for education and public transportation, and also asserted the importance of 
transparency, but this did little to quiet the protesters’ anger.289 The demonstrations 
continued into 2014, and on multiple occasions turned violent. In March 2014 the 
municipal governments of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo abolished their original public 
transportation hikes, but this gesture failed to address underlying causes for public 
dissatisfaction.290  
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Given the protests that began in June 2013 as well as the preexisting violence that is 
rampant in many urban areas in Brazil, there were serious concerns about security during 
the World Cup. The security needs for teams, fans, tourists, official stadiums, and Fan 
Fests across the country stretched resources and was expected to cost US$900 million.291 
These preparations included the creation of an additional elite policing unit with 10,000 
members.292  
Another cause for safety concerns was the proximity of many World Cup sites to favelas, 
where the rates of violence were increasing. Violence had been decreasing in the ongoing 
battle for neighborhood control between drug gangs and police, with credit for the 
turnaround given to pacification programs, but armed robberies and deathly altercations 
with police increased again after the police killed Amarildo de Souza in 2013.293 Federal 
police squads were deployed in favelas in late March 2014. This was by no means a 
measure certain to quell violence, however—Brazilian police are notorious for their 
brutality and impunity, and are known to have their own “death squads” operating in 
favelas. This violence is so severe that six of the World Cup host cities are ranked among 
the fifty cities with the highest murder rates worldwide.294  
Energy and the Environment: The Belo Monte Dam Project 
The construction of the Belo Monte Dam is supposed to be completed in 2016. When 
finished, the dam will be the third largest in the world, behind China’s Three Gorges and 
the Itaipu dam on the Brazil-Paraguay border. Currently, the Belo Monte project has 
reached the 50% mark in construction, but progress has been fraught with challenges. 
The current design for Belo Monte project is the most recent in a lengthy series of 
designs to dam the Xingu. 
For decades, indigenous groups and environmental activists have thwarted attempts to 
build the dam. The state-owned Norte Energia finally purchased the contract for the 
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project in 2010, and the company broke ground in 2011. During her tenure as the 
Minister of Mines and Energy, Rousseff gained a reputation as a prodevelopment 
technocrat, “bullish” in the face of objections over environmental concerns. The Belo 
Monte Dam project is a key component of Rousseff’s energy development plan and 
budget. 
Brazil needs affordable, clean power to ensure the continued growth of development in 
the north. The Rousseff administration sees the Belo Monte project as a way to create 
jobs and stimulate slowing development. More than half of the PAC-2 budget is energy 
related. Regardless, large dam projects are characteristically completed over budget, and 
finding accurate estimates on the cost—fiscal, environmental, and social—is complex. 
Estimates vary on the cost of the Belo Monte Dam, ranging from the official estimate 
US$14.4 B to US$27.4 B.295  
The Rousseff administration maintains that Belo Monte is part of larger green 
initiatives.
296
 The newest iteration of the Belo Monte plans has passed five inspections 
and has been cleared by the environmental ministry. While the original plans included a 
large reservoir, the Belo Monte project will now only cover a small landmass, using land 
that has already been deforested. Altino Ventura, the Secretary of Planning and 
Development, is quoted in The Economist: “It will minimize the social and environmental 
costs . . . The new dams will use ‘run of river’ designs, eschewing large reservoirs and 
relying on the water’s natural flow to power the turbines. And they will not flood any 
Indian reserves.”297 This change will mitigate environmental impact, but will also 
substantially decrease the projected output of the dam while increasing the overall cost of 
the project by R$2 billion.298
 
While the Belo Monte project has now made it through the checks and balances of 
Brazilian bureaucracy under Rousseff’s guiding hand, protesters continue to maintain that 
the project violates the constitutional rights of indigenous people in the Amazon. 
Environmental activism groups such as International Rivers and Amazon Watch believe 
that the environmental and social impacts of the dam have been underestimated by the 
Rousseff administration. These groups also assert that wind energy is a more sustainable 
and less socially harmful power supply option for the Brazilian Northeast. 
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Brazil in the Global Economy 
In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, Brazil has struggled to reach precrisis levels of 
economic growth. Like China, Brazil created much of its economic growth by opening up 
access to private debt in the form of credit, which caused a consumer-spending boom. 
This private credit bubble has also been a main contributor to poverty alleviation, 
expanding short-term income. Recently, however, growth in Brazil has stalled, as many 
citizens have slowed down their private sector borrowing. The other major factor of 
Brazil’s former booming growth was the peaking commodities super cycle, which has 
since slowed, because many countries face recovery and austerity measures. To increase 
business investment in Brazil, the Rousseff administration has launched a program of tax 
relief and subsidies for industry to assure business and employment does not slow to a 
halt as consumers and businesses cut back on spending. Rousseff’s programs have been 
extremely successful at saving jobs, and Brazil’s less than 6% unemployment rate at the 
end of 2013 proved that Rousseff was able to keep her citizens employed. President 
Rousseff can credit much of her continued domestic popularity to her administration’s 
successful economic policies, which aim at pulling more than 40 million Brazilians out of 
poverty through increased public spending on social welfare benefits for low-income 
earners.299
 
The increase in spending on the World Cup negatively impacted Rousseff’s approval 
ratings. To combat the drop in ratings, the President publicly expressed her determination 
to fight the reemergence of monetary inflation by raising the central bank’s interest 
rates.300 These policies have kept investment in Brazil’s economy strong enough for 
Brazil to remain globally competitive during a harsh recovery when the market’s loyalty 
is fleeting. Other impressive economic statistics in Rousseff’s portfolio include Brazil’s 
debt to GDP ratio, which was at 35% at the end of 2013, indicating that Brazil continues 
to be a very strong and stable market for international investment. In terms of national 
debt to GDP, the lower the percentage the better, because it indicates the ability of that 
country to repay the debt.  
Successful economic policy was extremely significant to Rousseff’s reelection campaign. 
Public support for the President faltered before the October 2014 elections as economic 
concerns took center stage in the debate. To balance approval ratings and gain public 
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support, the Rousseff administration allowed wages to rise in Brazil, despite the slowing 
of economic growth.301  
International Relations  
Rousseff is balancing two of her administration’s top international relations concerns: the 
BRICS alliance and relations with the United States. The BRICS alliance is a coalition of 
emerging markets of the “Global South.” In July 2014, Brazil hosted the sixth annual 
BRICS summit in Fortaleza, and for the first time, had the opportunity to recommit to the 
BRICS agenda. Since the fast-paced economic growth of the BRICS countries has 
slowed in recent years, Brazil has not prioritized alliances with Russia and China, instead 
has chosen to focus on trade relations with India. However, as host to the summit this 
year, Brazil will take a leadership role to help further the BRICS agenda. At the top of 
their policy list is institutionalizing a BRICS Development Bank to function similarly to 
the World Bank’s mission of funding international aid and development loans.302  
As an emerging economy, Brazil has developed relationships with many world powers 
through the avenues of trade agreements. However, Brazilian relations with the United 
States have been strained in the last year. Brazil’s recent distrust of the United States has 
arisen from the NSA’s phone and wiretapping methods, which Edward Snowden exposed 
to the media and international community in 2013. As a result, the Rousseff 
administration found out that President Rousseff’s phone conversations were being 
recorded. President Rousseff publicly canceled a trip to Washington, DC, to meet with 
President Obama in response to the spying incident. Furthermore, Rousseff found out that 
American diplomats had allegedly been advised to “drive a wedge” between Brazil and 
the other BRICS countries, in order to bring Brazil closer to a US-Brazil trade alliance.303 
Rousseff has remained steadfast in her position not to form a formal alliance with the 
United States, for fear of alienating other important international trade partners. Instead, 
as a diplomatic strategy, Rousseff expressed to President Obama that Brazil wants a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This request has yet to be supported by 
President Obama, and has not been formally presented to the other permanent members 
of the UNSC.  
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Furthermore, Brazil is already prone to distrusting the United States because of the US 
involvement with the military coup that overthrew the Brazilian government in 1964; the 
United States also assisted in implementing a military dictatorship that lasted twenty 
years. This, of course, is the same military dictatorship that tortured and imprisoned 
Rousseff from 1970 to 1972. Additionally, the military dictatorship, and the United States 
as a supporter of the dictatorship, is blamed for a decade of lost economic growth and 
development in Brazil. While President Rousseff is Brazil’s head of state, she has the 
power and personal-political history to leverage diplomatic decisions to craft the future of 
Brazil-US relations.  
Symbolic Representation  
Traditional Modes of Leadership and Rousseff  
The celebratory atmosphere typically surrounding the election of a female President 
arises from the notion that women in executive office govern differently, and thus there 
will be a change for the better. Despite evidence to the contrary, there is a popular belief 
that women will govern with other women in mind, and will develop and implement 
policy agendas that transform the daily lives of women and other minorities for the 
better.  
Female leadership is heralded as the dawn of a new age; the election of a woman means 
that we have reached a milestone of equality for all historically marginalized groups. 
Unfortunately, this enthusiasm is largely misguided. Women in the executive do carry 
some symbolic importance and can create policy aimed at improving the lives of women. 
But focusing on their leadership exclusively in gendered terms misses out on other 
important aspects of leadership in general and female leadership specifically.  
The final section of this case study analyzes the symbolic and transformative power of 
the Rousseff administration: how she presents herself as a female leader, how she is 
typified as such by the public, and what her leadership means for Brazilians. Do media 
interpretations of her symbolic power and leadership style substantiate claims that her 
election is of revolutionary or transformational importance to Brazilian women?  
Historical Analysis 
Women have been historically excluded from institutionalized power, both in Brazil and 
around the world. As such, the election of a female leader is seen as important regardless 
of whether that female leader has a gendered agenda. Prior to the redemocratization of 
Brazil in 1985, women were absent from institutionalized power. In the three decades 
since, a handful of female leaders have risen to municipal and state executive office. 
These women have had varying levels of substantive commitment to gendered agendas, 
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but their legacies as successful political figures legitimized the entrance of other women 
into Brazilian politics. 
In Presidentas latinoamericanas e igualdad de género: un camino sinuoso, Fernández 
Ramil and Oliva Espinosa assert that we can classify the election of women to the 
executive in Latin America into two stages. The first in which leaders were either 
members of political dynasties or rose to power post-conflict, and the second in which 
women are elected as experienced candidates in stable democracies.304 In the cases of 
Bachelet, Fernández de Kirchner, and Rousseff, these women were the designated 
successors of the men who came before them, inheriting the loyalty of the party from the 
previous head of state. This is particularly true in the case of Rousseff, who served as the 
Minister of Mines and Energy and Chief of Staff under Lula.  
Gender and Leadership in the Rousseff Administration 
An analysis of Rousseff’s leadership style faces a significant obstacle: much of political 
science literature surrounding leadership uses masculine-feminine binary to discuss 
female leadership. The authors of this report believe that classifying Rousseff’s 
leadership along these lines limits a complex understanding of who she is as a leader.  
Gender-Described Style of Leadership 
Rousseff receives praise for her stern style of leadership and technocratic executive 
decision-making, with her leadership characterized as “passionate technocrat.” Her 
leadership abilities are often assessed as “bullish” or “hard,” descriptions that are 
typically linked to her past as a guerilla activist during the military regime. While this 
description of her leadership is not pointedly gendered, it does fall within traditionally 
masculine notions of leadership. A notable exception to this characterization occurred 
during her tenure as Lula’s Chief of Staff, when she was dubbed “A Mãe do PAC” (the 
mother of the PAC).  
Media descriptions of her overall person reveal a popular media association between her 
stern leadership and personal styles. Rousseff has undergone considerable physical 
changes during her rise to power, including plastic surgery to make her appear “less 
crabby” and more “gentle.”305 This commentary on her tough leadership is often 
extrapolated into an assessment of personal appearance in masculine terms, especially 
prior to her presidential run: “[Her youth as an activist] made her a harder person, 
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sometimes brutal and severe, and that is reflected in her looks. The looks that took her 40 
years to construct and one year to try to change.”306 
Gender and the Importance of Female Leadership in Brazil 
Minister of Culture Marta Suplicy perhaps best articulates the enduring impact of the 
Rousseff election:  
After Dilma was elected, girls started playing in ways they didn’t before. I took 
my granddaughter to the Senate ahead of the inauguration. Someone asked her, 
‘What do you want to be when you grow up?’ She replied, ‘President of Brazil.’ I 
would never hear that when I was 10. Now I see more imagination and ambition 
in the play of young girls. It all starts with the games they play—not the princess 
waiting for a guy on a white horse, but an accomplished person who is capable of 
succeeding.307 
The symbolic power of female leadership is primarily discussed by the mainstream media 
and thought leaders in these terms: that female leadership is as significant as soft cultural 
power for the dreams of young women. Additionally, the election of a female leader is 
praised for the cultural significance this achievement holds for women and minorities in 
general.  
In her presidential acceptance speech, Rousseff promised to honor Brazilian women, 
facilitate the entrance of other women into institutional power, and promote policies that 
would positively impact all women.308 In interviews and speeches, Rousseff uses the 
female pronoun “ela” often when talking about a hypothetical Brazilian person and the 
impact policies will have on that person. In doing so, she weaves an investment in female 
political participation and visibility into her public discourse.  
The Brazilian media pointed to her election as a move toward a less unequal state for all 
marginalized groups. Fernandes asserts that Carta Capital, a weekly magazine, “explored 
the expectation that her mandate might be more pluralistic and create opportunities for 
men and women, black and white, atheists, and Christians.”309 The expectation that her 
election would substantially transform the lives of marginalized Brazilians is explored in 
the following section. 
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Rousseff As a Transformational Leader  
To evaluate the transformative capacity of female leaders, it is necessary to first discuss 
the different levels of transformation that we might expect to see. According to Patricia 
Lee Sykes, “transformational leaders seek to change individual citizens, their states, their 
societies and the relationship among these.”310 As we evaluate Dilma Rousseff’s tenure 
against these possibilities, we will see that there is an inherently transformative 
symbolism present in her presidency, but we are unable to label her a truly transformative 
leader.  
In Women As National Leaders, Michael A. Genovese states that in a patriarchal society, 
“any woman who aspires to the top is potentially subversive of the established order.”311 
By positioning herself as a candidate for a powerful, public position traditionally 
occupied by a man, a woman challenges patriarchal norms. It is true that Rousseff 
challenged these norms by serving as Chief of Staff and Minister of Mines and Energy, 
but the presidency has a unique level of visibility and prestige, which grant it 
unparalleled symbolic importance.  
This symbolism refers to “the attitudinal and behavioral effects that women’s presence in 
positions of power might confer to women citizens.”312 To have a member of the 
historically subordinated gender now running the country affects the way women view 
themselves and each other. After centuries of being excluded from power, they may now 
be able to identify with their political system and even aspire to be a part of it.313 This is 
not to say that electing a woman President has eliminated gender roles or gender bias. 
Instead, this is a single step towards dismantling gender roles and eradicating gender bias, 
which sets a new precedent for Brazilians.  
Beyond gender, Rousseff’s presidency has not challenged the power relationships 
between other groups in society, and it has not transformed race or class hierarchies. 
Rousseff differs from her predecessors by being female, but she is like those traditionally 
in power in other regards: white, wealthy, and educated. While she has pursued some 
significant policies of poverty alleviation, she has also simultaneously overseen the 
demolition of favelas to make way for international visitors. She has called the 2014 
World Cup the “Copa contra o racismo,” but it is yet to be seen how that might be 
enacted, and there is no expectation that it will significantly transform race relations. 
Even regarding gender, Rousseff has not been transformational in a substantive sense. 
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Her cash transfer and public health programs benefit women, but she has not pursued an 
overt gender agenda. In fact, during the early stages of her campaign, Rousseff supported 
the decriminalization of abortion, but as the election drew near, her political pragmatism 
won over her female solidarity and she declared her opposition to it.314
 
The one area in which Rousseff’s actions suggest that she wishes to be transformative is 
corruption. In fighting to end this seemingly intractable scourge, Rousseff is attempting 
to wrest power away from the elite and redefine Brazilians’ relationships with their 
public institutions. If she were to end impunity and establish a government and 
bureaucracy that the nation trusted, she would have achieved a significant transformation 
in the relationship between the people and the state, and at the same time she would have 
advanced Brazilian democracy. Currently, we can describe Dilma’s steps against 
corruption as progress, but they fall short of being transformational. 
It is safe to call Dilma a role model for Brazilian girls and women, but we cannot claim 
that she has remodeled any traditional structures of dominance, nor has she attempted to 
“dismantle hierarchies of power that privilege men and the masculine.”315 At her 
inauguration in 2011, she spoke about her dream of parents saying to their daughters 
“yes, women can,”
316
 and at the United Nations she called for the “century of women,”317 
but like other female leaders, she continues to operate within the existing institutional 
framework of gender relations. In 1993 Genovese concluded that none of the female 
world leaders he studied “challenged, in any fundamental way, the patriarchal power 
structure of society. To do so would have been political suicide.”318 Two decades later his 
observations still ring true.  
Media Representation of President Rousseff  
In the process of writing this report, the authors did not perform a formal content analysis 
on the media’s portrayal of Dilma Rousseff. We did, however, read extensively about the 
President, and we feel familiar enough with media coverage on her to be able to share our 
observations. The sources here are newspaper and news magazines with an online 
presence and can be divided into four categories: Brazilian coverage at the time of her 
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election, and after June 2011; and English-language coverage at the time of her election, 
and after June 2011.
319
 We have chosen to organize our analysis this way in order to 
identify any differences between domestic and international portrayals of Rousseff, as 
well as variation in the coverage of a new President compared to an established one.  
A brief survey of Brazilian newspaper coverage of Rousseff’s electoral victory in 2010 
reveals a number of common points: that she had never run for election previously but 
had held multiple appointments at the state and federal level; that she was a relative 
newcomer to the PT; and that she owed her campaign success to her mentor, Lula, and 
the ten-party coalition that he assembled on her behalf. Most articles also made reference 
to her status as the first female President of Brazil and a former prisoner of the military 
regime. These facts were located in prominent positions at the beginning of articles, but 
did not occupy much space in the bodies of the texts. Instead, journalists focused 
primarily on her campaign promises of continuity and expansion of Lula’s social and 
economic policies, and the consequent absence of a formal program for her government. 
Many concluding paragraphs featured the question of whether the President-Elect would 
prove herself capable of governing.  
Rousseff won the presidency in a runoff election with 55% of the national vote, a 
majority that was lower than expected after she won 46.9% of votes in the first round. 
The newspaper articles discussed two events that had an impact on the final result: a 
corruption scandal involving Erenice Guerra, Rousseff’s successor as Chief of Staff to 
President Lula; and Rousseff’s late change in stance on abortion policy in response to the 
Catholic Church’s campaign against her. Foreign media also reported on Rousseff’s shift 
on abortion, although they characterized it as a “flip-flop” and did not include the 
Catholic Church in their content, nor did they mention Rousseff’s need to appeal to 
religious voters. The allegations against Guerra of peddling influence to raise campaign 
money for Rousseff were notably absent from English-language coverage.  
Articles from the United States and United Kingdom tended to include multiple 
references to Rousseff being the first woman President, as well as descriptions of her as a 
former Marxist guerrilla who was “barbarically” tortured. These articles also used a 
significant amount of space to talk about Lula, his presidency, popularity, and charisma, 
and how he handpicked Rousseff to be the next President. Like the Brazilian press, the 
foreign press credited Lula with Rousseff’s victory, but they did not mention the 
importance of the coalition he built. All of the articles studied here included Rousseff’s 
intentions of continuity with the outgoing administration and her primary mission of 
eradicating extreme poverty. The English-language coverage referenced Rousseff’s 
appointments in Lula’s Cabinet, and discussed that this was her first ever election, but 
they did not tend to mention her positions in state government. Gendered descriptions of 
Rousseff as an “iron lady” and a “twice-divorced grandmother” appeared in the English 
                                                 
319 
June 2011 was chosen because it marked the end of the first six months of Rousseff’s presidency. 
 
150 
articles, while the personal content in Portuguese representations were about her 2009 
battle with lymphoma and her somewhat-confrontational personality.  
Since her inauguration as President, media representations of Rousseff have been more 
obviously gendered in foreign coverage than in the domestic press. Unlike in Brazil 
where she is the head of government and everybody is aware of her, abroad every article 
about Rousseff requires an introduction to her and this is where gendered descriptions 
often appear. In these introductions the author will describe Rousseff’s clothing, her 
demeanor, her temperament, and the fact that she is the first female President and Lula’s 
protégé. Articles state explicitly that she is competent and not a proxy president, they 
portray her as serious and surprisingly independent, and they frequently use the phrase 
“iron lady.” The foreign press refers to the President by her last name, while in Brazil she 
is always written about as “Dilma.” The novelty of having a woman in the presidential 
palace is perhaps most evident when Brazilian journalists discuss Rousseff’s Cabinet 
(which is composed of 26% women, including some in influential positions) and use the 
nickname “Palace of the Amazons.”  
Using Data Analysis to Find Preliminary Symbolic Effects of Rousseff’s Presidency 
Latinobarómetro collected data from a sample of 1,204 Brazilians in order to analyze 
citizens’ interest in Brazil’s democracy and politics. One subset of questions about 
democracy probed citizens’ opinions on the state of democracy in Brazil during the last 
year of Lula’s presidential term, 2009–2010. Other questions were geared toward 
determining the public’s overall satisfaction with democracy, as well as their interest in 
political participation under the current administration. After the 2010 data was divided 
by gender of respondent, it could be seen that men were more interested in Brazilian 











Figure 9: Percentage of Brazilians Interested in Politics in 2010 
Source: Latinobarómetro, Online Analysis Time-Series Data. 
Politics ceased to be a “man’s game” in Brazil’s 2010 presidential elections. President 
Lula announced Dilma Rousseff as his handpicked successor for President early on in the 
2010 campaign season. This was the first time the public had been introduced to a female 
presidential candidate by the current President. Why then does the data show that men 
were still more interested in politics than women? In order to test the effect of a female 
President on political interest by gender, the same question about “interest in politics” 
would need to be asked by Latinobarómetro in 2011, but Latinobarómetro did not follow 
up on that question.  
Overall, data show that women’s political interest has increased since 1995. However, 
there is no further data on women’s political interest since 2010. Latinobarómetro did not 
ask the same question of Brazilians in 2011. This lack of data impedes an analysis on the 
impact of Rousseff’s symbolic representation, specifically on women’s political interest. 
The question remains: did the election of a female head of state impact women’s political 
interest and political behavior? Future research is needed to test women’s political 
interest and political participation in the years following Rousseff’s election to determine 
if there was a significant increase in women’s interest. If there is not an increase, that 
means that more men are becoming interested and involved in politics as a result of a 




more interested in politics when women are candidates because they support them, or 
because they oppose them.  
Although women’s interest in politics cannot be directly compared from 2010 to 2011 
using Latinobarómetro data, overall political interest of both men and women can be 
analyzed from 2010 to 2013. Latinobarómetro’s 2013 data on Brazil’s “overall political 
interest” reports that 28% of Brazilians are either “very interested” or “somewhat 
interested” in politics. This represents a 6.3 point decrease from 34.3% in 2010.  
A conclusion can be drawn from the data provided by Latinobarómetro analyzing the 
change in Brazil’s political interest from 2011, the first year of Rousseff’s administration, 
to 2013, the third year of the Rousseff administration. From the data presented, Brazilians 
are overall less interested in politics than they were when Lula was President. Without 
more recent data, it cannot be determined if President Rousseff’s election increased or 
decreased political interest in Brazilian women. 
Inferences can be drawn from the Latinobarómetro data and other research presented in 
this case study to evaluate the symbolic effects of Rousseff’s presidency. An important 
element throughout this case study has been the significance of the World Cup 
preparations for the political landscape. One reason that Brazilians may be less interested 
in politics is that they may have been more focused on current events. Although the 
World Cup preparations were highly politicized by the media in 2012 and 2013, the drop 
in interest in politics may reflect a shift of public interest from traditional politics to 
political mistakes and scandals. Data from 2014 will help to analyze if Brazil’s interest in 
politics increased with the Presidential elections in October 2014. An analysis of both 
election years, 2010 and 2014, can be compared for changes in men’s and women’s 
political interest. This analysis will test if the symbolic representation of a female head of 
state in Brazil affected women’s political interest.  
Assessing the public’s satisfaction with democracy is another way Latinobarómetro 
measures the symbolic impact of a leader. The shifts in Brazilians’ satisfaction with 
democracy during Rousseff’s first year as President may indicate the impact of electing a 








Figure 10: Percentage of Brazilians Satisfied with Democracy in 2010 
and 2011 (Top) Political Perception 2011 (Bottom) 
Source: Latinobarómetro, Online Analysis Time-Series Data. 
By analyzing data collected after Rousseff’s first year in office, some conclusions can be 
made about the differences in opinion by gender on the “political situation” in 2011 (data 
shown in Figure 10). According to the Latinobarómetro survey, more women than men 
thought that the present political situation was “about average” a year after Rousseff took 




was “very bad.” This data shows that women were almost equally as dissatisfied as men 
with the political situation under Rousseff, indicating that Brazilian women do not have 




Chapter 7: Chile Case Study 
Descriptive Representation 
Chile’s Political System 
Chile has a presidential political system in which presidents serve four-year terms. 
Presidents can be reelected an unlimited number of times but cannot serve consecutive 
terms.320 Presidents have the authority to appoint Intendentes, the main executive 
authority in each of Chile’s fifteen regions. Intendentes normally serve for the President’s 
term, but can be dismissed at the President’s discretion.321 
After the dictatorship that ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990, five democratically elected 
Presidents have taken office since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990. Michelle 
Bachelet has been the only woman to serve as President and has been elected twice, first 
in 2006 and then in 2013.  
As seen in Table 12, most Presidents between 1990 and 2010 were part of the 
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, a center-left coalition formed to oppose 
Pinochet’s dictatorship. In 2010, Sebastián Piñera became the first center-right President 
to be elected after the dictatorship. The Concertación united with the Communist Party in 
April 2013 to form the new center-left coalition Nueva Mayoría. Michelle Bachelet ran as 








                                                 
320 Georgetown University Political Database of the Americas, “Chile: Sistemas Electorales / Electoral 





Table 12: Chilean Presidents Since the Return to Democracy 
Term President Coalition 
1990–1994 Patricio Aylwin Azócar Concertación de Partidos por la 
Democracia 
1994–2000 Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle Concertación de Partidos por la 
Democracia 
2000–2006 Ricardo Lagos Escobar Concertación de Partidos por la 
Democracia 
2006–2010 Michelle Bachelet Jeria Concertación de Partidos por la 
Democracia 
2010–2014 Sebastián Piñera Echeñique Coalición por el Cambio 
2014–Present Michelle Bachelet Jeria Nueva Mayoría 
Source: Created by authors  
The 2013 presidential race had nine candidates, three of whom were women. Michelle 
Bachelet obtained 47% of the vote, missing the absolute majority required to win the 
election.322 This resulted in the first runoff election in Chilean history to be staged 
between two women—Bachelet and Evelyn Matthei. The latter was former Minister of 
Labor under Piñera’s administration and representative of the center-right Coalición por 
el Cambio. On December 15, 2013, Bachelet was reelected as President of Chile, with 
62% of the votes. She will serve as President until March 2018.323  
Legislative Branch 
The Upper House or Senate and the Lower House or Chamber of Deputies form the 
National Legislature. The Senate has thirty-eight members, who serve eight-year periods, 
and balloting to elect half of the senators is held every four years.324 The Lower House or 
Chamber of Deputies has 120 members that serve five-year terms. The legislative 
elections use an open list proportional representation system, called the binomial system. 
The binomial system elects two members per district, usually from opposed coalitions, 
and they do not necessarily represent the first two majorities in the district. For one 
                                                 
322 Rocío Montes and Waldo Díaz, “Bachelet no logra triunfar en primera vuelta en las elecciones de 
Chile,” El País, November 18, 2013, 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/11/17/actualidad/1384699551_986911.html. 
323 Servicio Electoral de Chile, “Elecciones Presidenciales. Resultados Globales,” Inforgrafía de 
Resultados Electorales, May 24, 2014, 
https://public.tableausoftware.com/views/INFOGRAFA1_1PresidentesdeChile_Resultadosglobales_RG25
_5_14/1_129_4_14?%20amp;:embed=y&:display_count=no?:showVizHome=no  
324 El Mercurio, “Cómo queda compuesto el Senado con las elecciones parlamentarias 2013,” El Mercurio, 




coalition to elect two candidates, the joint votes for that coalition need to double the votes 
received by the other list. The binomial system ends up limiting the participation in 
Congress to two coalitions. 
Women’s representation in the legislative has been traditionally low. In November 2013 
women’s representation in the Senate increased from 13.2% (5) to 18.4% (7), 325 but 
remained below the world average of 19.4%.326 The number of female deputies increased 
from 14.2% (17) to 15.8% (19).327 Representation in the lower house is also below the 
world average of 21.8%.328 The binomial system has been one of the main causes for 
women’s underrepresentation in the legislature, as parties choose candidates with a 
greater chance to win and those are usually men.329  
No gender quotas have been implemented in the legislature. Franceschet states that the 
absence of quotas could be explained by the lack a unified women’s support between the 
political arena and the civil society.330 In an interview with María de los Ángeles 
Fernández, a militant of the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), she stated that, due to 
Chile’s strong meritocratic culture, gender quotas are socially perceived as undeserved 
privileges. In her opinion, this cultural characteristic has hindered the implementation of 
gender quotas. The Concertación coalition has adopted voluntary quotas ranging from 
20% to 40% in order to increase female representation inside the parties and in elected 
positions. However, in the majority of cases, quotas have not been fulfilled and their 
existence has not had a significant impact on women’s political representation.331  
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During the Concertación governments between 1990 and 2010, every successive 
administration appointed more women in their cabinets than the previous one. 332 
President Lagos’s administration not only appointed more female ministers than his 
predecessor, but also defied traditional notions of gendered cabinets. He appointed 
women in traditionally masculine ministries, such as Defense and Foreign Affairs. 
Bachelet’s first government promoted ministerial parity: women’s participation in cabinet 
positions was 46.5% on average.333 In her first term, strict parity was achieved in her first 
two years as President and then decreased in her final two years.334 In Sebastián Piñera’s 
administration, women’s Cabinet participation declined to 23% on average. Bachelet’s 
Cabinet appointments for the 2014–2016 presidential term consisted of 39% female 
ministers, 335 which casts doubts on her intentions to promote gender equality in her 
second term. Despite the trend of increasing women’s representation in Cabinet positions, 
women have never held ministerial positions in crucial areas such as Finance, Interior, 
Energy and Transportation. 
Other Political Positions 
At the regional level, Bachelet appointed three female Intendentas—out of fifteen 
available positions—for her presidential term 2014–2016. 336 This is three fewer than in 
her first term, when there were only thirteen regions.337 
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At the municipal level, female elected mayors represent less than 13% of the total mayors 
in office and around 25% of the city councilors, as seen in Table 13. Women candidates 
in the 2012 election accounted for 15% and 25% of the total candidates, respectively. 
Despite the modest numbers, some female mayors serve key municipalities like Carolina 
Tohá in Santiago and Virginia Reginatto in Viña del Mar.  







2000 9.4 14.4 
2002 12.3 17.3 
2004 12.3 17.3 
2006 12.2 21.1 
2008 12.2 21.1 
2010 12.5 23.2 
2012 12.2 24.8 
Source: CEPAL data 
Chilean Political Society 
Chilean women were the first women in Latin America to attain access to higher 
education with the 1877 Amunátegui Decree, but still women did not have the same 
political rights as men.338 Women first challenged their exclusion from politics in the 
1870s and 1880s. In 1884, women in San Felipe registered to vote. The women declared 
that they had a right to vote, as the Chilean Constitution did not explicitly prohibit 
women from voting. Consequently, the government amended the Constitution to give the 
right to vote to men only.339 Because of increased female political activism, political 
parties began incorporating women’s wings into their parties as early as the 1880s. 
Between 1913 and 1925 the first feminist organizations, such as the Centros Femeninos 
Belén de Sárraga, emerged to demand social, political, and economic rights.340 Many 
early feminists, however, defined themselves as apolitical and emphasized family and 
societal issues in their activism. 
                                                 





Women’s movements in the 1920s and 1930s sought a “betterment of society” and 
separated themselves from men’s political participation, which they saw as corrupt and 
power-driven. Because of this, they pursued an autonomous strategy separate from 
traditional political parties.341 Some feminists defied the male-dominated political system 
by forming their own political parties. Two female political parties, the Feminine Civic 
Party and the Feminine Democratic Party, emerged in the 1920s. Women argued for 
inclusion on the basis that they brought something particular, because of their morality 
and responsibilities as women, to the political system. Some feminists chose to 
emphasize their maternal roles, while others, such as female workers, emphasized their 
ability to function just as well as males in the workplace.  
Women’s groups and organizations expanded in the 1930s. The most prominent women’s 
group was the Chilean Women’s Pro-Emancipation Movement (Movimiento Pro 
Emancipación de la Mujer Chilena, or MEMCH). MEMCH promoted a variety of 
women’s social, economic, and political issues through the mass mobilization of women. 
It also worked with groups on the left, namely the Popular Front, to advocate for the 
rights of working-class women. In 1944, the women’s suffrage movement gained 
momentum with mass support from MEMCH and the Chilean Federation of Feminine 
Institutions.342 Women were given the right to vote and be elected nationally in 1948.343 
Women’s political participation increased throughout the 1970s and ’80s. Women 
organized against both the Allende and Pinochet governments.344 Pinochet sought to 
demobilize and depoliticize women by emphasizing the maternal, rather than political, 
role of women in society. The feminist movement in the Pinochet era criticized the 
military for excluding women’s and gender issues from the political process. As a result, 
the women’s movement, which emerged from the larger pro-democracy political 
movement, campaigned for a democracy that would address women’s concerns in the 
political arena.345 
Women publicly denounced the military for its systematic subordination of women and 
human rights abuses.346 Because the military targeted political actors and opposition 
groups, women’s groups were less subject to disappearances, detainment, and other forms 
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of violence and repression. During the dictatorship and post-dictatorship period, women 
formed human rights organizations to expose the Pinochet government for its crimes 
against humanity.347 Increased political participation of women coincides with 
redemocratization.348 The presence of international NGOs focused on women’s issues 
may have also helped increase women’s roles in the political sphere in the post-
dictatorship period.349 
Women in the pro-democracy transitory period demanded a more inclusive democratic 
political system above all else.350 Franceschet states that the second feminist movement 
became politicized because pro-democracy groups needed the support of female 
voters.351 Because political parties saw women as future voters, they invited women’s 
political participation in the transition to democracy.352 In 1988, the feminist movement 
divided between the Concertación de Organizaciones Sociales de Mujeres, who operated 
outside of the larger political movement, and the Concertación de Mujeres por la 
Democracia, who integrated into the larger political movement.353 The integration of 
women into politics through the double militancy strategy influenced political parties to 
place women’s demands on political agendas. Most notably, it institutionalized women’s 
issues through state mechanisms like Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM). 
In 1991, the Chilean government created SERNAM to promote women’s rights and 
gender equality in Chile. SERNAM’s main objectives are to promote women’s social and 
political participation, increase women’s access to voting, education and employment, 
and promote equality among men and women, among others.354 SERNAM’s strategic 
objectives are to:  
design, propose and coordinate policies, plans, measures, and legal reforms in 
coordination with the public sector to advance equality; incentivize and 
incorporate women’s employment into Chilean companies; strengthen families as 
the base of society and integrate programs that promote a decent quality of life 
and well-being for families; reduce family violence and provide services to 
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victims of violence; and promote women’s participation in political decision-
making processes and foment women’s leadership.355  
Since the nation’s return to democracy in 1990, women have moderately increased their 
representation in public office. However, the political coalitions born from the pro-
democracy post-dictatorship have not been thoroughly inclusive or effective in bringing 
women into the political sphere. Actually, observers including Franceschet and Ríos 
Tobar state that political parties hinder women’s representation in formal politics. 
Political parties have long resisted implementing quotas; they are highly monopolized by 
popular and heavily financed candidates; and parties are extremely polarized, making it 
difficult to garner broad support for unlikely candidates.356 The election of Michelle 
Bachelet, who campaigned on the premise of a more inclusive and participatory 
democratic political system, rose above such obstacles and changed notions of traditional 
politics in Chile. 
Michelle Bachelet: First Female President of Chile 
In February 2006 Michelle Bachelet Jeria was elected as the first female Chilean 
President. This was as a result of mass popular support rather than strong support from 
Chile’s traditional political elite.357 Bachelet’s visibility and popularity increased after 
serving as a Minister of Health and Defense under the Ricardo Lagos administration. She 
became one of the Concertación pre-candidates for the 2005 presidential race along with 
Soledad Alvear, another Cabinet member of Lagos’s administration. Before the primaries 
were held, Alvear stepped down from the race and Bachelet was proclaimed as 
Concertación’s single candidate. After defeating the center-right candidate Sebastián 
Piñera in the January 2006 runoff, Bachelet was elected. Thus, a divorced single mother, 
who was agnostic, socialist, and without family connections in politics, became the first 
female President of Chile, a traditional and morally conservative country.358 
Bachelet became involved in politics as a student of medicine at the Universidad de 
Chile. She was a student leader and part of the Socialist Youths group during Allende’s 
government. Bachelet’s father, an air force general in charge of the food supply entity in 
Allende’s government, was imprisoned and died as a result of torture after the 1973 
coup.359 Bachelet continued her activism with Socialist Party activities, and in 1975, 
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Bachelet and her mother, Ángela Jeria, were tortured by the military regime and later 
exiled.360  
The General of the Air Force Fernando Matthei—friend of General Alberto Bachelet and 
father of Evelyn Matthei, Bachelet’s contender in the 2013 election—interceded to allow 
Michelle Bachelet and Angela Jeria to return to Chile after the exile.361 In 1979 Bachelet 
returned to Chile from East Germany—where she got married and had her first son—and 
resumed her medical studies in Universidad de Chile. She became a surgeon and a 
pediatrician and worked primarily in the health field, as a consultant in the Pan American 
Health Organization and in the Ministry of Health. Later, she pursued studies in strategy 
and defense, first at the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies in Chile and 
later at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington DC.362 From 1998 to 2000 
she became a member of the Political Committee of the Socialist Party and participated in 
Ricardo Lagos’s presidential campaign.363 
As Minister of Health of the Lagos administration, Bachelet was tasked with eliminating 
the wait lines in public health care facilities within three months’ time. This mission was 
only achieved partially; Bachelet reduced 82% of the lines. As a result, she presented her 
resignation to Lagos, who refused to accept it and backed her up her publicly as the most 
qualified person for the job.364 This episode positioned Bachelet as the most popular 
minister of Lagos’s administration during his first hundred days in office.365 After two 
years in the Health Ministry, Lagos appointed Bachelet as the Minister of Defense. She 
became the first woman in Latin America to hold this position.366 As Minister of Defense 
she promoted gender equality in the Armed Forces, establishing an equal opportunity 
policy for women in the Armed and Police Forces.367 After two years, she left the cabinet 
position to run for the Chilean Presidency. She held that position from 2006 to 2010.  
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In 2010, Bachelet was appointed the first Under-Secretary General and Executive 
Director of a new United Nations agency, United Nations Women.368 UN Women, the 
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, was 
created in 2010 as part of a larger UN organizational reform. UN Women’s stated goals 
are: “to support inter-governmental bodies, such as the Commission on the Status of 
Women, in their formulation of policies”; “to help Member States implement standards 
by providing technical and financial support to countries that request it, and to forge 
effective partnerships with civil society”; and “to hold the UN system accountable for its 
own commitments on gender equality, including regular monitoring of system-wide 
progress.”369 UN Women partners with domestic authorities and civil society groups to 
support projects that promote women’s political participation, economic empowerment, 
equality, and many other gender issues. As Executive Director of UN Women, Bachelet 
led the agency’s international, regional, and country-specific programs to advance gender 
equality. Bachelet served as Executive Director from 2010-2013. 
Upon her return to Chile in March 2013, she announced her candidacy to the Presidency. 
She was sworn in as President for the second time in March 11, 2014. At Bachelet’s 
inauguration, Isabel Allende—the Senate’s President and daughter of former President 
Salvador Allende, overthrown by Pinochet’s dictatorship—invested Bachelet with the 
presidential sash.  
Substantive Representation 
Michelle Bachelet’s First Government (2006–2010) 
After sixteen years of Concertación’s male presidents, Michelle Bachelet represented 
change but also continuity.370 Being the first female president was a step towards political 
transformation, but her policies continued the center-left coalition’s tradition. As her 
predecessors did before her, Bachelet pursued market-friendly reforms and maintained 
macroeconomic stability although emphasizing social protection policies.371 Bachelet’s 
commitment to gender equity,372 support of social policy with a gender focus, and 
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advocacy for increasing women’s participation in appointed positions were the main 
factors that distinguished her from other presidents.  
Bachelet’s first government can be separated for analysis into two periods according to 
Garretón.373 The first period (2006–2008), when Bachelet pursued cabinet parity and the 
inclusion of new actors into politics, is less transparent in terms of policies. A series of 
protest events of different aims—education, public transportation, and mining— captured 
the government’s attention, postponing action on Bachelet’s own projects. The second 
period (2008–2010) is characterized by a more traditional management path. During 
these years, experienced political figures replace the parity intents, social protection 
policies take form, and Bachelet’s popularity gains strength.  
Main Policies 
Social policy was the signature of Bachelet’s first term.374 The pensions’ system reform 
and the implementation of the early childhood protection program, Chile Crece Contigo, 
were the most salient policies of her government.375 Bachelet’s administration drove the 
reform of the pensions system—primarily based on personal savings—introducing a 
solidarity pillar. For people who did not participate in the pensions system, the new 
policy guaranteed a minimum pension, and it supplemented pensions for those whose 
savings were too low.376 The reform also included gender components, including a 
special bonus for every woman’s child, acknowledging the differences between women 
and men’s participation in the system.377  
Her administration developed Chile Crece Contigo, a comprehensive program to attend to 
early childhood needs from pregnancy to the child’s fourth year.378 As a result, childcare 
and preschool education expanded during her government; in 2005 there were 781 
childcare facilities, and after her government, they have climbed up to 4,200.379 This 
increase was part of the strategy for increasing women’s participation in the labor 
market.380 
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In continuity with President Lagos’s health protection system Universal Access of 
Explicit Guarantees (Acceso Universal de Garantías Explícitas, or AUGE), Bachelet’s 
administration increased the number of medical conditions included in the universal 
coverage system.381 Moreover, the fiscal responsibility policy established by the Lagos 
administration was institutionalized in her government through a fiscal responsibility 
law.382 The law continues Lagos’s policy of maintaining a fiscal structural surplus that 
serves to fund pensions and to stabilize the economy in case of deficits.383 Bachelet’s 
fiscal responsibility policy protected the Chilean economy from the 2007 financial crisis. 
Her administration put in place an economic stimulation package using funds from the 
fiscal surplus to alleviate the consequences of the world crisis.384 Her administration’s 
successful management of the economic crisis translated into higher ratings for Bachelet 
in nationwide polls.  
The Bachelet administration also established, through the Transparency and Access to 
Public Information Law, a number of transparency and accountability measures in efforts 
to increase the effectiveness of its policies. This legislation aims to increase the 
participation of Chilean citizens in the public sphere. It allows citizens to make inquiries 
concerning public spending and guarantees a quick and thorough response from 
government institutions. Herwig Cleuren, a professor at Lieden University specializing in 
redemocratization and political participation in Latin America, suggests that Chile 
capitalizes on its economic growth as a way to advocate social policies that will increase 
social well being.385 This, in turn, Cleurig states, contributes to a better state-society 
relationship.386 International transparency and anticorruption advocates have praised 
Chile for its implementation of such policies and recognize the positive impact they have 
on the Chilean economy and citizenry. 
Social Mobilizations and Controversies 
President Bachelet’s administration faced several social protests, especially during her 
first years in office. These demonstrations led her administration to a reactive public 
policy agenda, prioritizing areas that were not the intended focus of her administration. 
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These controversies had an impact on Bachelet’s approval and disapproval rates (Figure 
11). 
Figure 11: Bachelet Approval and Disapproval Rates: First 
Government 
Source: CEP Chile. 
The first conflict faced by her administration was the secondary students’ mobilization 
during May to June of 2006.387 Students demanded structural reforms to the educational 
management system, such as increasing state participation and lessening the system’s 
market orientation.388 The Bachelet administration established a Consultant Committee, 
with representatives from different social groups that had an interest in education 
reform.389 This action corresponded to her campaign goals of increasing citizen 
participation in policymaking.390 The committee formulated a proposal to replace the 
existing law, but some critical issues were modified in the negotiation in Parliament and 
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finally, a moderate version of the reform was approved.391 The final project did not end 
for-profit private subsidized education and did not modify the existing municipal 
administration of schools.392 Bachelet’s slow response to students’ demands and her 
political naivety when appointing an eighty-person committee to work on a controversial 
topic as education, cast doubt on her leadership capability.393 Her public approval 
decreased, and after only five months in government, her first Cabinet reshuffle took 
place.394  
In 2006 Bachelet’s government also had to confront the mobilization of the copper 
subcontracted workers by the state mining company CODELCO.395 The government 
agreed to their demands, and the Catholic Church pushed the government to confront the 
profound equity and equality issues in labor conditions.396 Again, the government 
established a Consultant Committee that aimed to improve conditions in the labor 
market.397 However, the Committee did not attack the structural problems of the labor 
conditions.398 
The third wave of mobilizations in March 2007 was a consequence of the implementation 
of a new public transportation system in the capital, called TranSantiago. The Lagos 
administration had made efforts to radically transform and modernize the public transport 
system.399 During the modernization implementation, which was led by Bachelet’s 
government, the system collapsed, and the users protested en masse against the 
transportation policy. 400 The TranSantiago problems led to a second Cabinet reshuffle, 
and Bachelet’s popularity once again suffered.401 President Bachelet publicly apologized 
for the disastrous consequences of TranSantiago in the annual state of the nation speech 
in front of the Parliament.402  
After the first two years, Bachelet faced less pressure from the grassroots movements. 
Her social policy agenda gradually became clearer to the public, and the government’s 
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management of the 2007 world financial crisis increased Bachelet’s support. Her 
approval rate was around 80% by the end of her first term.  
Days before the end of her administration, an 8.8 earthquake affected the southern-central 
region of the country. The National Emergency Office did not emit a tsunami alert, and 
several tsunami waves on the southern coast of the country killed hundreds of people. 
The tsunami victims surpassed greatly the number of victims of the earthquake, and 
Bachelet’s presence in the National Emergency Office was criticized for hindering the 
decision-making of the pertinent authorities.403 President Bachelet was also questioned by 
her decision of sending military troops to the affected areas thirty-six hours after the 
earthquake, when looting was already taking place.404 A judicial investigation cleared 
Bachelet from criminal responsibilities for her performance in the National Emergency 
Office.405 Despite the controversies regarding the earthquake and tsunami, her popularity 
remained unaffected.406  
Gender Policies 
Bachelet had a vision of gender equality and utilized the Chilean women’s bureau, 
SERNAM, to promote women’s rights and gender equality in Chile. Through gender 
mainstreaming, which integrates a gender equality component into political, economic, 
and social policies, Bachelet used her presidential prerogative to push gender policy 
initiatives through the administration.407 SERNAM’s comprehensive gender agenda for 
the 2006–2010 period focused heavily on domestic violence issues and providing equal 
rights to female workers.  
In 2006, Bachelet increased SERNAM’s budget by 30%.408 Domestic violence policy 
was at the forefront of Bachelet’s gender agenda. Taking office in 2006, the Bachelet 
administration would assume responsibility for implementing Law No. 20,066, which 
obliges the state to take actions to prevent, sanction, and eradicate family violence, and 
protect victims of abuse. Law No. 20,066 prompted the government to gather and 
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publicly report data on domestic violence, launch public awareness campaigns, provide 
aid to victims of violence, and criminalize abusers.409 Bachelet utilized SERNAM’s 
increased budget to build sixteen shelters for victims of domestic abuse across Chile. In 
2008, Bachelet announced plans to build twenty-seven more shelters and centers to 
provide a safe place and assistance to women and children.410 
The administration also doubled the budget for the Programa Nacional de Prevención de 
la Violencia Intrafamiliar in order to help prevent family violence and give support and 
treatment to victims of domestic abuse.411 The Proyecto de Ley sobre Femicidio 
introduced legal measures, such as criminal penalties, for perpetrators of violence against 
women. The most important development of this law is that it requires the state to take 
legal action against perpetrators.412 The law aims to reduce the number of women subject 
to domestic violence and the number of deaths that result from such violence.  
President Bachelet also took action on the labor front. The government aimed to eradicate 
labor discrimination through legal reforms to the Código de Buenas Prácticas.413 In 2006, 
male workers received 19% higher payments than women for comparable jobs.414 To 
counter such inequalities, the administration introduced a clause to the Código del 
Trabajo, which guarantees that men and women who work the same jobs are paid equal 
wages.415 Another major reform included the implementation of measures to give 
domestic workers the right to a minimum wage. The Código del Trabajo also outlines 
measures to be taken to generate gender equality in the workplace. 
In regards to women’s representation, Bachelet appointed a parity Cabinet within her first 
year as President.416 She also appointed more female Undersecretaries and governors than 
any of her predecessors. By the end of her term, female representation in the Cabinet 
decreased, but did not fall below 40%.417  
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The International Stage 
Upon its creation, Bachelet served as temporary President of the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR), an organization that promotes the integration of South 
American countries. During Bachelet’s term, Chile signed agreements on a range of 
issues, such as free trade and social reform, with Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and 
Brazil.418 Between 2006 and 2010, Chile signed ten free trade agreements with Japan, 
India, Australia, and Japan.419 These agreements helped advance Chile’s overarching 
economic growth strategy. 
Michelle Bachelet’s Second Term (2014–2018) 
Bachelet’s 2013 presidential campaign focused on three major pillars: an educational 
reform, a tax reform, and the formulation of a new political Constitution. These proposals 
were a response to the 2011 mass student mobilizations whereby students demanded 
educational reform funded by tax revenues 420 and a more democratic Constitution. 
Bachelet’s educational reform proposes to address quality problems in the educational 
system, promote inclusion, eliminate for-profit primary and secondary education that is 
publicly funded, and move forward to free higher education.421 The tax reform promotes 
a more progressive tax system that pursues equity as one of its main goals, increasing the 
tax burden for wealthier Chileans.422 The formulation of a new Constitution based on 
democratic principles is also a cornerstone of Bachelet’s new administration. 
The presidential program, a document that states all the policy guidelines for Bachelet’s 
second administration, includes gender equality as an underlying objective in all policy 
reforms: labor, education, the electoral system, and the new Constitution.423 The program 
included the transformation of SERNAM to feature a full-rank position at the Minister of 
State level, the Minister of Women; this transformation occurred within the first hundred 
days of government.424 In terms of political representation, the number of women 
appointed in ministerial, undersecretary, and governors’ positions are all below 40%, a 
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threshold that was never crossed during Bachelet’s first administration, at least for the 
Cabinet positions.425  
In her first days of government, Bachelet announced the cancelation or modification of at 
least eleven policies established during Piñera’s administration. These included several 
education policies that were inconsistent with Bachelet’s proposed reform, and other 
projects in the health, public safety, and agriculture sectors.426 The administration passed 
its first law on permanent direct cash transfers every March to vulnerable families,427 and 
placed the overseas voting law project for urgent revision in Congress.428 After twenty-
one days in office, Bachelet’s administration responded to an 8.2 Richter scale 
earthquake in the north of the country, followed by a tsunami. This time her government 
reacted promptly to the emergency, and only six deaths were registered as a consequence 
of the natural disaster. Ten days after the earthquake, a disastrous fire took place in 
Valparaíso, leaving more than 2,500 people without homes.429 Bachelet’s administration 
assigned three special envoys to be in charge of the reconstruction tasks in the north of 
the country and in Valparaíso.430  
Symbolic Representation 
This section explores the sociocultural impact of Michelle Bachelet as the first female 
President of Chile.  
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Traditional Notions of Leadership 
Traditionally, women’s representation in the executive power has been scarce in Latin 
America. Since the 1990s, however, the number of women in the executive power has 
increased. Bauer and Tremblay measured the advancement of women in executive branch 
positions from 1998 to 2008. Not one of the eighteen Latin American countries surveyed 
in 1998 had a female President.431 By 2008, the number of female Presidents increased 
from zero to two, with Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina and Bachelet in Chile, 
constituting 11% of Presidents in the region.432 The number of females serving as head of 
state in Latin American countries has steadily increased since then. In 2014, four out of 
the nine elected female heads of state in the world governed in Latin America.433 
Moreover, three of the women— Bachelet, Fernández de Kirchner, and Rousseff—have 
assumed the presidency in prominent Latin American countries. 
Greater female representation can be attributed to various factors including the 
implementation of quotas, more liberal voting trends, international attention to gender 
equality, and political appointments, among other factors. Bauer and Tremblay attribute 
the general upward trend to two factors: progressive voter preferences and presidential 
autonomy in appointing cabinet ministers. Most executive branch positions held by 
women in the 1990s were nonelected cabinet appointments.434 In Chile and Nicaragua 
female representation in cabinet positions reached 50% and 41%, respectively.435 These 
increases are a direct result of presidential advocacy for gender parity in the cabinets. On 
average, women make up about 25% of the parliamentary power in the Americas.436 That 
figure is just above the world average of 22%. Compared to world figures, the realization 
of gender parity in Chile is especially striking. 
Women were not integrated into Chile’s political system in the immediate post-
dictatorship period in 1989–1990. By 1995, however, women held notable ministerial 
positions. In 1995, Soledad Alvear was appointed Minister of Justice. As Minister, 
Alvear spotlighted gender and family issues, and citizen participation in the democratic 
process. She was also a strong advocate for the implementation of quotas in Chile. 
Another notable female minister, Adriana Delpiano, was appointed Minister of National 
Resources from 1994 to 1999,437 and would later become Director-Minister of SERNAM 
(2000–2003). Women’s representation in the executive branch reached new heights under 
President Lagos. Political pressures prompted Lagos to increase the percentage of women 
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in his Cabinet from 12% to 36%.438 This jump in women’s representation set the stage for 
women to seek executive political positions, including the Chilean presidency.  
Bachelet’s rise to power is marked by her 2001 appointment as Minister of Health, which 
is a traditionally feminine or gender-neutral position.439 In 2003, Bachelet was promoted 
to Minister of Defense, a prestigious and conventionally masculine post.440 Bachelet’s 
command of this position expanded her professional portfolio and increased her 
desirability as a candidate for the presidency. In her campaign, Bachelet promised to 
implement gender equality measures at all levels of Chilean politics. From the start, 
Bachelet embraced her femininity and brought gender equality to the top of her agenda. 
In her first annual address as President, Bachelet said the word “woman” a total of thirty-
six times.441 Bachelet’s commitment to gender equality was demonstrated by the delivery 
of her promise to achieve gender parity in the cabinet in 2006. Bachelet emphasized the 
fact that women constituted 55% of the population in Latin America and that government 
needed to reflect that proportionally. As President, Bachelet’s advocacy for gender 
equality, combined with her feminine approach to governing, preserved her reputation as 
a competent and popular President among both men and women.  
Transformational Leaders 
During her first period in office, Bachelet attempted to establish the idea of the “citizen 
government” (gobierno ciudadano), opening the political system to increase social 
actors’ participation and include new faces in politics. This defied the traditional political 
model of consensus pursued by Concertación’s previous governments that emphasized 
unity among member parties and avoided conflict with other actors.442 However, this 
course of action was short lived. Political conditions and social mobilizations put 
pressure on Bachelet’s government, and her response was to return to traditional 
consensual politics, appointing more experienced politicians to her Cabinet and having a 
closer relationship with Concertación’s parties.443 The introduction of gender parity to 
Cabinet and Undersecretary positions defied traditional patterns of power distribution in 
the executive, but this policy also lost momentum.444 Overall, Bachelet’s first 
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administration promoted moderate political system transformations. Her second 
administration has been more ambitious in that area, by supporting the formulation of a 
new constitution to replace the current one, enacted under Pinochet’s dictatorship, and by 
promoting a more progressive tax reform in the country.  
Gender-favorable policies encouraged during Bachelet’s first government had mixed 
effects. In the political arena, women in elected positions in Chile remain below the 
world’s average of representation.445 Female cabinet appointments decreased in Piñera’s 
administration and in Bachelet’s second term. Bachelet’s first administration did not 
advance on the formalization of quotas to ensure women’s political participation, which 
explains the stagnation and decrease in the legislative and executive respectively.446 
However, in terms of public policies, Bachelet’s first administration passed legislation 
that improved women’s conditions in labor, pensions, and domestic violence issues. This 
contributed to enhance women’s position in society, regardless who was in office.  
Media Image 
In Chile the main means of mass communication are controlled by right wing economic 
sectors, so it is not surprising that Bachelet’s has been negatively depicted.447 During the 
first campaign, the media emphasized her nontraditional characteristics as a divorced 
single mother or an agnostic, while in her period in office, it highlighted her “weak” 
leadership style.448 However, this is inconsistent with public opinion surveys. During her 
first two years in office, her weakness exceeded her authoritativeness, but that tendency 
was reversed in the following two years. Bachelet was perceived as being authoritative by 
more than 60% of the interviewees in the CEP (Centro de Estudios Públicos) public 
opinion survey, one of the most important polls in Chile, and further, the survey showed 
that she had the highest evaluation among all Presidents since Frei.449 Bachelet enjoyed 
increasing personal support during her first term in office, finishing it with a 78% 
approval rate.450 The international media depicted a mixed view of Michelle Bachelet. 
The Economist in 2006 highlighted the fact that Bachelet was the first female President in 
Latin America who was not the widow of a previous President. The article also 
mentioned her political inexperience as a challenge.451 In 2009, the same publication 
described Bachelet as one of the most influential political leaders in Latin America and 
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explained her success, stressing Bachelet’s consultative leadership style and her 
government’s emphasis on social protection during the world economic crisis.452 For her 
recently inaugurated government, The Economist cast doubts on her ability to direct her 
new coalition—Nueva Mayoría—that includes the center-moderate Christian Democrats 
party and the left Communist party.453 
Symbolic Effect of Michelle Bachelet’s Leadership 
The symbolic effects of Bachelet as the first female President in Chile are hard to 
measure. Her government’s impact can be examined through public opinion studies. 
According to a PNUD (United Nations Development Program) gender parity survey in 
2009, more than 70% of the interviewees agreed with the statement that women had been 
empowered since Bachelet took office in 2006.454 This reflects the impact on civil society 
of Bachelet’s election as President. Moreover, 62% of the interviewees disagreed with the 
statement that men are better political leaders than women,455 which is a significant 
advance for future female politicians after Bachelet, considering that the World Value 
Survey reported a 52% against this claim in 2006.456 In relation to her policies, a 2008 
study for SERNAM presented evidence of favorable attitudes towards Bachelet’s parity 
measures and women’s political participation.457 Also, 83% of the interviewees supported 
the idea of extending parity measures to all political institutions, and those surveyed, 
particularly women, greatly supported quota laws (73% of the women and 64% of the 
men).458 The favorable changes in public opinion regarding women in leadership 
positions and the support to Bachelet’s gender parity measures can be understood as part 
of a wider society change towards gender equality. 
Bachelet’s first administration’s symbolic impact can also be assessed through the 
analysis of data from Latinobarómetro, a political climate survey. Preference for 
democracy over other types of political regimes increased 6 percentage points, from 57% 
in 2006 to 63% in 2010. Not only did the preference for democracy increase during the 
Bachelet government, but the levels of satisfaction with democracy also changed 
favorably. As observed in Figure 12, dissatisfaction with democracy was greater than 
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satisfaction until 2008. In 2008 the tendency was reversed and satisfaction with 
democracy surpassed dissatisfaction. Satisfaction with democracy follows a pattern 
similar to Bachelet’s approval rate, decreasing in the first two years of government 
(2006–2008) and increasing in the final two (2008–2010).459  
Figure 12: Satisfaction with Democracy in Chile 2006–2010 
The increase in the number of female presidential candidates for the 2013 elections can 
also be interpreted as a consequence of Bachelet’s successful first term in office. Her 
efficacy promoted a positive vision of female politicians in executive power, encouraging 
other women to participate in the presidential race. Furthermore, Bachelet’s presence as a 
candidate has permeated campaign discourses, as all presidential campaigns since 2005 
have incorporated gender issues. The 2013 runoff for the presidency marks a noteworthy 
advance of women’s representation in Chile. This election was the first time in Chilean 
history where two women, Michelle Bachelet and Evelyn Matthei, were the final 
candidates in the run for the presidency.460 Their leadership and popularity in different 
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political parties, Bachelet in a center-left coalition and Matthei in a center-right alliance, 
also gives women from different political spectrums the opportunity to be represented in 
Chile’s political sphere. The election of Bachelet for a second presidential term also 
symbolizes the citizens’ confidence in Bachelet as a competent and successful leader. 
Despite these positive interpretations of Bachelet’s symbolic impact, the representation of 
women in the media was not altered significantly by Bachelet’s presidency. Media image 
is an important aspect to analyze, as it produces and reproduces discourses and meanings 
in society.461 Bucciferro and Ross’s analysis of thirty-three articles in important Chilean 
written media between 2006 and 2010, reveal that the most common representation of 
women continues to be portrayals as mothers or sexual objects.462 The authors identify a 
tendency to combine these two archetypes in the figure of a successful woman: a mother, 
a wife, and a professional worker. The media supports the image of feminine 
empowerment, portraying successful upper-income women that do not ultimately defy 
traditional gender roles. These women are usually white, fashionable, professional, and 
have money at their disposal. Bucciferro and Ross’s analysis identifies the support for the 
idea that “women can have it all,” which is far from promoting gender equality.463 When 
women engaged in political activities are depicted, they are either portrayed using 
stereotypes or they are judged more harshly than men. In the authors’ words: “Michelle 
Bachelet’s election enabled an inquiry into traditional gender roles, but they are now 
being replaced with commercialized images that do not challenge the existing structures 
of power.”464 However, it is important to note that Bucciferro’s research was conducted 
using magazines targeted to middle- and upper-income women, which can explain the 
bias towards this type of women.  
Simon Romero of the New York Times states that the 2013 Chilean election resembles the 
growing empowerment of women in the executive power in Latin America.465 Despite 
the traditional notions of Latin America as a region rich in machismo, the number of 
women in the executive power has increased significantly in the past decade. Of the 
twenty-nine women who have reached the highest political office in their respective 
countries, eight have come to power in Latin America and the Caribbean.466 President 
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Bachelet has continuously said that, despite these advances, much work remains to be 
done before gender equality is achieved in Latin America.467 
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Chapter 8: Costa Rica Case Study 
Descriptive Representation  
Political Structure  
Laura Chinchilla Miranda became Costa Rica’s first female President in May 2010. 
Although her administration faced scandal and difficulty, her election represented a major 
shift in national attitudes toward women in power.  
Costa Rica became a democracy in 1948 after a brief civil war, making it the only nation 
in Central America to democratize before 1950. Because of this, Costa Rica is often 
considered the pillar of democracy in Latin America. The right to vote was extended to 
women in 1949, the year after José Figueres Ferrer came into power. In 1949, voting 
rights were also extended to blacks and indigenous peoples, dramatically altering Costa 
Rica’s electorate and political structure. Perhaps the most radical change during the 
transitioning government was the disbandment of Costa Rica’s armed forces.  
As a democratic society, Costa Rica has a well-defined government with established 
checks and balances between each branch. The executive branch consists primarily of the 
President, who serves as the head of government and the head of state, and the 
President’s appointed cabinet, which currently consists of two Vice Presidents and twenty 
Ministers. The President and Vice President are elected by nationwide popular vote to 
serve one four-year term. In 2003, the constitutional court of Costa Rica annulled a 
constitutional reform that prevented Presidents from ever running for reelection. As it is 
now, individuals may run for reelection after being out of office for eight years, or two 
presidential terms. An independent Supreme Electoral Tribunal, a commission of three 
principal magistrates and six alternates selected by the Supreme Court of Justice, 
supervises the electoral process. 
Political parties play a crucial role in Costa Rica’s political system. Laura Chinchilla is a 
member of the National Liberation Party (PLN), which has dominated Costa Rican 
politics much of the last fifty years. Until 2002, Costa Rica functioned as a two-party 
system with the PLN and the Social Christian Unity Party. However, in recent years, the 
left-leaning Citizen’s Action Party has gained momentum, and Costa Rica is transitioning 
to a multiparty system.  
The legislative branch of Costa Rica consists of a unicameral legislative assembly made 
up of fifty-seven legislators, who are elected by popular vote in each district for four-year 
terms. Female representation within the legislative assembly has considerably increased 
in the past two decades. Gender quota laws in Costa Rica have been cited as some of the 
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most successful in the Western world. The combination of a solid legal framework and 
strong enforcement mechanisms has led to substantial increases in women in power 
throughout the nation. In 1990, the country passed its first piece of legislation aimed at 
increasing women’s political representation: the Law for the Promotion of Women’s 
Social Equality. Due to its lack of specific targets, quotas, and enforcement mechanisms, 
however, the law did little to increase the number of women elected. Following the 1995 
World Conference on Women in Beijing, Costa Rica reformulated its Electoral Code and 
introduced gender quota laws.468 This reform legislated a 40% quota for women at the 
candidate level, but the legislation lacked both specificity and enforcement mechanisms. 
Following the 1998 elections, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) reevaluated the 
quota legislation to increase its efficacy. As of March 1, 2013, women occupied 38.6% of 
the seats in the Legislative Assembly.469 Furthermore, an electoral law passed in 2009 
required gender parity of candidates in the 2014 election.470 Quotas will continue to affect 
Costa Rican politics in the coming years.  
Women in Power  
There have been significant government-wide increases in women’s political 
representation across the country. Though Chinchilla’s successful election marked the 
first female President in the country, several others have been Vice Presidents. These 
women include Victoria Garrón in 1986, Rebecca Grynspan in 1994, Elizabeth Odio in 
1998, and Lineth Saborío in 2002. Chinchilla, who was elected as Vice President in 2006, 
and Saborío are the only two women to hold the position of first Vice President.  
As mentioned above, women currently occupy 38.6% of seats in the Legislative 
Assembly, a number that has been constant since 2006. In 2012, 30% of the highest court 
judges were women, down from 35% in 2011.
 
Women occupy only 12.3% of elected 
mayoral positions in Costa Rica, a figure that has grown at a much slower rate than the 
other indicators.471 
Cabinet appointment numbers have varied considerably between administrations but are 
showing positive trends in women’s representation. As of March 2013, 22.7% of 
                                                 
468 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Report of Costa Rica on Implementation of 
the Beijing Platform for the Action and the Outcome of the Twenty-Third Special Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, 28. 
469 “Latin America: Statistics Are Encouraging, but Parity Is Still out of Reach,” International IDEA, 
March 8, 2013, accessed February 23, 2014, http://www.idea.int/americas/latin-america-statistics-are-
encouraging-but-parity-is-still-out-of-reach.cfm. 
470 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Report of Costa Rica on Implementation of 
the Beijing Platform for the Action and the Outcome of the Twenty-Third Special Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, 28. 
471 “Latin America.” 
 
183 
ministerial positions belonged to women, a long way from parity, but a definite 
improvement from previous years.472 Chinchilla achieved gender parity with her original 
cabinet: she appointed ten women to ministerial positions.473 Women were appointed to 
several positions that are traditionally held by men, including the Ministries of Foreign 
Relations, Economy Industry and Trade, Agriculture and Livestock, and Health and 
Science and Technology. However, due to numerous scandals and reshuffling, many of 
these appointees resigned. In fact, as of February 2014, only three of the original female 
appointees remained on the cabinet and the total number of women on the cabinet 
decreased from ten to six.  
Broader Societal Factors 
Though a substantial increase in women in power has occurred over the last few decades, 
the change has not happened overnight. The women’s movements in Central America 
came to fruition during the 1980s, as the countries faced economic, social, and political 
instability. Authoritarian rule, neoliberal economic models, and social injustice resulted 
in high unemployment and decreased wages that unequally affected women. Nicaragua 
was in the midst of a bloody revolution where the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) had ousted the Somoza dictatorship. El Salvador and Guatemala were deeply 
entrenched in a civil war, while Costa Rica experienced a stable but limited democracy. 
Although women in Central America had fought for various issues in the past, authors 
point to this time period as the birth of a true feminist movement. This was the first time 
women came together despite social class.474As the countries of Central America faced 
widespread poverty, the women organized collectively in the public sphere to ameliorate 
the deplorable social conditions. 
As a result of the different political and social atmospheres in the countries of Central 
America during the 1980s, each women’s movement manifested in a unique form. El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala were transitioning to democracies, which 
engendered women’s movements that were heavily focused on politics. The women’s 
movement in Honduras fomented in opposition to the military rule. Unlike the other 
countries in Central America, Costa Rica had a relatively stable democracy and lower 
levels of poverty, but in many ways, women’s power was still limited in society. 
Though not as severe as other Central American countries, the economic situation in 
Costa Rica was a significant catalyst for the women’s movement. Again, structural 
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adjustment programs created inequality and poverty, negatively effecting women. As a 
result, women in Costa Rica rose to the challenges presented, and the women’s 
movement made some of its greatest strides between 1985 and 1995. While a majority of 
the leaders were professional women, rural workers and indigenous women also joined 
the movement. The diversity of women’s involvement was evidenced by the creation of 
political groups, commercial groups, and feminist groups such as: Colectivo de Mujeres 
Pancha Carrasco, Comité Intercofederal Femenino and Programa de Estudios de Género 
de la Universidad de Costa Rica.475 Furthermore, associations of indigenous women, 
African women, and the disabled were created. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the women’s movement saw higher levels of coordination, 
which expanded and strengthened the women’s movement. One major event for Central 
America as a whole was hosting the VI Encuentro Feminista Lationamericano y del 
Caribe in El Salvador in 1993. The Encuentros were meetings organized by the women of 
Latin America to discuss, organize, and strategize regarding women’s empowerment 
issues and feminism. The Encuentros have taken place in Peru, Colombia, Brazil, and 
other countries in Latin America with substantial participation. The Encuentro in El 
Salvador signified the importance of Central America’s women’s movement and gave 
more visibility to the women’s groups’ struggles.476 Another important event that 
underscored the coordination and empowerment of the women’s movement was the 
Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995. 
In 1998, the National Women’s Institute (INAMU) was created to promote women’s 
issues in public policy in Costa Rica. INAMU emerged from a series of national 
organizations that had focused on women’s rights since the 1970s, starting with Costa 
Rica’s first women’s organization: the Office of Programs for Women and Family 
(created in 1974 under the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports). By 1986, the office 
had expanded and changed its name to the National Center for the Development of 
Women and Family. After a decade of promoting women’s rights in national politics, the 
organization determined that an official national institutional body, with its own laws and 
resources, was needed to promote women’s issues more effectively. In 1998, the 
Legislature voted in favor of transforming the National Center for the Development of 
Women into the National Women’s Institute (Act No. 7801).  
INAMU’s broad objectives are to advance the social status of women and to promote 
gender equality and equity in Costa Rica. INAMU seeks to protect the rights of women as 
they are defined in international declarations and conventions such as the 1995 Beijing 
Platform for Action. Costa Rica has ratified the Inter-American Convention on the 
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Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women and the Optional 
Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. The UN has noted major progress in women’s issues as a 
result of key actions and measures taken by INAMU. INAMU has propelled women’s 
rights by embedding elements of the Beijing Platform for Action into national laws.477  
As mentioned above, the two major initiatives actualized during the women’s movement 
in Costa Rica were the Law for the Promotion of Women’s Social Equality and the 
electoral code reform in 1992. Though there has been one female President and several 
female Vice Presidents in Costa Rica, it is important to note the politicization of the 
women’s movement. Only a small portion of the organizations were affiliated with 
political parties, a stark contrast to the women’s movement in Nicaragua.  
Factors of Underrepresentation 
Underrepresentation of women in society manifests itself in a variety of social, economic 
and political ways. Below is a brief look at educational achievement and labor force 
participation rates in Costa Rica over the past 20 years. Statistics show education levels 
in Costa Rica to be fairly equal: both men and women over the age of twenty-five 
average approximately 8.3 years of schooling, slightly more girls than boys are enrolled 
in primary and secondary schools, and approximately 96% of both men and women are 
literate. 
As illustrated by the charts below (Figures 13 and 14), a distinct difference exists 
between men and women’s participation in the labor force in Costa Rica. Though the gap 
in participation has decreased significantly over the last twenty years, women’s 
participation is still approximately 33% less than men (as of 2010), indicating women are 












Figure 13: Labor Force Participation in Costa Rica 
Source: Data compiled from The World Bank database; charts created by Clare Zutz. Original sources 
include: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Institute for Statistics. 
World Bank, Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/). 
Furthermore, the unemployment gap between men and women is increasing. As 
illustrated below in Figure 14, the percentage of unemployed females reached almost 












Figure 14: Unemployment by Gender in Costa Rica 
Source: Data compiled from The World Bank database; charts created by Clare Zutz. Original sources 
include: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Institute for Statistics. 
World Bank, Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/). 
In looking at the type of employment by gender, women account for a majority of the 
service jobs while men dominate the industrial and agricultural sectors. As of 2010, 
15.4% of firms in Costa Rica had a top female manager. Overall, in certain areas of 
society, women still are underrepresented.  
Networks and Personal History 
Laura Chinchilla had a successful career as an international consultant before returning to 
Costa Rica to begin her political career. Chinchilla was born on March 28, 1959, in San 
José. She was born into a political family. Her father was Rafael Ángel Chinchilla Fallas, 
who served as Comptroller General in Costa Rica from 1972 to 1987.478 She became 
interested in political science at a young age and solidified her passion for public service 
                                                 





when she toured the region at the age of eighteen.479 Chinchilla then received a 
bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Costa Rica before obtaining 
a Master’s in Public Policy from Georgetown University in Washington, DC.480  
After finishing her education, she began her international career at Florida International 
University, where she worked on judicial reform projects in Panama, Honduras, and 
Costa Rica. Afterwards, Chinchilla worked with the US Agency for International 
Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the United Nations 
Development Programme as she continued her work on security and justice reform.
 
She 
also served as a lecturer, covering the topics of development, human rights, and 
institutional reform. She spoke across Latin America, working with organizations 
including Project Advisory Committee of Civil Society and Public Safety for the 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Central American Dialogue, Foundation 
Arias for Peace and Human Progress, and the Foundation for Peace and Democracy.
 
Her 
career as an international speaker and consultant gave her oratory and diplomatic 
experience that were beneficial to her future in public service in Costa Rica.  
In 1994, Chinchilla was appointed as the Vice Minister of Public Security. In 1996, she 
was promoted to Minister of Public Security, a position she held for two years. After that, 
Chinchilla was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica where she represented 
her home province of San José for four years. During her time in legislative office, she 
focused her efforts on security causes such as decreasing crime and corruption as well as 
protecting women and children from domestic violence.
 
Following her legislative term, 
she reentered the national spotlight, serving as First Vice President in PLN member Óscar 
Arias’s administration. In 2008, Chinchilla also took over the role of Minister of Justice.
 
She resigned from office, with the support of President Arias, in order to focus on her 
own presidential election in 2010. She won the presidency in a landslide election and 
assumed office May 8, 2010.  
Her primary political influence and mentor leading up to her presidency was her 
predecessor, Óscar Arias. She worked closely with him as a Vice President, and he 
endorsed her candidacy. Political opponents often criticized Chinchilla for her close 
relationship with Arias, stating she was merely a puppet of her predecessor.481 
However, as President Chinchilla faced allegations of corruption, the relationship 
between Arias and Chinchilla deteriorated. In July 2013, Arias delivered biting criticism 
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of Chinchilla and her administration, indicating he regretted supporting her candidacy 
and going as far as to say that Chinchilla lacked “intellectual clarity” and her 
administration lacked necessary direction.482 Their strained relationship represented 
growing divisions within the PLN, Costa Rica’s largest political party.  
Laura Chinchilla is married to José María Rico Cueto, and has a son, José María Rico 
Chinchilla. Chinchilla has often spoken of her commitment to faith and family. The 
Catholic Church heavily influenced Chinchilla’s political career and presidency. She has 
voiced her beliefs in the conservative values of the Church and has stated her opposition 
of same-sex marriage, abortion, and emergency contraception. In addition, she has 
pledged to keep the Catholic Church as the official state religion.483
 
When elected, 
Chinchilla created a special commission aimed at improving the relationship between 
church and state.484 Chinchilla was endorsed by priests internationally and wore a rosary 
around her neck throughout her campaign for good luck. 
Substantive Representation 
Laura Chinchilla inherited the presidency amidst difficult political conditions. The nation 
had mounting national debt and violent crime rates were rising. In her campaign, Laura 
Chinchilla utilized the campaign slogan “firm and honest.”  
Once elected, her agenda was multifaceted. Her first priority was to focus on decreasing 
organized violent crime stemming from the drug trade.485 Additionally, she worked to 
minimize national debt and increase economic prosperity. Lastly, Chinchilla maintained 
her commitment to conservative social principles. However, her agenda was affected by 
controversies and allegations that arose during her presidency.  
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Reproductive Rights  
It is impossible to discuss Laura Chinchilla’s political stance on controversial social 
issues without again acknowledging her close connection to the Roman Catholic Church. 
During her campaign, she was touted as a woman of faith who would protect traditional 
family values including the definition of marriage as a union between one man and one 
woman and the protection of life beginning at conception. In May of 2012, President 
Chinchilla traveled to the Vatican to meet with Pope Benedict XVI where they discussed 
the necessity of the pro-life movement. Again, in November of 2013, Chinchilla traveled 
to the Vatican to meet with Pope Francis.486 Upon her successful election, in a phone 
conversation with a bishop from Costa Rica, Chinchilla vowed to keep the Church’s 
values at the center of her administration.487 This comment fell in line with most of the 
electorate, as 76.3% of the Costa Rican population is Roman Catholic.488 
While many women saw the election of Laura Chinchilla as a huge victory for women’s 
empowerment, feminists across the nation were less positive, recalling her conservative 
approach regarding women’s reproductive rights. Even before her election to the 
presidency, Chinchilla publically opposed abortion. In fact, in 2009, Chinchilla 
participated in the March for Life and Family, a rallying day supported by the Citizen’s 
Observatory for Life and Family (an organization that works to end abortion in Costa 
Rica and opposes same-sex marriage). Current abortion laws in Costa Rica are restrictive 
and abortions are legal only when the mother’s health is at risk; Chinchilla has 
continuously indicated she supports these laws.  
During the latter half of Chinchilla’s presidency, the issue of in vitro fertilization took 
center stage. In vitro fertilization is currently illegal in Costa Rica. It was allowed for a 
brief five-year period between 1995 and 2000 until Costa Rica’s Constitutional Court 
revoked the provision. The court cited Article 21 in the Costa Rican Constitution and 
Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights in their decision, both of which 
point to the necessity for the “right to life.”489 Faced with pressure from the Inter-
American Courts on Human Rights, Laura Chinchilla pushed to reverse the ban on in 
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vitro fertilization and promised to continue to work for its reversal until the end of her 
presidential term. 490 
Gay Rights 
Chinchilla has found herself in the middle of a passionate debate regarding same-sex 
marriages, although she decisively stated gay marriage was not a part of the national 
agenda. 491 In July of 2013, the Costa Rican legislature “accidently” passed legislation 
that could have opened the door for same-sex unions. Though the legislation did not 
specifically endorse same-sex unions, it did not explicitly define marriage as only 
between a man and a woman. Though her conservative supporters encouraged Chinchilla 
to veto the legislation, she did not. It has yet to be seen if the legislation will have any 
practical changes in the law. As of now, gay marriage is illegal. When asked about her 
opinion regarding same-sex marriage, Chinchilla often indicated that she would not 
oppose its legalization if the majority of the electorate supported it. As of now, the 
majority of Costa Ricans appear to oppose same-sex unions. The National Survey on 
Sexual Health and Reproductivity showed that 70% of Costa Ricans disagree or strongly 
disagree that same-sex couples should have the right to marry or adopt children.492 
During her presidency, Chinchilla did not focus on reproductive or gay rights. She 
remained conservative on social values but also indicated she was willing to listen to the 
desires of Costa Ricans.  
Crime  
During her campaign, Laura Chinchilla had an impressive résumé, including her work 
with justice reform at the United Nations and her role as Vice Minister of Security, and 
was viewed as someone dedicated to decreasing crime. Unfortunately, Chinchilla’s 
administration was faced with allegations of corruption and administrative negligence 
throughout her term.493 Nevertheless, fighting crime, violence, and drug trafficking were 
top priorities of Chinchilla’s administration. 
Chinchilla assumed the presidency during an especially fierce time of drug violence and 
trafficking. Laura Chinchilla took office in 2010, the first year Costa Rica was included 
on the US State Department’s list of major drug transit nations. She recognized Costa 
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Rica’s location as an extreme disadvantage when combatting drug cartels because most 
drug producers are south of Costa Rica, and the largest drug consumer, the United States, 
is to the north.494 Recognizing the need for action, Chinchilla’s administration proposed 
looser wiretapping laws and easier confiscation of suspicious possessions. In addition, 
Chinchilla proposed ending the longstanding ban on extraditing Costa Ricans for 
prosecution.495 
Most of Costa Rica’s strategies regarding drug trafficking that centered on interdiction 
were ineffective and might have made the situation in Costa Rica worse. In 2012, 
President Chinchilla called on the United Nations to become more involved and to take 
the global threat of the drug trade more seriously.496 Chinchilla has shown she is open to 
new strategies and has initiated discussions regarding the legalization of certain drugs, 
which could help mitigate some of the violence resulting from drug trafficking.497 
Chinchilla’s reputation as an “incorruptible” woman was challenged when she was 
involved in a controversy regarding the planes she used to fly to Venezuela for Hugo 
Chávez’s funeral and on a private trip to Peru.498 The planes she used were tied to 
Colombian drug traffickers, and the incident sparked an international outrage. Chinchilla 
transferred the blame, primarily to other members of her cabinet and her team, several of 
whom resigned. This was only one of the controversies that led to a significant decrease 
in her approval ratings over the course of her administration.  
Fiscal Reform 
Chinchilla’s presidency began when the Costa Rican economy was recovering from the 
hard-hitting global recession of 2009. Moreover, she inherited high debt from the 
previous administration. As a result, a centerpiece of Chinchilla’s agenda was fiscal 
reform; she ran on a platform of “corralling” Costa Rica’s debt.499 Unfortunately, 
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Chinchilla’s administration faced scandals that overshadowed her policies and 
jeopardized her administration’s ability to pass legislation.  
During the promotion of a major tax reform that would raise taxes for the citizens of 
Costa Rica, the reform gained support in the legislature (which at the time had a majority 
in the opposing party), while both the Finance Minister, Fernando Herrero, and the head 
of Costa Rica’s Tax Administration, Francisco Villalobos, resigned amidst investigations 
of their own tax evasions; these allegations were later substantiated.500 Many Costa 
Ricans were outraged at the idea of paying more taxes, especially when high officials 
were not paying their taxes in full. Furthermore, the allegations of corruption Chinchilla 
faced decreased her political clout with politicians of the opposing party. 
The Supreme Court ultimately declared the proposed tax reform bill unconstitutional in 
2012; there were amendments to the bill that had not been disclosed to the public.501 The 
lack of transparency in Chinchilla’s administration hindered the passage of the fiscal 
reform package, ultimately hurting the Costa Rican economy. By the end of 2012, Costa 
Rica had the fastest-growing public debt to GDP ratio among Central American 
countries.502 Furthermore, in 2013, Moody’s Investors Service decreased Costa Rica’s 
bond rating from stable to negative. Moody’s cited “large fiscal deficits and a rising debt 
burden” as reasons for the decrease.503 The scandals that engulfed Chinchilla’s 
administration were a large part of the reason she was unable to accomplish a critical 
reform, one of the biggest pieces of her agenda, desperately needed to boost the Costa 
Rican economy.  
Foreign Policy: Nicaraguan Border Conflict 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica have been at odds over land for the last century. Over the last 
decade, this dispute has manifested itself in an area of land on the Atlantic Coast known 
as Isla Calero, located next to the San Juan River. At the beginning of Chinchilla’s 
presidency in 2010, Nicaragua sent troops to occupy the land and started a dredging 
project to build canals. Costa Rica claimed the canals produced waste that ended up on 
Costa Rica’s land and were damaging the protected wetlands. Furthermore, Costa Rica 
argued Nicaragua did not have the legal right to occupy the land.  
                                                 
500 “What Else Can Go Wrong for Laura Chinchilla’s Government?,” Tico Times, accessed April 29, 2014, 
http://www.ticotimes.net/2012/04/13/what-else-can-go-wrong-for-laura-chinchilla-s-government. 
501 Ibid. 
502 “Noticias Fiscales más Importantes de Septiembre,” Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales, 
accessed April 29, 2014, http://icefi.org/noticias-fiscales-mas-importantes-de-septiembre/. 
503 “Moody’s Changes Costa Rica’s Outlook to Negative,” Moodys.com, September 23, 2013, accessed 




Chinchilla’s administration took a firm stand and gave Nicaragua forty-eight hours to 
leave the territory Chinchilla claimed Nicaragua had invaded. Though known for its 
pacifism, Costa Rica put a police force in place on the border. With Nicaragua’s refusal 
to leave, Chinchilla pushed the case towards the United Nations’ judicial body, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), again emphasizing the importance of preserving the 
wetlands and the desire to settle the issue without violence.504 
In March of 2011, the ICJ ruled that all Nicaraguan and Costa Rican civilians must 
refrain from entering the disputed territory, except for Costa Rican environmentalists who 
were protecting the wetland.505 Following the ruling, Nicaragua filed a suit against Costa 
Rica for building a road along the San Juan River. In 2013, the ICJ ultimately voted in 
favor of Costa Rica, ordering Nicaragua again to remove all personnel and security forces 
and to “abstain” from dredging projects, prohibiting Nicaragua from completing the 
canals. The decision was a victory for Chinchilla’s administration and underscored 
Chinchilla’s desire to protect Costa Rican land and the environment without using force. 
Trade 
Costa Rica has a history of liberalized trade and currently receives the highest amount of 
direct foreign investment in Central America. In 2008, Chinchilla’s predecessor Óscar 
Arias signed the DR-CAFTA trade agreement, opening up the Costa Rican economy to 
trade more freely with the United States and other Latin American countries. Chinchilla 
continued economic policies similar to those of her predecessor, further integrating Costa 
Rica into the world economy.  
In 2012, Costa Rica signed an Association Agreement with the European Commission.506 
The agreement centered on trade, political dialogue, and cooperation between Central 
American countries and the European Union. In 2014, before the end of her term, 
Chinchilla also signed a “declaration of intent” to join the Pacific Alliance. The alliance 
is a trade bloc that includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru and gives Costa Rica 
access to a market of over 200 million people. Chinchilla argued that these trade 
agreements were victories that emphasized her intent to expand and diversify the 
economy and raise the standard of living for Costa Ricans.507 
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Ecotourism and Environmental Policy 
Over the last two decades, Costa Rica has worked diligently to protect its land, and as a 
result, has become an ecotourism destination. In 1997, Costa Rica pioneered a Payment 
for Environmental Services (PES) program that incentivized landowners to act in a more 
environmentally friendly way, protecting over 250,000 hectares of land from 
deforestation.508 Chinchilla’s predecessor Arias pledged that Costa Rica would be the 
first carbon-neutral country in the world by 2021, drawing worldwide attention for this 
significant goal. Today ecotourism generates approximately US$2 billion a year for the 
country, making it one of the most significant factors in Costa Rica’s economy.509  
In 2013, Chinchilla’s administration furthered this pledge of reaching the carbon-neutral 
goal. The Costa Rican government and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility signed a 
letter of intent to negotiate an emission reductions payment agreement (ERPA). The 
agreement expanded the forestland currently protected by allowing more Costa Ricans to 
participate in the PES program (expanding the program to have US$63 million in carbon 
credits available), including indigenous landowners.510 
Though Chinchilla has prioritized environmentalism in her agenda, she has been 
criticized for not doing enough and simply purporting to protect the environment. 
Symbolic Representation 
Aspects of Laura Chinchilla’s presidency have been disastrous and corrupt. The coming 
years will show the extent to which her administration negatively affected women who 
will run for office in the future.  
Traditional Notions of Leadership 
Chinchilla’s leadership and management styles have not received significant media 
attention, but the little attention paid has been negative. She was able to position herself, 
to a certain extent, as a prominent international leader; she made a point to travel and 
meet with influential people around the world during her presidency. Yet the various 
scandals that plagued her administration and the massive reshuffling of her cabinet 
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overshadowed the positive strides she made and called into question her leadership and 
management skills. 
Chinchilla’s leadership style can be described as one of “style flexing,” where a person 
vacillates between a traditional male style of leadership and a traditional female style of 
leadership. 511 For example, during the Nicaraguan border dispute, Chinchilla asserted 
Costa Rica’s sovereignty and presented a very hard, aggressive style of leadership that is 
typically characterized as male. However, on a majority of issues, she took a softer, less 
outspoken stance commonly characterized as female. 
In an interview with Forbes, Chinchilla described leadership as a gendered trait. She 
stated women leaders focus more on “consensus” and success in the sense of a “team.” 
Her explicit acknowledgement of the gendered stereotypes of leadership is reminiscent of 
the overall social climate in Costa Rica, where machismo and gendered roles are 
prevalent. In the interview, she went on to describe the “obligation” she felt to succeed so 
that more women would be elected in the future.512 Chinchilla underscored an important 
idea put forth by Genovese this way: “a politically ambitious woman cannot escape the 
consequences of social beliefs that gender differences are politically relevant.”513 Though 
she was cognizant of the important role she played for the women of Costa Rica and 
Latin America, Chinchilla has been largely ineffective at making positive changes in her 
country. 
Transformational Leaders  
Very few positive conclusions can be drawn regarding Chinchilla’s administration or her 
future legacy as the first female President of Costa Rica. Nevertheless, Chinchilla’s 
presidency has transformed the political environment, and the conclusion of her term will 
usher in significant changes in government.  
Chinchilla won the 2010 presidential election by a landslide, receiving over 46% of the 
votes. She is a member of the National Liberation Party, a political party formed in 1951, 
and adheres to center-right ideology. Chinchilla’s predecessor and former mentor, Óscar 
Arias, was also a member of the National Liberation Party. Since the mid-1970s, the 
National Liberation Party and the even more conservative Social Christian Unity Party 
have dominated Costa Rican politics. It was largely assumed that Johnny Araya, the 
National Liberation Party’s presidential candidate, would become Chinchilla’s successor. 
However, the candidate of the Citizen’s Action Party, Luis Solís, unexpectedly claimed 
victory in the 2014 election.  
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The Citizen’s Action Party is a progressive, left-leaning organization. Founded in 2000, it 
was created largely due to frustrations with the apparent corruption in the National 
Liberation Party. Analysts have blamed Chinchilla and her administration for weakening 
the party. Manuel Rojas, a political researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences stated, “Chinchilla is behind the defeat of the PLN because her administration 
has been so poorly graded that it was going to be very difficult to start fresh with a new 
image.”514 Though it was unintentional, Laura Chinchilla created a shift to left-leaning 
politics in Costa Rica.  
Symbolic Effect of Her Leadership  
Regardless of the events that occurred during her administration, Laura Chinchilla’s 
election as President was a monumental historical occasion that challenged preconceived 
notions that the role of President was reserved for men only. A female President of Costa 
Rica is now a reality that younger generations have experienced. With that said, it has yet 
to be seen if her presidency will encourage or discourage the election of women to 
executive office. It is difficult to determine if Costa Ricans’ anger at Chinchilla will be 
contained to solely her administration or if it will tarnish the reputation of women leaders 
as a whole in Costa Rica. Some have suggested that there was not a single female 
candidate for the presidency in 2014 because of Laura Chinchilla’s disappointing 
presidency.515  
In the aforementioned interview with Forbes Magazine, Chinchilla expressed her 
intolerance for the stereotype that women are weak leaders.516 Her strategic campaign 
slogan “firm and honest” seems to directly counter this stereotype, positioning Chinchilla 
as a strong and decisive leader, qualities often reserved only to describe male leaders. 
Unfortunately, Laura Chinchilla’s presidency was plagued with allegations of dishonesty 
and disastrous leadership. Hopefully, Chinchilla’s failures will not tarnish the reputation 
and standing of women as leaders in Costa Rica.
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Chapter 9: Mexico Case Study 
Descriptive Representation 
Mexico’s Political Structure 
Mexico’s political structure is formalized through the Political Constitution of the United 
Mexican States, published in 1917. Mexico is a representative democratic republic; as 
such, the President acts as both head of state and government. The federal government 
directs the country’s thirty-one united Mexican states through legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches. The federal branch of the government is referred to as the Supreme 
Power of the Federation and its capital is located in Mexico City (Distrito Federal). Each 
state’s government functions separately under the same structure as the federal branch.517 
At the federal level, the President leads the executive branch for a single six-year term. 
National elections are direct, with no runoff elections. After the six-year term, the 
President is not allowed to serve a second term, but traditionally he has chosen the 
successive nominee within the same political party. Though the power of the President 
has changed significantly since 1917, Mexico’s political power remains centralized in the 
President. Among the current presidential powers, the President has the right to appoint 
and/or nominate most subordinate executive officials, including the executive cabinet. 
The executive cabinet advises the President and is independent of the legislature. 
Currently, there are twenty presidential cabinet and extended cabinet positions (referred 
to as “gabinetes ampliados”).  
The legislative branch of Mexico’s federal government is structured as a bicameral 
congress with the Senate (Cámara de Senadores) and the Chamber of Deputies (Cámara 
de Diputados). Together, the Congress of the Union has powers to approve legislation 
and budgets, ratify diplomatic appointments, and declare war. 
The Senate is responsible for foreign policy issues and also approves presidential 
appointments. Senators are elected for six-year terms using a parallel voting system of 
sixty-four plurality members (two per state). As with Presidents, Senators cannot serve 
consecutive terms. 
The Chamber of Deputies is a collection of 500 nationwide representatives who are 
elected for three-year terms through a parallel voting system. The electoral structure 
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consists of 300 uninominal elected officials and 200 elected through proportional 
representation. Deputies are not eligible to run for consecutive terms. 
Political Parties 
Mexico’s political parties have a longstanding history of representative imbalance. 
Specifically, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) single-handedly governed for 
nearly seventy years until the mid-1980s. The PRI believes women must be involved in 
politics at every level and not under a specific government branch. In the 1990s, they 
formed the Programa Nacional de la Mujer, one of the largest women’s organizations 
within the government. Though formally instituted by President Zedillo’s administration 
in 1995, it is commonly believed that the organization was born directly from the Beijing 
Women’s Conference. The goal of the program was to integrate women’s programs into 
various government agencies, thereby incorporating a space for women in all spheres of 
the government. Led by renowned politician and former governor Dulce María Sauri, the 
organization evolved over time to focus on health and education reform. In 2001, 
Programa Nacional de la Mujer was reformed and consequently renamed Instituto 
Nacional de la Mujer.518 
The PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) was the first opposition party to ever win against the 
PRI, with its first gubernatorial win in 1989. Arguably the most monumental of the 
party’s successes was the presidential election of the PAN’s Vicente Fox in 2000, 
whereby the PRI was effectively dismantled as the ruling party. The PAN is not very 
supportive of women’s political participation. Their main women’s political organization, 
Promoción Política de la Mujer, advocates for the preservation of women’s traditional 
roles. 
Finally, the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) was founded in the late 1980s 
with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as leader. It is known for its left-of-center ideology. Since 
1997, the PRD operates in nearly all congressional districts and assembly elections in 
Mexico City but is underrepresented at the executive level. The PRD has been known to 
address women’s concerns in a more broad-based, policy-driven way than the other two 
major parties. Some of Mexico’s most successful female politicians, namely Amalia 
García and Rosario Robles, have been affiliated with the PRD.519 
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Electoral System and Quotas 
Electoral Reform 
Mexico’s electoral system has changed dramatically in recent years. For much of the 
twentieth century, electoral law had few regulatory mechanisms for ensuring fair and 
democratic processes. In fact, Mexico’s electoral system remained mostly untouched 
until major reform in 2007. For many years prior, funding and media coverage went hand 
in hand as a way to secure power and isolate other parties. Misuse of public dollars to 
freely promote a candidate’s campaign through media was frequent, and no law existed to 
prevent it. Additionally, no law existed to regulate primaries or how internal party 
candidates were selected at the federal office. This created a “permanent campaign” 
concept once the party had a stronghold. They continued to exercise their power for 
future appointment and elections within their party as soon as they took office. Finally, 
those in power were able to launch slanderous attacks on opposing parties with impunity, 
with the free-flowing money and control of media that allowed them to manipulate 
voters. 
Mexico’s 2007 reform created much stricter oversight and regulation of campaign 
activities. Mainly, legislation mandated a reduction in maximum campaign budgets; 
control over candidate media use; regulation of slander and libel; reduction in campaign 
time, business affiliations, and donor caps; internal campaign restrictions; and an external 
auditing system. Since 2012, Mexico has proposed further changes to its electoral system. 
The following section outlines these changes with regard to Mexico’s current quota laws 
and their possible effects on women’s political representation.520 
Quota Laws 
Mexico represents a case of gender quotas’ success in a mixed electoral system. Mexico 
first established a gender quota policy in 1993 after a wide array of NGOs and members 
of political parties from the left pressured for a major presence of women in the political 
arena.521 The first 1993 law, inscribed in the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and 
Procedures (Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales, or COFIPE), 
urged Mexican political parties to promote women’s participation in the political life of 
the country, but did not establish any enforcement mechanism. In 1996, the law 
established that political parties should consider that their candidacies did not exceed 
70% of one same gender; however, the law did not establish an ordering mandate in both 
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majority and closed lists. Political parties then chose women for positions that they had 
no probability of winning, and relegated them to the lists’ lowest positions. As a result, in 
the 2000 elections, the percentage of women elected to the Chamber of Deputies dropped 
from 17% to 16%.522 
According to Lisa Baldez,523 2002 was a turning point for gender quotas in Mexico.That 
year, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of gender quotas in Coahuila, and 
discarded the opposing actors’ argument that gender quotas violated the principle of 
equal protection under the Constitution. Furthermore, the COFIPE was reformed to 
include two crucial elements in the quota law: an ordering mandate to construct the 
representation lists in segments of three candidates, each of which had to include one 
candidate of a different gender, as well as sanctions for political parties that did not 
comply with the quotas. These changes caused an increase of over 5% in women’s 
presence in the Chamber of Deputies. The reform of 2008 established that candidate lists 
presented by political parties to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate should be 
integrated with at least 40% candidates of the same gender, and that they should work 
towards parity. 
During recent years, gender quotas in Mexico have had a great impact in both the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The reforms establishing sanctions and ordering 
mechanisms in the lists have resulted in a significant increase of women’s presence in 
both chambers. While the percentage of women in both Chambers was below 10%524 
before the quotas were established, today those percentages have increased to over 
30%.525 
Despite such progress, political parties still resist giving women full access, and have 
found ways to circumvent quotas laws. One example is the use of women in principal 
positions, and placing men in the alternate positions. After the election, women were 
forced to resign in favor of the alternate male to occupy that position. These women were 
infamously known as “Las Juanitas.” Additionally, the law did not apply for candidacies 
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that had primaries. As discussed by Baldez, the ambiguity regarding this exemption made 
primaries an obstacle for women’s participation and appointment to political positions.526 
However, in 2013, the major political parties approved a political reform that prevents 
political parties from continuing these practices by extending the (now) mandatory 
percentage of 50% quota for the principals, to also include the alternates, and all internal 
processes of political parties, including the primaries. The Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate have both approved the political reform. 
Women in Power 
Mexican women have played an important role in the country’s history; nevertheless, 
they still remain “marginal players in formal politics.”527 It was not until 1953 that 
women in the country gained the right to vote and total citizenship recognition.528 
However, this did not immediately translate into appointed or elected positions in the 
public administration. For example, five years passed before Amalia González Caballero 
de Castillo Ledón was appointed Subsecretary of the Education Ministry in the 
Department of Cultural Affairs, becoming the first female Subsecretary at a federal 
level.529 
During the 1980s, women’s participation in the public arena increased significantly. 
Patricia Galeana states that according to the IX General Population and Housing Census 
in 1970, 13.2% of the female labor force worked in government; and that by 1980, this 
number increased to 16.9%. Despite such growth, only 5% to 10% of these women 
occupied decision-making positions while the rest were assistants, teachers or nurses.530 
The 80’s, which came along with democratization processes in Latin America, 
represented a significant period for women’s participation in decision-making processes: 
the first female Governor, Griselda Álvarez, was elected in Colima; four female 
Subsecretaries, and the first female General Attorney were appointed; twenty-seven 
women occupied General Director positions in the executive branch; Rosario Ibarra 
became the first female presidential candidate; and the first female President of Mexico 
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City’s High Tribunal was appointed.531 During the 1990s and early 2000s, women such 
as Marcela Lombardo and Cecilia Soto (1994), and Patricia Mercado (2006) ran in 
Mexico’s presidential elections; however, they did so in small parties with no 
possibilities of winning. In the most recent election of 2012, the PAN nominated Josefina 
Vázquez Mota as its presidential candidate. It was the first time that a main Mexican 
political party chose a woman as its candidate for the presidency.  
Governors 
In 2014, there were no female governors in Mexico. During the last elections in 2012, 
Mexico City and six states (Yucatán, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Tabasco, Chiapas, and 
Morelos) elected governors. From the seven elections, only Mexico City and Chiapas had 
female candidates in major parties. Beatriz Paredes from the PRI and Isabel Miranda de 
Wallace from the PAN participated and lost to the candidate from the left; while in 
Chiapas, María Elena Orantes, a former Senator, lost to the candidate of the Green Party, 
Manuel Velasco. Women candidates from the PANAL, a small political party, 
participated in the elections of Jalisco, Mexico City, and Yucatán. Female candidates did 
not participate in the elections of Guanajuato, Morelos, and Tabasco.532  
Historically, Mexico has had only six women Governors (see Table 14). Only four 
women were elected while the other two were appointed after the elected governors left 
their positions. In 1979, Griselda Álvarez, from the PRI, won the governorship of the 
state of Colima and became the first woman to be elected governor in the country. In 
1987 Beatriz Paredes Rangel, one of the PRI’s most prominent members, was elected to 
govern the state of Tlaxcala. Amalia García Medina won the elections in Zacatecas with 
the PRD in 2004. The last elected female was Yucatán’s governor from the PRI, Ivonne 
Ortega Pacheco, who stayed in power from 2006 to 2012. Two women acted as 
Governors after the elected ones resigned to compete in other elections: Rosario Robles 
Berlanga in Mexico City after Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas resigned to run for the presidency; 
and Dulce María Sauri Riancho, who governed Yucatán in an interim position from 1991 
to 1994.533 Political parties, the most important gatekeepers in Mexican politics,534 
remain reluctant to nominate women to run for governorships. The PAN has not had a 
single female governor, and the PRI and PRD have only nominated a handful of women.  
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Table 14: Female Governors in Mexico 
Governor State Period Political Party Mechanism 
Griselda Álvarez Ponce de León Colima  1979–1985 PRI Elected 
Beatriz Paredes Rangel Tlaxcala 1987–1992 PRI Elected 
Dulce María Sauri Riancho Yucatán 1991–1994 PRI Interim 
Rosario Robles Berlanga Mexico City 1999–2000 PRD Interim 
Amalia García Medina Zacatecas 2004–2010 PRD Elected 
Ivonne Ortega Pacheco Yucatán 2006–2012 PRI Elected 
Source: Created by authors. 
The Cabinet 
Political negotiations and commitments have hindered women’s access to higher 
positions in the administration. The 2012 UNDP report Mujeres y Participación Política 
en México stated that only twenty-three women (without taking into account Peña Nieto’s 
administration) had occupied a position in the main cabinet. However, the report includes 
women appointed to positions in the extended cabinet. If those are excluded, that reduces 
the number to eighteen. The so-called extended cabinet includes the heads of 
decentralized organizations such as the Women’s Institute, the Youth’s Institute, the 
Committee for Culture and Arts, and the National Lottery. Such organizations do not 
hold the same rank, budget, or influence over Mexican policies as the original cabinet 
positions do. 
Krook and O’Brien developed a “gender power score” to analyze the cabinets and 
political positions to which women in cabinets have been appointed around the world. 535 
Such score takes into account two categories: the categorization of ministries into 
feminine, neutral, or masculine (private vs. public, respectively); and the level of prestige 
of the cabinet, measured though the visibility and the level of control of policy that 
cabinets in specific cultural and political contexts hold. According to the authors, 
masculine cabinets include Fisheries, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Industry and Commerce, 
Finance and Economy, and Transportation; neutral cabinets include areas of Tourism, 
Civil Service, Justice, Environment and Natural Resources; and feminine cabinets include 
the portfolios of Culture, Education, Health, and Social Welfare. In the Mexican case, 
contrary to the general classification, the portfolios of Education and Social Development 
have high prestige. The Education Ministry requires high political expertise and rank due 
to the complexities of dealing with the teachers’ union, the most powerful in the country, 
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and the media attention given to education policy in Mexico. Furthermore, the Ministry 
of Social Development is one of the ministries with higher visibility, and is usually used 
as a political platform for politicians seeking a candidacy at a federal or state level. The 
relevance of heading up Education and Social Development is best portrayed by Josefina 
Vázquez Mota, a woman who occupied these two Ministries during different 
administrations, and became the first woman from a major political party to be nominated 
as a presidential candidate.  
Women appointed to cabinet positions in Mexico have occupied neutral and feminine 
cabinets with low and medium prestige, and very rarely masculine high prestige 
portfolios. Table 15 lists women appointed to cabinet positions from the 1980s to date. 
Women have been appointed most frequently to the Ministries of Social Development 
and Tourism. Women won important spaces in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to which 
two women have been appointed in the last four administrations; and in the Ministries of 
Education and Energy, to which Josefina Vázquez Mota and Georgina Kessel were 
appointed during Felipe Calderón’s administration. Women in Mexico have not yet been 
appointed to higher prestige and masculine portfolios such as Secretary of Government 
(Gobernación), Finance, or Commerce; or the Banco de México.  
In the administration that started at the end of 2012, the newly elected President Enrique 
Peña Nieto only appointed three women to his cabinet: Mercedes Juan López in the 
Ministry of Health; Claudia Ruíz Massieu Salinas in the Ministry of Tourism; and 
Rosario Robles Berlanga in the Ministry of Social Development. Mercedes San Juan is 
the first woman to be appointed as Secretary of Health in Mexico.536 The Ministries of 
Social Development and Tourism are the ones to which more women have been 
appointed (see Table 15). Women’s access to cabinet positions has increased over the 
years, but growth has not been constant, and has been limited to specific cabinets.  
Before taking office, the President Elect, Enrique Peña Nieto, sent a general Public 
Administration reform proposal to the Congress which included the merging of the 
independent Women’s Institute (created under the Presidency of Vicente Fox in 2000) 
with the Social Development Ministry. As argued by more than forty activist and feminist 
groups, such a proposal reflected the lack of a gender vision in the administration, and 
framed women as a vulnerable group. Former presidential candidates such as Patricia 
Mercado, and founders of state-level Women’s Institute such as María Elena Chapa, 
argued that such a change would also convert the Institute into a “handout” 
                                                 





organization.537 Due to these groups’ pressures, the initiative was pulled back, and the 
Women’s Institute kept its status and independence.  
Table 15: Women in Cabinet Positions in Mexico  
  Secretary Ministry Period President 
1 
Rosa Luz Alegría 
Escamilla 
Ministry of Tourism 1980–1982 José López Portillo 
2 
María de los Ángeles 
Moreno 
Ministry of Fisheries 1988–1991 Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
3 
María Elena Vázquez 
Nava 
Ministry of General 
Federal 
Accountability 
1988–1994 Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
4 
Norma Samaniego de 
Villareal 




1994–1996 Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León 









Ministry of Tourism 1994–1997 Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León 
7 Rosario Green Macías 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
1998–2000 Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León 
8 
María Teresa Herrera 
Tello 
Ministry of Agrarian 
Reform 








Ministry of Social 
Development 
2000–2006 Vicente Fox Quesada 
11 Ana Teresa Aranda 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
2006 Vicente Fox Quesada 
12 
María Beatriz Zavala 
Peniche 
Ministry of Social 
Development 








Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 








Ministry of Tourism 2010–2012 Felipe Calderón Hinojosa 
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General Attorney 2011–2012 Felipe Calderón Hinojosa 




Ministry of Social 
Development 
2012– Enrique Peña Nieto 
21 Claudia Ruíz Massieu Ministry of Tourism 2012– Enrique Peña Nieto 
Source: UNDP 2012 Report, “Mujeres y participación política en México 2012,” and authors’ creation. 
Women in the Highest Judiciary Body 
In 1961, María Cristina Salmorán de Tamayo was the first woman to be appointed 
Magistrate of the Supreme Court, and the first woman in the world to form part of a 
Supreme Tribunal or Court of Justice.538 Today, according to the Comisión Económica 
para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), female judges in the highest courts occupy 
only 18.2% of the positions, a percentage that is lower than that achieved during the 
period from 2004 to 2006 (20%), but higher than that between 1998 and 2003 (between 
12.5 and 14.3%).539 A study comparing women’s presence in the highest judiciary bodies 
in Mexico, the United States, the European Union, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, shows 
Mexico as one with one of the lowest percentage of women in this branch, only above 
Chile.540 
Women in the Legislative Branch 
The legislative is the power that concentrates the higher rate of women participation. As 
reported by the CEPAL, in 2012 female legislators occupied 36.8%541 of the seats, 
achieving a historical high. Women’s positions in the legislative have been significantly 
affected by the quotas’ design and enforcement mechanism across time. Women in the 
Senate occupy 22.7% of the seats. The highest increase of women in the Senate occurred 
in 2006, when women elected to the Senate registered a growth of 3 percentage points.542 
While the numbers for women in the legislative are highly positive, women will still need 
to struggle to enter the closed circle of legislators who make decisions. Members of the 
Pact for Mexico’s Committee for Political Coordination, in charge of the negotiation and 
                                                 
538 Olga Sanchez Cordero, “Juzgar con Ojos de Mujer” (presented at La Mujer y la Integración en el 
Derecho del Nuevo Milenio, Mexico City, 2000), http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/Ministros/oscgv/Conf/Conf-
009.htm.  
539 Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean, Equality Indicators: Mexico, 




542 United Nations Development Programme, “Mujeres. Participación Política en México 2012,” 5. 
 
209 
design for the major political reforms, are all men, with the exception of the PANAL’s 
representative.543  
In the case of local legislatures, the results are highly uneven among the different states. 
While in Oaxaca, Veracruz, Chiapas, Baja California, Tamaulipas, Morelos, and 
Veracruz women hold more than 30% of the positions, in states such as Aguascalientes, 
Coahuila, and Puebla women represent less than 15% of the seats.544  
Broader Societal Factors 
Political Transformations 
The most obvious political transformation within Mexico was the Revolution and the end 
of a long dictatorship with the enactment of the Constitution of 1917. From then on, 
however, the PRI party dominated Mexican politics for more than seventy years.545 To 
the extent that this political control directly affected women’s ability to influence and 
create a public space requires analysis beyond the scope of this case study. It is 
noteworthy, however, that this longstanding history of a single party’s control of the 
political system is a likely component of women’s underrepresentation in politics today.  
Women’s Movements 
The political context in twentieth-century Mexico discussed above did not stop women 
from mobilizing and creating legislative change from the country’s beginning. While 
Laura MacDonald argues that Mexican women’s movements post-Revolution were 
minimal,546 the continued emergence of prominent women, organizations and legislative 
change suggests otherwise. Rodríguez emphasizes the resilience of Mexican women in 
the face of major political and economic hurdles: “Both the Revolution and the 
importance that the Mexican state placed on revolutionary rhetoric helped set in motion 
the first cohesive women’s organizations in the country.”547 With Mexican feminist 
congresses to early women’s political organizations and influential organizations like 
Frente Único Pro Derechos de la Mujer (FUPDM), the first half of the twentieth century 
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was full of the clear, determined voices of women. These efforts eventually led to 
women’s national suffrage in 1953, but the movement lost momentum soon thereafter. 
Whether this was the result of women’s competing regional or class perspectives, or 
political stronghold by the PRI, women’s movements were not active again until the 
1960s. Between then and the mid-1970s, the first politically driven feminist movement 
was taking shape in Mexico. The Coalición de Mujeres Feministas was formed from the 
1975 UN women’s conference in Mexico City. For the first time, Mexican women 
discussed the fractured perspectives between upper, middle, and lower classes and were 
able to organize more broadly. Eventually, the Coalición led to the formal political 
organization Frente Nacional por la Liberación y los Derechos de las Mujeres, from 
which major legislation for the protection of women was passed. 
 
This history contributed to further advancement for women but only explains a fraction 
of women’s underrepresentation in contemporary Mexican politics. Up until the late 
1970s, Mexican women’s movements focused on establishing collective networks and 
earning the basic civil rights necessary to move forward. As Mexico was on the verge of 
a long economic and political roller coaster, women would face a new and difficult 
struggle.  
Economic Crisis in Mexico, 1970–2000 
Another possible factor of women’s marginal representation in Mexican politics is the 
effects of long-lasting, politically driven economic crises starting in the 1970s. 
Specifically, these crises were both the cause and effect of political corruption, a series of 
presidential administrations’ poor economic policy decisions and foreign trade and 
investment practices. Together, the largest burden has been placed on women and, 
despite major legislative and political improvements, the effects have been worse for 
them. 
Rodríguez notes that the beginning of the Mexican economic crisis was directly related to 
Mexico’s economic dependence on oil exports. “[Mexico] became one of the largest 
suppliers of oil to the world market. As the price of oil quadrupled [in the mid-1970s and 
again in the early 1980s] . . . no one seemed to pay much attention to the fact that as 
interest rates were rising, so was the debt.”548 This debt was attributed to massive public 
spending by President José López Portillo’s administration in the late 1970s. As the oil 
market collapsed internationally, López Portillo nationalized Mexican banks to avoid 
Mexico’s default. Overvaluation of the peso and corruption, Rodríguez says, further 
added to this public deficit.  
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From this initial downswing, Mexico underwent a series of economic austerity measures 
throughout various administrations in the 1980s. These measures, such as the de la 
Madrid administration’s decision to control Mexico’s exchange rate in 1987, created an 
altogether erratic and unstable economy. The country saw a combination of high 
consumer good prices, high interest, and high unemployment rates. Lower-class women 
were forced to enter the workforce and produce goods in home that they once were able 
to afford. As the country welcomed more industrialization, new spaces were created for 
women, such as the maquiladoras industry. With an unprecedented number of women in 
and out of the workforce, it becomes difficult to assess how exactly women’s political 
participation was impacted. Regardless, this background adds yet another layer of 
complexity to women’s current standing in Mexican politics. 
Networks and Personal History 
The political biographies of Mexican women involved in politics show some general 
patterns: women that have been governors have strong ties to the political parties, where 
they usually started their careers; most of them come from political families; their fathers 
played an important role in their formation and their attitude towards politics and public 
service; and these women have been marked by national political events, mainly the 
student movement of 1968.  
The six governors have had strong ties with the political parties from which they were 
elected to be governors. Namely, Beatriz Paredes was a prominent member of the rural 
sector of the PRI, the CNC (Confederación Nacional Campesina); Griselda Álvarez had 
the support of the President, López Portillo; and Rosario Robles was one of the founders 
of the PRD. Many of the women in politics in Mexico come from traditional political 
families in their respective states: Griselda Álvarez’s great grandfather and father were 
governors of Colima; Amalia García’s father was also governor of Zacatecas; and 
Rosario Ibarra’s father was one the founders of the PNR (Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario), the precursor of the PRI.549 Claudia Ruiz Massieu Salinas, the Secretary 
of Tourism, is the niece of former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and daughter of a 
former PRI Secretary, Franciso Ruiz Massieu.550 
The 1968 student movement awakened some women’s political consciousness. For 
Amalia García, it made her return from her family’s self-exile in Poland to Mexico City 
and get involved in the fight for democracy. For Rosario Ibarra, her initiation in the 
political realm occurred when her son “disappeared” after a student demonstration; Dulce 
María Sauri’s husband was incarcerated for more than seven years due to demonstration 
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activity; and for Rosario Robles, the student movement fostered her critical vision of the 
political system and of the PRI.  
Substantive Representation 
According to Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, the impact of women in power 
substantive’s dimension analyses look at “whether women seek or are able to promote 
women’s issues once they are elected to political office.” 551 Substantive representation 
studies examine if women in power are able to make a difference for other women’s 
lives. In other words, substantive representation is related to the construction of policy 
and public agendas. In Mexico, the relation between Mexican political and institutional 
organizations and women has progressively changed to a more open and inclusionary one 
from the first UN Conference on Women to the UN Conference on women in Beijing 
1995.552 Zaremberg argues that feminist and women’s movements have been the main 
promoters of gender initiatives.553 
Substantive representation analyses in Mexico have focused on the legislative branch. 
Studies conducted by Zaremberg554 and Martínez and Garrido555 have concluded that the 
number of initiatives with a gender perspective is still small, but more importantly, they 
cover a wide array of perspectives: equality, discrimination, violence, or/and 
transversality (mainstreaming). Zaremberg argues that while the agenda for women’s 
reproductive rights has been largely ignored by political parties, most of the initiatives 
focus on the institutionalization of a gender perspective across the public administration, 
and on the design of mechanisms to prevent, eliminate, and punish violence against 
women.556 Martínez and Garrido argue that it was only during the recent legislatures 
(2003– 2006 and 2006–2009) that gender legislation was approved through the passing of 
the Federal Law to Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination (2003); General Law for 
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Equality between Men and Women; and the Law for Women’s Access to a Life Free of 
Violence (2007).557 
Another factor that affects the willingness of women in power to defend women’s issues 
is their associated political party. According to Zaremberg, the left-wing party, the PRD, 
has presented more gender-focused initiatives, including those advocating for sexual 
diversity rights. The right-wing party, the PAN, has opposed many of the issues that 
feminist and women’s movements consider important, such as reproductive rights. The 
PRI has presented initiatives that focus on gender and women only marginally.558  
This case study analyzes women in executive power at the state level. Mexico has not had 
a female President, though it has had six female governors: Griselda Álvarez Ponce de 
León, Beatriz Paredes Rangel, Dulce María Sauri Riancho, Rosario Robles Berlanga, 
Amalia García Medina, and Ivonne Aracelly Ortega Pacheco. These six women governed 
in very different political, social, and economic contexts that, along with their individual 
characteristics, highly influenced the policies and programs they developed during their 
administrations.  
In order to analyze the substantive dimension of these women’s performances, we 
decided to extend the analysis to other aspects of their administration rather than focusing 
only on gender policies. To do so, we include an adaptation of the framework used by 
Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter559 in their analysis of contemporary leftist governments in 
Latin America. These authors evaluate two types of lefts in Latin America (the 
contestatory and the moderate left) in three categories: economic policy and performance 
(i.e., macroeconomic policy, and efforts to transform the market model); social policy 
and performance (i.e., redistribution strategies and equity-enhancing programs); and 
political strategy and performance (i.e., pragmatic vs. revisionist, relations with the 
opposition, and efforts of mass inclusion).560 
There are two fundamental differences between Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter’s 
framework and the analysis of the Mexican case. Firstly, we are not looking at national 
governments, but state administrations. Secondly, the analyzed Mexican female 
governors do not necessarily represent or lead leftist administrations. 
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Griselda Álvarez (1979–1985) 
Griselda Álvarez was the first woman governor in Mexican history. Elected in the state of 
Colima, her campaign slogan was “Educating for Progress.” She was affiliated with the 
PRI and had a close working relationship with then-President José López Portillo. Before 
her term as governor, she served as a senator in Jalisco. 
Much like Amalia García, Griselda Álvarez had a passionate interest in social welfare 
long before her governorship. She served as director of the Social Action Ministry of 
Education and Social Work within the Ministry of Health and Welfare, as well as the 
head of Social Services for Mexico’s Institute of Social Security. During her 
administration, the illiteracy rate in the State of Colima decreased from 13.2 in 1979 to 
0.4 in 1985,561 and she effectively provided public services for 100% of the population. 
Álvarez’s gender policy was broad-based and the organizations she founded during her 
administration were largely focused on social welfare, health, and antiviolence for 
women. Among many of the women’s programs she created during her time in office 
were the Center for Women’s Care and the Women’s Alliance of Mexico.562 
Álvarez focused on decentralization of the state’s power in order to facilitate trust and 
working relationships between various social groups in Colima. This political strategy 
allowed her to execute the aforementioned social policies and create overall public 
support.563 
Beatriz Paredes (1987–1992) 
Beatriz Paredes was elected Governor of Tlaxcala in 1987. She governed until 1992, 
when she left the governorship to occupy the PRI’s General Secretary position. She 
became the second governor to be elected in Mexico after Griselda Álvarez and the 
youngest to that date. Before becoming governor, she was also the first woman to lead 
the Ligas de Comunidades Agrarias (one of the PRI’s major agricultural/rural sectors), a 
congresswoman at the age of twenty-one, and Rural Reform Subsecretary under President 
Miguel de la Madrid.564 When running for the governorship, she had the support of de la 
Madrid and of Tlaxcala’s former governor, Emilio Sánchez Piedras (1975–1981). Due to 
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the continuing economic crisis of the late ’80s, employment was the core of her running 
platform.565 
The administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) was in its last year when Beatriz 
Paredes took power. In 1988, his successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, started an 
ambitious project of economic restructuring. Being of the same party, in a context where 
party discipline was completely aligned with the President, Beatriz Paredes’ economic 
policy followed the same pattern of deregularization, privatization, and building of 
infrastructure. 566 In 1987 Beatriz Paredes started a thinning out of government-owned 
industries and agencies, and by 1988 only ten of twenty-six state-owned industries 
remained. Furthermore, the state also merged several state-owned industries.567 These 
measures required a program of job creation that could support the losses that the 
privatization and deregulation processes created. The governor was able to forge alliances 
with the business community in Tlaxcala to promote the creation of new jobs. During the 
first months of 1988, the government, along with twenty-three businessmen, invested 
53,553,000 pesos employing 2,102 workers.568 
Paredes’s social policies were based on poverty mitigation programs, and equity 
enhancing projects. Her major social project was what she called the “urbanization of the 
rural areas.” The program consisted of the use of both state and federal funds to develop 
productive projects to bring basic services such as electricity, potable water, and sewage 
to rural areas in the state. Through the federal program Solidaridad, the governor 
allocated 7,000 million pesos (7 billion) to forty community projects, from which 12% 
was invested in infrastructure rehabilitation. During 1990, the state government built 
more than 99 miles of streets and avenues throughout different municipalities.569  
Beatriz Paredes’s government’s gender policies were reflected in two specific arenas: the 
decision at the beginning of her administration to maintain all female directors and 
government employees,570 and the targeting of women in specific welfare programs. 
Paredes’s stated goal toward women was the betterment of the general living conditions 
of women in Tlaxcala. However, there is little information on the work and policies 
developed to achieve this goal. Social programs toward women included the 
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establishment of laundromats and the prevention health program “White Flag” (Bandera 
Blanca), which worked with rural and urban women to prevent cholera.571 
Beatriz Paredes identifies herself as a feminist. However, feminist and women’s groups 
have accused her of not doing much to advance women’s rights throughout her career, 
and have argued that during her administration she did not design any specific policy 
regarding women’s political or civic rights.572  
The “silence” of Paredes regarding women’s issues, specifically reproductive rights, may 
have to do with her political strategy which is marked by her institutional discipline and 
pragmatism. She prioritized the party’s goals and principles above hers. Beatriz Paredes 
is a clear example of an institutional leader who is more pragmatic than revisionist; 
whose relations with the opposition are based on her ability to negotiate and reach middle 
ground. 
Dulce María Sauri Riancho (1991–1993) 
Dulce María Sauri was elected by Yucatán’s Congress to replace Víctor Manzanilla 
Schaffer after he was forced to resign due to constant conflict with President Carlos 
Salinas and Yucatán’s former governor, Víctor Cervera. Her work program principles 
were unity, respect, and work. During the almost two years that she governed, Sauri led a 
major economic transformation of the state’s most important industry, the henequen (a 
native agave from Yucatán; its main products are textiles) and faced a political crisis 
which would force her to present her resignation.573  
Sauri took power in the middle of an extremely difficult economic and social period in 
Yucatán. The federal government was pressing for an urgent transformation of henequen 
production. From the federal government’s point of view, the heavy subsidy scheme 
sustaining the henequen industry was no longer viable due to Mexico’s economic 
situation and free trade policies.574  
The transformation of the henequen industry became the governor’s most important 
project. Sauri liquidated the government-owned CORDEMEX (the state-owned industry 
in charge of the henequen industry in Yucatán) that employed more than 3,000 workers, 
and, with state and federal funds, was able to negotiate the workers’ settlements. 
However, the workers were not the only ones affected by the restructuring. CORDEMEX 
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was the exclusive buyer of all the henequen plants in the State.575 Consequently, its 
liquidation also affected the agricultural sector. CORDEMEX’s disappearance, and its 
economic and social effects on the population, forced the government to launch a wide 
array of social programs to ameliorate the living conditions of those linked to the 
henequen industry.576 This process proved to be the most difficult and complex that Sauri 
had to face during her administration.  
The other significant economic project of Sauri’s administration was the construction of 
the federal highway Mérida-Cancún. As with the henequen industry, the highway project 
was linked to President Salinas de Gortari’s national program of economic 
restructuration, a program that required the building of infrastructure, especially 
highways.  
Dulce María Sauri’s social policy was based on the federal programs of PRONASOL 
(Programa Nacional de Solidaridad) and PROCAMPO (for agriculture), which acted as 
poverty-mitigating mechanisms rather that distributive or equity-enhancing strategies. 
PRONASOL was crucial to reducing the negative impacts of unemployment and the 
restructuration of the henequen industry, and by the end of 1992, half of Yucatán’s 
population received some kind of direct benefit from PRONASOL. PROCAMPO 
consisted of a package of subsidies for producers to increase productivity in Yucatán’s 
agriculture.577 According to Pérez Medina,578 the social policies carried out during this 
administration were successful in stabilizing poverty, and bringing it down despite the 
restructuration and regulation processes that were taking place. 
At the beginning of her gubernatorial period, Sauri’s political strategy seemed to be 
aligned with that of President Salinas de Gortari. Nevertheless, things changed when, 
during the local elections, President Salinas tried to force her to accept a party’s defeat, 
and give the opposition an electoral win. Sauri refused to negotiate what she was 
convinced was a legitimate victory, and presented her resignation to the governorship. 
Despite the conflict, she continued to be involved in the PRI. During the administration 
of the following President, Ernesto Zedillo, she became the Women’s National Program 
Director. 579 
                                                 
575 Ibid.  
576 Susana Pérez Medina, “Políticas públicas de combate a la pobreza en Yucatán, 1990–2006,” Gestión y 
Política Pública 20, no. 2 (2011): 291. 
577 Ibid. 
578 Ibid. 
579 Cabrera, Las gobernadoras, 119. 
 
218 
Rosario Robles (1999–2000) 
Rosario Robles was appointed governor of the Federal District in 1999 to finish 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’s term, after he resigned to run for the presidency. Like Amalia 
García, Robles was a founding member of the PRD and served in Congress from 1994 to 
1997.580 
Upon taking office, Rosario Robles proposed the same austerity measures as her 
predecessor, pledging in one speech to “promote an austere government, with our 
expenditures oriented primarily toward solving the needs of our people and making this a 
livable city.”581 Additionally, she promised to continue transparency and anticorruption 
efforts also begun during the Cárdenas administration.  
Robles faced increasing backlash during her governorship for charges of financial 
corruption and a 2004 scandal regarding misuse of public funds with her alleged romantic 
partner. Despite her unfavorable exit from office, she is the current Minister of Social 
Development, where she focuses on economic and social equality. She has been quoted 
as saying, “if there exists a ‘democratic’ country where half the population is poor, then it 
actually isn’t a real democracy.”582  
Robles has noted in autobiographic writings and public speeches that she is a feminist, 
and has been known for her advocacy of women’s reproductive rights. In 2000, Robles 
was responsible for the enactment of a federal government mandate coined as the 
“Robles Law,” which decriminalizes abortions on the grounds of congenital defects and 
requires district attorneys to approve abortion for cases of rape.583 
As a cofounder of the PRD, Robles maintained a political strategy with strong loyalty to 
her party, but unlike her predecessor, she also promised to work closely with the 
opposition. She emphasized a need for mass inclusion among all points along the political 
and social spectrum throughout the PRD’s creation, stating “The PRD is the single party 
that has opened space for women . . . the party’s statutes recognize the [need for] popular 
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representation.”584 During her governorship, Robles shared her pro-state sentiments in a 
2002 speech where she stated that the federal government attempts to hold back the cause 
of women’s rights.  
Because Robles was chosen to finish Cárdenas’s term in the Federal District while he ran 
for the presidency, it can be assumed that her political strategy was largely dictated by his 
larger campaign agenda. Undoubtedly, Cárdenas required a successor to his governorship 
who would maintain continuity and act as a successful model of his political platform. 
Robles has iterated this notion, stating, “[Cárdenas’s nomination for the governorship] 
was not easy or unimportant . . . it required two issues: ensuring continuity and good 
government in the city and largely winning the votes.” 585 
Amalia García (2004–2010) 
Amalia García became the first woman to lead a major political party in Mexico. In 2004, 
her win for the governorship in Zacatecas made her the third female governor in Mexican 
history. As a founding member of the PRD, García played a major role in the party’s 
growing dominance over the PRI, which had a longstanding hold in Mexico. Though she 
played an allegiant role in her own party, García was praised for her ability to 
communicate effectively with an often-fractured party and even with members of 
opposing parties. 
Amalia García was especially focused on economic growth in Zacatecas; at the time of 
her election, a significant portion of the state’s population had left to find work in other 
states and in the United States. For this reason, her policy focused on creating new 
economic programs in collaboration with Mexican businesses in the United States. She 
encouraged these businesses to invest in their home state and, for the first time, bridged 
the gap between her constituents living in Zacatecas and in the United States. As she 
stated in a New York Times interview, “I consider Zacatecas a bi-national state.”586 
García’s social policy was undoubtedly influenced by the social landscape she was 
exposed to by her father, also a former governor of Zacatecas. Her rise to politics is said 
to have begun after the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre in Mexico City. In college, she was 
involved in the student-rights movement and at the beginning of her political career was 
affiliated with socialist and communist groups. 
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Amalia García’s administration prioritized health and education as the cornerstones for 
development, and as tools to advance life conditions in the state. Consequently, she 
implemented programs to improve health and education infrastructure in Zacatecas. One 
example of this was the program “Por amor a Zacatecas/ For Love of Zacatecas” which 
sent medical brigades to poor rural communities. In addition to this, García envisioned 
Zacatecas, located in the center of Mexico, as a “star” for connectivity, and started the 
construction of two important highways, one to the city of San Luis Potosí and another to 
Saltillo, Coahuila. 
García’s focus on gender policy began early in her political career; as a legislator in the 
1990s, she was a leading activist for new legislation implementing harsher sentencing for 
physical violence against women. Additionally, García was an active proponent for new 
gender quotas rules within the PRD party. A rule that was successfully passed in the late 
1990s mandated a minimum 70/30 gender split in the PRD candidate lists. García 
attributed her governorship victory to the female voters she focused on during her 
campaign, largely due to the aforementioned decrease in Zacatecas’s male workforce at 
the time of her election. 
As previously mentioned, García’s political strategy was largely grounded in 
communication and alliances within and between party leaders to create effective change. 
Likewise, she maintained her nationalist beliefs but realized the importance of gaining 
economic support from Mexicans living north of the border.  
Ivonne Aracelly Ortega Pacheco (2007–2012) 
Ivonne Ortega Pacheco began her administration with the statement: “A stronger and 
fairer Yucatán” (Yucatán más fuerte y más justo). The first day of her administration she 
released three decrees: a 50% reduction of her salary; a project promoting the footwear 
industry; and Reconocer, a welfare state program targeting the elderly.587 
The 2008 world financial and economic crisis impacted Mexico and forced Ortega to 
create Yucatán’s Economic Pact which included the reduction of government 
expenditures; agreements to avoid price increases in medicines and foods; the expansion 
of welfare programs to the poor; and the stimulation of employment, tourism, and 
investment in the state. 588  
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Of these strategies, the promotion of tourism became crucial for her administration. The 
governor’s budget for tourism has been the highest in Yucatán’s history.589 Ortega’s plan 
for promoting tourism was heavily based on the glorification of the Mayan culture. She 
started the construction of the Great Museum of the Mayan World, which cost 770 
million pesos.590 The governor was criticized for this megaproject, whose social and 
economic benefits seem uncertain, as well as for expensive concerts in Chichén Itzá 
pyramids featuring Elton John, Shakira, and Plácido Domingo among others.591 
Another cause of scandal during her administration was the significant increase in 
government debt and expenditures. The government’s debt increased from 300 million 
pesos in the past administration to 8 billion pesos. 
Ivonne Ortega’s social policy was focused on the development of programs for the poor, 
but did not include redistribution or equity enhancing programs. The governor used 
federal programs such as Oportunidades and Habitat, and increased the number of 
beneficiaries of such programs. Pérez Medina argues that during her administration, the 
number of beneficiaries from Oportunidades grew from 1,631 to 6,781 families. The state 
also created other programs at the state level such as Steps that Leave Footprints (Pasos 
que Dejan Huella), consisting of giving shoes to students; Cobijar, which gave jackets to 
children in public schools and blankets to the elderly; and Producir, which consisted of 
giving supplies such as sewing machines. According to Pérez Medina, these programs 
were characterized for their lack of transparency. Furthermore, they were not coupled 
with other programs that could have triggered social and economic betterment in the long 
run.592 
Ivonne Ortega’s gender policies were always presented in the government reports as part 
of the administration’s social policy. In her last activities report, the governor describes 
the following actions to promote equality between men and women: the elaboration of 
budgets with a gender perspective; agreements with the judicial power to incorporate the 
gender perspective in their processes as well as to eliminate the mediation process in 
cases that involved violence against women. Among the administration’s actions for the 
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“attention to women,” several social programs are described. However, Ortega did not 
include a single woman in her main cabinet.593  
Ortega’s alignment with the PRI suggests her institutional approach to politics. After 
being governor, she became general secretary of the PRI, and still holds this position. 
Ivonne Ortega is close to President Peña Nieto, and supported him since the beginning of 
his campaign.  
Conclusions 
Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo argue that substantive representation studies have 
shown that women in power may have different priorities than men in their agendas, but 
that they do not always translate into benefits or “policy gains” for women. That is, 
women in power have not typically implemented policy congruent with their unique 
political priorities. The impact that these female leaders’ policies have on women 
constituents is mediated by various explanations: the proportion of women elected and 
their ability to form strategic alliances; individual factors such as party membership and 
feminist attitudes; and contextual and institutional factors such as party discipline and 
civil society pressures.594 
In the Mexican case, and as argued in the descriptive section, the contextual and 
institutional factors seem to be the ones that better explain the policies and approaches to 
gender issues of the women in power. Political parties are very strong in the country, and 
their agendas seem to weigh more than the female governors’ political will or ability to 
implement gender policies. Furthermore, governors such as Beatriz Paredes and Dulce 
María Sauri governed in a political context where power was highly concentrated in the 
presidency, leaving the governors’ agenda priorities overrun by the president. Dulce 
María Sauri hardly implemented any gender policies during her short administration, and 
her efforts were focused on economic restructuring projects. Women’s political 
participation at the state executive level is often confined by the political strategies of 
their predecessor, as in the case of Rosario Robles.  
Female governors have concentrated their gender agenda on social policies for women 
and on the prevention and eradication of gender violence; likewise, they have avoided the 
design and implementation of women’s reproductive rights. The governors’ selection of 
focus may be due to the higher priority that these issues hold due to a sense of 
emergency, but also because of the social pressures that come from the highly 
conservative societies in which they have governed. It is noteworthy that this lack of 
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prioritization for women’s policies is not necessarily a reflection of personal ideology; 
most of the governors here have called themselves feminist at some point in their career. 
Explanations for the gap between principle and policy are unknown but may be worth 
further exploration. 
Symbolic Representation and Leadership Style 
This section aims to analyze two distinct yet related categories. On the one hand, to 
examine the impact of Mexican women’s presence in politics in the symbolic dimension; 
on the other, to examine their leadership styles. These two analyses are crucial to 
understand women’s roles in politics, to advance the engagement of more women in 
political careers, and to challenge gendered stereotypes of leadership.  
Of the three aspects of representation analyzed in this report (descriptive, substantive, and 
symbolic), the symbolic one is the one with most ambiguous results. Symbolic 
representation regarding women’s presence in politics refers to the impact that their 
presence has on two dimensions: on the perception of the quality of the political system 
(i.e., if it is perceived as more democratic or less corrupt) and on the perception of 
politics as a male domain.595 Studies in this dimension have had varied results due to the 
ambiguous nature of the questions, and to the wide array of methods employed.596 In the 
Mexican case, Zetterberg has found that there are methodological obstacles that prevent 
the adequate analysis of women’s participation in this realm, and that the introduction of 
quotas did not have a significant or generalizable effect on the symbolic arena.597 
The leadership style discussion will draw from Genovese’s Women As National Leaders, 
whose main claim is that women’s leadership studies should be grounded in the culture of 
each region and subregion and should be contextualized to specific cultures and political 
climates.598 Genovese argues that traditional gendered notions of leadership relate men 
with hierarchy, dominance, and order, and women with cooperation, influence and 
empowerment, but case studies have shown that there are not clear patterns and even 
suggest an androgynous style of leadership exists. Furthermore, leadership is a mixture of 
opportunities and skills; consequently, Genovese and Thompson state that when studying 
leadership, the depth and tenacity of gender stereotypes have to be addressed, as well as 
women’s strategies to cope with them. In other words: do these women challenge 
gendered notions of leadership?599 In the same book, Patricia Lee Sykes600 defines 
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transformational leaders as those who were able to fundamentally transform the relations 
between and among citizens and the State. Furthermore, she argues that women who 
foster such fundamental change have done so within the traditional left-right political 
framework, but have failed to advocate for what she calls a “new dimension” that escapes 
the traditional left-right spectrum.601 The framework used in this section questions the 
existence of “female” and “masculine” leadership styles, and stresses the importance of 
studying each case in relation to specific political and cultural contexts.  
We found the absence of analyses examining Mexican female leadership staggering. As 
stated by Ortiz-Ortega, there is a lack of studies regarding female Mexican leadership; 
most studies in the country have focused on gender institutionalization processes.602 In 
this section, the leadership style analysis will focus on two main questions: have female 
Mexican politicians challenged gendered classifications of leadership styles? And, have 
female politicians in Mexico been able to radically transform relations between and 
among different actors within the state? Because analyses in this regard are scant, we will 
rely on the testimonies of female politicians to analyze how they see female leadership, 
and will also review female politicians’ media depictions as an approximation to examine 
the depth and strength of gendered stereotypes in Mexico.  
Symbolic Representation  
Drawing from the Latinobarómetro political climate database,603 the most recent survey 
data in 2011 shows that an overwhelming majority of respondents are either “not very 
satisfied” or “not satisfied” with the current democracy. Likewise, public opinion about 
democratic improvement was overwhelmingly unfavorable, with 79% of total responses 
either “democracy has worsened” or “democracy has stayed the same.” In terms of 
corruption, 67% of respondents felt there was little or no decrease in Mexico’s political 
corruption. At the state level, 2011 showed a 65% approval in statewide government 
management. 
The data was then analyzed across multiple-year surveys and the aforementioned 
questions at the national and state level were compared. Figure 15 shows percentage 
responses to the question, “How satisfied are you with the democracy?” from 1995 to 
2011. For purposes of time series comparison, those who responded either “very 
satisfied” or “more satisfied” were counted as a “favorable opinion” answer. Likewise, 
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respondents who answered either “not very” or “not satisfied” were included as an 
“unfavorable opinion.”  
Figure 15: Public Satisfaction with Democracy in Mexico, 1995–2011 
Source: Latinobarómetro, Online Analysis Time-Series Data. 
Despite frequent variation in responses over time, the data shows an overall unfavorable 
level of satisfaction with democracy. A sharp decrease in favorable response and increase 
in unfavorable response between 2000 and 2006 suggests that respondents were most 
dissatisfied with democracy during this time; this period correlates with Vicente Fox’s 
presidential term. Because Fox’s administration marked a turning point in political party 
power, the trend could be attributed to the fact that Fox’s election largely affected PAN 
constituents and changed a longstanding political party structure. 
Figure 16 shows public opinion of state-level government management between 2002 
and 2011, where data was collected from survey responses to the question “Approval of 







































































































Figure 16: Public Approval of State Government, Mexico, 2002–2011 
Source: Latinobarómetro, Online Analysis Time-Series Data. 
Although the state-level survey data was collected for a shorter period of time than that of 
the national level, statewide disapproval was only slightly higher than approval in 2002. 
Overall the trend shows a growing level of approval starting in 2004. This time period 
correlates with the terms of two female governors: García in 2004 and Pacheco in 2007. 
Additionally, the increasing favorability for state governments starting in 2006 is 
inversely related to decline in favorable public opinion about national level government 
and democracy as a whole. This satisfaction with state-level government could be 
attributed to the rise in female state leadership; however, such conclusions would require 
much more comprehensive empirical analysis.  
Leadership Style  
Culture  
Gender roles in Mexico continue to be rigid. According to Ortiz-Ortega, the relation 
between the State and Catholic Church in Mexico becomes a crucial element in the study 
of the culture, and how their discursive practices regarding the separation of the public 
and private spheres are one of the most pervading ways through which women are being 



































Mexico emphasizes women’s role in the private sphere, and reinforces the idea that 
public activities are those pertaining to men.604 Some female Mexican politicians are well 
aware of this division. When talking about her experience in politics former Senator and 
former PRI President, María de los Ángeles Moreno, states that “the world is organized 
so that men are dedicated to public activities, and women to the private ones,”605 while 
Dulce María Sauri, former governor of Yucatán and also former president of the PRI, 
says that what women in power in politics face is a “cultural reluctance.” Religion and 
cultural practices deriving in machismo606 contribute to the rigidity of gender roles in 
Mexico.  
Political Climate 
As described in previous sections, women in Mexico have gained important political 
spaces in the last decades. The implementation of quotas in the legislative branch and the 
increasing presence of women in politics are positive signs (see descriptive section in this 
case study), and in that sense it may seem that the political climate towards women is all 
positive. However, as female Mexican politicians recognize, politics are still a “world of 
men.” Beatriz Paredes states: “Politics are a space for masculine solidarities” where men 
continue the work in bars—sharing drinks while sharing information to which women 
have no access.607 The political climate in Mexico then is marked by an inclusive 
institutional discourse that recognizes women’s equality and participation in politics, 
while in practice restricting their full access to participation.  
Challenge Gendered Qualifications?  
In practice, female politicians in Mexico do not follow a specific leadership style pattern, 
nor can they be classified as following “masculine” and “feminine” qualifications. In that 
sense, the Mexican women support the argument of Genovese and Sykes that states that 
women leaders around the world do not seem to follow what are considered traditional 
notions of leadership.608 Women such as Beatriz Paredes, Dulce María Sauri, Rosario 
Robles, or Amalia García cannot be categorized in either female or masculine styles of 
leadership.  
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However, in their discourse, female politicians do differentiate between “masculine” and 
“feminine” leadership styles. For example, Beatriz Paredes states that women in the 
“masculine world” (politics) acquire certain reflexive attitudes and lose spontaneity due 
to masculine stereotypes; and that women in politics in Mexico have a reputation of being 
harsh, but that that occurs because they unconsciously assume and reinforce certain 
gender stereotypes. María de los Ángeles Moreno argues: “we do not pretend to be 
identical to men, we want to complement the approach, to be closer to vulnerable groups, 
to have more sensitivity to discrimination.”609 Amalia García mentions that she has tried 
not to assume masculine traits or actions such as authoritarian attitudes or pronouncing 
edicts; she has instead acted in a balanced way, she says, using heart and mind. Rosario 
Robles asserts that she is a team player because she is a woman.610 
Media Representations  
Reyes’s dissertation “Nagging Mothers and Monstrous Teachers: Female Politicians in 
Political Cartoons: A Comparative Analysis between Mexico and the U.S.” analyzes 
national media’s representations of female politicians. While her work focuses on the 
depiction of female politicians in political cartoons, and does not include other discursive 
analysis, it is useful to understand how the media perceives women in politics in Mexico. 
Reyes found that women in these cartoons were “domesticated” and pushed back to the 
private sphere by being portrayed as either housewives or “motherly stereotypes,” and 
that their physical features were objectified (either as objects of desire, or as repulsive).611 
A three-month analysis of women’s representation in the two Chambers of Congress, in 
government offices, and in political parties conducted by CIMAC (Communication and 
Information for Women) during the 2009 midterm elections came to similar conclusions. 
The study, which included print media and five Internet portals, found that informative 
news tended to discount women as meaningful political actors, that their presence was 
either incidental or aleatory, and that only physically attractive women were included in 
the graphics.612 
Women As Transformational Leaders 
Female politicians in Mexico have not been transformational leaders due to several 
elements. Firstly, no woman has ever held the position of president in Mexico; thus, the 
scope and autonomy have been limited by features of the political system such as the 
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concentration of power in either political parties or the president. Secondly, as stated by 
Beatriz Paredes, women in relevant political positions have performed according to the 
ideological and political patterns of the political organization that took them to power.613 
Furthermore, as stated by Cabrera, female governors seem to be closer to the people, and 
spend their time in office developing social and welfare programs.614 Female governors’ 
programs and social policies register on both the right and left of the political spectrum. 
However, they resemble the findings of Sykes’s “Women As National Leaders: Patterns 
and Prospects”615 in that they have failed to advocate for the so-called new dimensions of 
power; in other words, they have not changed the nature of power and the relationship 
between and among citizens and the State.  
Conclusion  
The findings outlined in the above graphs show a growing distrust and unfavorable 
opinion of Mexican democracy and executive level government. In terms of symbolic 
representation, the findings do suggest that Mexico’s national level government is being 
adversely affected by either its lack of gender diversity, dissatisfaction with political 
parties, or a combination of the two. Women have been able to enter state-level 
government more easily than executive level branches but, without a female president or 
greater numbers of women in executive positions, it is nearly impossible to make a 
conclusion about the symbolic effects of their governance. 
Contrary to the analytical framework used in this case study, female politicians in Mexico 
believe that there are gendered qualities that determine a “feminine” or “masculine” style 
of leadership. This resembles Fukuyama’s approach to women in leadership which states 
that a world ruled by women would follow a different direction, with states that are less 
aggressive, competitive, and violent.616 The fact is that, in practice, there are no clear 
patterns around the way female Mexican politicians govern. Their style seems to be 
marked by sociocultural context, past experiences, individual characteristics, and their 
political party’s ideology. This finding is aligned with and further supports evidence 
suggested in the substantive section that female governors’ personal feminist ideology 
does not translate to the ways in which they governed. 
In the end, one comes across Genovese’s question: does it even matter? Women should 
be a critical mass in political leadership and representation because they are part of the 
society and their presence should be reflected in a representative government, and 
because gender equality processes strengthens democracy.617 Women should be held to 
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the same standards as men to measure their capacity to govern, and female politicians’ 
bad performance should not account (as it frequently does) for the performance of all 
female politicians, just as that equivalence is not made in the males’ case. Beatriz Paredes 
makes this argument clear:  
In Mexico we cannot generalize about ‘women’ in leadership positions without 
looking to the specific woman, and her specific position. . . . Being a woman is 
not a guarantee against corruption, stupidity, or laziness. . . . We women cannot 
separate ourselves from human condition. There are few, very few women who 
exercise power differently.618 
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Chapter 10: United States and Canada Case Study 
Descriptive Representation  
Introduction 
The governments of Canada and the United States share some similarities; understanding 
their differences, however, is key for this case study. Both governments have three major 
branches of power: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. They differ in that 
Canada is a constitutional monarchy while the United States is a constitutional republic. 
Democratic elections play a vital role in governments, but these elections vary in form 
and function in both countries. Neither country has imposed nor enacted gender quotas to 
elevate more women into higher governmental positions in their election processes, yet 
equitable gender representation has been a visible issue in both countries in recent 
decades as neither country has elected a female candidate to its highest executive office. 
Canada 
Government Structure 
Canada’s constitutional monarchy is structured so that the reigning monarch, Queen 
Elizabeth II, who presides over a large commonwealth that includes territories in Europe, 
the Americas, and the South Pacific, has a legal and traditional role but not a political 
one. The monarch appoints a Governor General who serves as a liaison or ambassador 
between the Monarchy (the traditional government) and the Parliament (the political 
government). While this Governor General interacts primarily with the executive branch 
of government, it is the Prime Minister who actually leads the government. The Prime 
Minister is appointed to his/her position by the members of the political party that holds 
the majority in the House of Commons, one of two legislative bodies of the Parliament. 
The legislative branch of Canadian government, the Parliament, is made up of two 
houses: the Senate (the Upper House) and the House of Commons (the Lower House). 
The Governor General appoints the 105 senators to their seats on the recommendation of 
the Prime Minister.619 The citizens of Canada elect the 308 members of the House of 
Commons and each one is the representative of an electoral district.620 
The Constitution requires that elections be held every five years, but the House of 
Commons reserves the right and privilege to call an election at its discretion. As a result, 
                                                 





political parties have a great deal of power in Canadian politics. Each individual elected 
to a seat in the House of Commons is elected as a representative of his/her political party. 
Following an election, the party that holds the majority of seats has the privilege of 
appointing one of its party members Prime Minister. However, any member of 
Parliament can switch party allegiance at his or her discretion while holding his or her 
seat. This can lead to shifts in majority power, and often results in the House of 
Commons calling a new election to ensure that these party allegiances are still 
representative of the populace.  
In the case that an election is called and the majority party loses their majority position, it 
is tradition that the current Prime Minister resigns and allows for the new majority party 
to appoint a representative to the post. As a result, the term length for Canadian Prime 
Ministers has varied greatly across history. For example, Kim Campbell, who was 
appointed by a retiring Prime Minister (thus not following an election), only held office 
from June 25, 1993, to November 4, 1993, when a new election was called.621 The prime 
minister has the sole responsibility for assembling and organizing his or her own cabinet, 
all members of which also serve on the Queen’s privy council to directly advise her on 
the state of Canada. The Prime Minister chooses cabinet members from among the 
elected members of the House of Commons, traditionally from his or her own party.622 
Each Prime Minister creates the individual cabinet positions in his or her cabinet, so 
every Prime Minister’s cabinet has been composed of a different number of members, 
responsible for varying sectors of government. 
The ten provinces and three territories of Canada elect the members of their provincial 
legislature and the majority party then recommends one of these members to the local 
Lieutenant-Governor, an appointee of the Crown, who then appoints the recommended 
member as the Provincial Premier. 
The Supreme Court of Canada heads the judicial branch of the Canadian government. 
The Governor General appoints the court’s nine justices at the recommendation of the 
Prime Minister.
 623 Unlike in the United States, these justices are required to retire at the 
age of 75, so they do not serve lifetime posts.  
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Due to the power of the chief executive to exercise choice in the composition of his or 
her cabinet, examining the gender representation in these cabinets is pertinent for this 
case study. Prime Minister John George Diefenbaker appointed the first female minister, 
Ellen Loukes Fairclough, to the Ministry of the Crown in 1957 as Secretary of State.624 
Fairclough served in this role for just under a year before becoming Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration for the next four years.625 She finished her time as a cabinet 
official by serving as Postmaster General for around eight months.626 Since Fairclough’s 
appointment, Canada has had a total of sixty-one women serve in the Ministry of the 
Crown, holding seventy-nine different appointments. The most commonly held positions 
are: Minister for International Cooperation, Minister of Canadian Heritage, Minister of 
National Revenue, and Minister of the Environment.627 Six different women have held 
each of these ministerial positions.628  
Current Prime Minister Stephen Harper has appointed more women to cabinet positions 
in his tenure than any other prime minister before him, with eighteen women holding 
thirty-two different positions thus far.629 Currently, Prime Minister Harper has thirty-nine 
total ministerial positions in his cabinet and women hold twelve of them.630 These 
positions are: Minister of Health, Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
Minister of Canadian North Economic Development Agency/Minister of Arctic 
Council/Minister of Environment, Minister of Transport, Minister of Fisheries and 
Oceans, Minister of National Revenue, Minister of Canadian Heritage and Official 
Languages, Minister of Labour/Minister of Status of Women, Minister of State (Foreign 
Affairs and Consular), Minister of State (Seniors), Minister of State (Social 
Development), and Minister of State (Western Economic Diversification). 631 
Overall, sixty-one women have served in the Ministry of the Crown, a seemingly 
impressive number. However, of these sixty-one women, thirty-eight have been Ministers 
of State.632 Regardless of the portfolio, this position is the least prestigious of the cabinet-
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level positions. The Ministers of State do not oversee a specific portfolio; rather, they are 
assigned to assist other Ministers.633 
In the years since Campbell’s term in office, the public has been examining gender 
representation in the legislative branch of government, where seats are determined by 
election rather than appointment. Currently, Canada does not have any electoral quotas in 
place to encourage parity in the House of Commons, but there has been an upward trend 
in female representation in Canadian politics. In the Canadian Parliament, there have 
been 257 female members of the House of Commons and 92 female Senators.634 The first 
female member of the House of Commons, Agnes Campbell Macphail, was sworn in 
December 6, 1921, and served until she was defeated in the March 26, 1940 election.635 
The Canadian Senate did not have a female member for another nine years, when Cairine 
Reay Wilson took office on February 15, 1930. Wilson served until March 3, 1962.636 
Currently, there are thirty-eight women in the Canadian Senate and seventy-seven women 
in the House of Commons.637 
The national government is not alone in experiencing an upward trend in female 
representation; local governments have also seen a rise in participation from female 
politicians in recent decades. At the provincial level, a total of ten women have served as 
premiers, with seven coming from provinces and three from territories.638 After the 2011 
election, there was parity amongst the premiers, with five men and five women 
serving.639 These five female premiers governed over 85% of the population of 
Canada.640 Currently, two female premiers—Christy Clark and Kathleen Wynne—remain 
in office and preside over two of the three most populous provinces, British Columbia 
and Ontario.641 
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The Supreme Court of Canada currently has three female justices—Beverley McLachlin, 
Rosalie Silberman Abella, and Andromache Karakatsanis—with Beverley McLachlin 
serving as chief justice since 2000.642 The Right Honorable Chief Justice McLachlin is 
the only woman to have served in this position.643 The first female justice, Bertha Wilson, 
was appointed to the court in 1982; since her appointment, seven other women have been 
appointed to the court.644  
United States 
Government Structure 
The United States of America is a constitutional republic made up of fifty states and one 
capital district. The government is mostly composed of elected representatives at 
national, state, and local levels. As in Canada, the government is broken into three 
branches: the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. The head of the executive 
branch is the President, who is elected to the position by a proportional, national vote. 
The legislative branch is comprised of two chambers: the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. Each of the fifty states is allotted two senators and a varying number of 
seats in the House Representatives according to the state’s population. Senators and 
Representatives of the House are elected to their posts by a direct election in their home 
state. The Senate has a permanent number of 100 members, while the House of 
Representatives currently has 435 representatives. Lastly, the Supreme Court heads the 
judicial branch of government. The Supreme Court is a panel of nine justices who are 
nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. Each justice serves a 
lifetime tenure, thus not every president has the opportunity to nominate a justice to the 
Supreme Court. 
Gender Representation 
Although the United States has never had a female president, women have served as 
members of Congress for all states, with the exception of Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, 
and Vermont. These states have never elected a woman to either house of Congress.645 To 
date, there have been 294 total women elected to Congress, with 33 elected to the Senate, 
251 elected to the House of Representatives, and 10 serving in both houses. The first 
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female Senator, Rebecca Latimer Felton of Georgia, was appointed in 1922, though she 
only served one day until the Senator-elect could be sworn in.646 Jeanette Rankin, of 
Montana, was the first woman elected to the House of Representatives in 1917.647 
Currently, there are twenty female Senators and seventy-nine Congresswomen, making 
up 20% and 18.2% of each body’s composition, respectively.648  
Across the fifty states that comprise the United States, thirty-five women have served as 
governor of twenty-six different states.649 The first two—Nellie Tayloe Ross of Wyoming 
and Miriam “Ma” Ferguson of Texas—were both elected in 1925 to replace their 
husbands as governor.650 In 2004 and 2007, nine women served as governors 
concurrently, the largest number ever observed.651 Currently, five female governors 
preside over the states of Arizona, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South 
Carolina.652 
In addition to a lack of a female executive in the United States, there has also never been 
a female Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In total four women have served on the 
country’s highest judicial body—the first, Sandra Day O’Connor, was appointed by 
President Ronald Reagan in 1981.653 The other three women remain a part of the current 
makeup of the court: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice 
Elena Kagan.654 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made the first female cabinet appointment when in 
1933 he chose Francis Perkins as his Secretary of Labor.655 Perkins served as Secretary of 
Labor for the entire twelve-year duration of President Roosevelt’s tenure, leaving her 
office not long after his death.656 During this time, she helped draft and implement much 
of Roosevelt’s historic New Deal legislation.657 Since then, forty-four other women have 









653 “Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,” The Supreme Court of the United States, 
February 23, 2014, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx. 
654 Ibid. 
655 Center for American Women and Politics, “Women Appointed to Presidential Cabinets” (Center for 






held fifty appointments to a cabinet or cabinet-level position, with some women holding 
multiple positions. In addition, twenty-eight of the forty-five total women held a first-tier 
position in the cabinet itself as opposed to a second-tier, cabinet-level position.658 The 
most common position for a woman to hold has been Secretary of Labor, with seven 
different women serving in this position since Perkins first held it.659 Other popular posts 
have included Secretary of Health and Human Services (a cabinet position) and 
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator (a cabinet-level position), with five 
different women holding the former post and four different women holding the latter 
post.660 Women have yet to fill three cabinet positions: Secretary of Defense, Secretary of 
the Treasury, and Secretary of Veterans Affairs.661 Presidents Barack Obama and Bill 
Clinton both appointed historically high numbers of women to their cabinets, each 
selecting fifteen total.662 At one point during President Clinton’s second term, nine 
women served concurrently, accounting for 41% of the cabinet.663 During President 
Obama’s second term, three women currently serve in cabinet positions: Secretary of the 
Interior (Sally Jewell), Secretary of Commerce (Penny Pritzker), and Secretary of Health 
and Human Services (Sylvia Mathews Burwell).664 Another three women hold cabinet-
level positions as Administrator of the Small Business Administration (Maria Contreras-
Sweet), Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (Gina McCarthy), and 
Ambassador to the United Nations (Samantha Power).665 
Broader Societal Factors 
Women’s movements have played an instrumental role in increasing the number of 
politically active women in Canada and the United States. Women’s priorities during the 
first, second, and third waves of the feminist movements in Canada and the United States 
varied across class and racial lines. Differing priorities were a result of women of color’s 
inability to gain political and social rights at the same time as white women. For white 
women, the first wave secured their suffrage, the second wave focused on the passage of 
women’s rights legislation, and the third wave has concentrated on increasing the number 
of women in leadership positions. For women of color, the second wave secured their 
suffrage and the third wave has focused on addressing the unique social barriers they face 
as a result of their gender and race. For all women, the movements have succeeded in 
bringing national awareness to the obstacles they encounter due to their gender. 
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In both countries the first wave of feminist movements, taking place between the late 
1800s and the 1940s, was successful in securing suffrage for white women, thereby 
linking women’s activism to political action. In the United States, the Seneca Falls 
Convention of 1848 is cited as the first women’s rights convention. At the convention the 
participants created the Declaration of Sentiments, a document that established the 
foundation for how to achieve equality for women. Following the convention the 
National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) and the American Woman Suffrage 
Association were founded. A few decades later, in the early 1890s, an organization that 
advocated for women’s suffrage was also founded in Canada, the National Council of 
Women of Canada (NCWC).666 These organizations helped to mobilize middle class 
white women to seek the right to vote. In 1918, Canadian white women obtained the right 
to vote on the federal level, compared to 1920 for white women in the United States. The 
1920 amendment also enforced white women’s suffrage on the municipal level, 
stipulating that no state shall deny the right of a citizen to vote on the account of sex. 
Meanwhile, Canadian white women did not obtain the right to vote at the provincial level 
in all territories until the 1940s.667 
The second wave of the Canadian and American feminist movements, starting in the 
early 1960s and ending in the 1980s, had a broader political agenda. Sparked by the 
release of Betty Friedan’s Feminine Mystique in 1963, the second wave challenged 
traditional gender roles and illustrated that women were political leaders capable of 
pushing their own legislative agendas. Friedan’s book called for women to reject 
confinement to the domestic sphere and to pursue “meaningful work.” It also challenged 
readers to rethink previous notions of femininity. The book impacted women throughout 
the world.668 Scholars of the Canadian feminist movement acknowledge its significance 
in Canada, recognizing that it also sparked female activism there.669 
Following the release of Friedan’s book, national feminist organizations and female-
centered government committees were developed. A few years prior to Friedan’s 
Feminine Mystique, in 1961, President Kennedy established the Presidential Commission 
on the Status of Women, which published a report on gender inequality. The report stated 
that women faced discrimination in American society and outlined recommendations to 
reach gender equality. These recommendations included paid maternity leave and fair 
hiring practices. In 1966, Friedan founded and then led the National Organization for 
Women (NOW). In 1970 in Canada a commission comparable to the Presidential 
Commission on the Status of Women was established, the Royal Commission on the 
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Status of Women. This commission also published a report on sex discrimination and 
developed recommendations for improvement. These events in the United States 
influenced the Canadian government.670 A year later, the National Action Committee on 
the Status of Women (NAC) was founded; similar to NOW, it was an autonomous 
feminist organization that championed women’s rights legislation. Both NOW and NAC 
fought for abortion rights and were important participants in the passage of 1970s equal 
rights legislation.671 
In the 1960s women of color in both the United States and Canada developed their own 
separate movements to address the unique gender and racial issues they faced. For 
example, in Canada in the 1960s aboriginal women involved in the aboriginal rights 
movement fought alongside aboriginal men to secure their right to vote. Additionally, in 
the United States Asian, black, and Latina women created separate women’s rights 
groups to fight gender and racial discrimination simultaneously.672 
During the third wave of the movements, occurring from the 1990s to present day, the 
number of female governors in the United States has increased dramatically.673 
Additionally, Canada has had eleven female premiers since electing their first female 
premier in 1991.674 The third wave has advocated for a stronger female presence in 
positions of power. It has also emphasized that women do not face monolithic gender 
oppression and has called for research exploring the impact of gender barriers that 
develop as a result of the intersectionality of gender and race. Until the number of female 
leaders who are women of color increases, it will be hard to address on a political level 
the specific social barriers they face. 
Substantive Representation 
Introduction 
This section examines the substantive representation of female governors in the United 
States and female premiers in Canada from the 1990s to present day; essentially it 
examines how these women have governed. The authors analyzed their substantive 
representation by reviewing the major campaign platforms and the policy agendas they 
advanced during their time in office. American society has developed a subconscious 
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prejudice regarding how women will govern. Society assumes that women will focus 
more on social policies than economic ones, be keener on domestic issues than foreign 
policy, softer on criminal policies, favor appointments of other women over those of men, 
and be less knowledgeable and confident on environmental issues. However, an 
inspection of female executives in North America reveals that these assumptions are 
simply anecdotal. The policy choices of these women are as varied as the women 
themselves. These women run on platforms ranging from liberal to conservative, hold 
résumés that boast strengths in every sector, and each possess individual “pet policy” 
areas. This section is divided into policy areas, with each policy section highlighting 
notable policies female governors and premiers have implemented during their careers, 
providing a snapshot of the breadth of policy choices made by female executives. 
Social Policy 
Canadian Premier Nellie Cournoyea’s ties to the aboriginal community heavily 
influenced her policy agenda. Nellie Cournoyea was Canada’s second female premier and 
first aboriginal premier. Throughout her political career, Cournoyea fought for the rights 
of aboriginal groups.675 She was responsible for the negotiations that led to the Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement 1993.676 This agreement established the territory of Nunavut and 
an independent government for the Inuit people.677  
Jeanne Shaheen, the former governor of New Hampshire, was the first woman in the 
United States to be elected as both a governor (1997-2003) and senator (1992-1996). She 
implemented a number of policies that focused on gay rights. She repealed a law that 
prevented gays and lesbians from serving as foster or adoptive parents. She also added 
sexual orientation as a protected class in antidiscrimination laws.678 Similar to Shaheen, 
in 2001, former Washington governor, Christine O’Grady Gregoire, added sexual 
orientation and gender identity as protected classes. In 2007, she granted gay and lesbian 
couples the right to marry.679 
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Barbara Roberts served as the first female governor of Oregon from 1991 to 1995. She 
focused heavily on helping low-income families, by increasing the number of children 
enrolled in Head Start and expanding the number of welfare-to-work transition programs. 
She also worked to ensure Oregon increased the number of affordable housing units. 
Additionally, Roberts’s administration appointed significant numbers of minorities and 
women to state government positions.680 
During her time in office, former Governor of Kansas Joan Finney issued multiple 
executive orders addressing discrimination on the basis of ability and race. Executive 
Order 92-153 established a requirement that state agencies provide disability awareness 
training and sensitivity training, while Executive Order 92-154 created a liaison position 
between each state agency and the statewide Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
coordinator. This new position helped ensure that information regarding the ADA was 
adequately and appropriately disseminated within each agency. In addition, Finney issued 
Executive Order 93-159, which articulated that affirmative action programs were still 
necessary and would therefore continue to be used in Kansas.681 
While campaigning for office, former Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco promised to 
improve the state’s public education system.682 She fulfilled this promise by expanding 
prekindergarten access to all at-risk children; passing two consecutive pay raises for 
public school teachers across Louisiana; and fully funding all state colleges and 
universities for the first time in nearly twenty-five years.683 
The former Premier of Prince Edward Island, Catherine Callbeck, attempted to rectify a 
budget deficit by legislating a 7.5% wage rollback for provincial public sector employees. 
This rollback affected 12,000 employees and upset many more. In order to institute the 
rollbacks, Callbeck broke several collective agreements between the provincial 
government and public employee unions. As a result of breaching the agreements, 
Callbeck had limited support and popularity throughout the duration of her term. Her 
party lost handily in the subsequent elections.684 
Attempting to address a growing problem of suicide in the territory of Nunavut, former 
Premier Eva Aariak created a suicide prevention plan. The plan was primarily focused on 
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expanding mental health services; extending research on suicide, including data 
collection; and suicide intervention training. The plan also specified that the trainings, 
along with grief counseling, be culturally appropriate for the territory of Nunavut, which 
is home to a large Inuit population. In order to develop the plan, Aariak used suicide 
prevention and intervention best practices from around the world and relied on input and 
knowledge from the Inuit population.685 
Economic Policy 
Prior to serving as governor of New Hampshire, Jeanne Shaheen owned a small 
business.686 As a result, a number of her policies sought to connect small businesses to 
the global marketplace. For example, she spearheaded Experience New Hampshire, an 
annual event that allows New Hampshire businesses to showcase their goods and services 
in Washington DC. Shaheen also enacted legislation to create a $1 million annual fund to 
help businesses finance employee training.687 
The former governor of Montana, Judy Martz, emphasized economic policies while she 
was in office. Martz had also been a small business owner prior to serving as governor. 
She ran on a platform of tax reform policies and in 2003 was able to pass the first major 
tax reform in Montana in three decades. She created the Office of Economic Opportunity 
to help promote local businesses and assist residents in business and workforce 
development.688 
Kathleen Sebelius, the former governor of Kansas and until recently the United States’ 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, was named one of Time Magazine’s top five 
governors in 2005. The magazine praised Sebelius for eliminating the $1.1 billion debt 
the state faced when she took office without raising taxes or cutting public education 
funds. Instead, Sebelius achieved this by removing wasteful state government 
programs.689 
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British Columbia Premier Christy Clark’s administration focused on strengthening the 
economy. In 2011 she developed and implemented the British Columbia Jobs Plan.690 
The plan’s primary methods included lower taxes for families and businesses, and new 
investment in workforce development. The plan also outlined steps British Columbia 
should take to increase trade with Asia.691 Critics have argued that the plan has failed to 
deliver the economic growth it promised, citing its inability to create long-term jobs for 
residents.692 Another major initiative of the Clark administration was the Families First 
program, which she also implemented in 2011. The program concentrated on four main 
policy areas: job creation, encouraging civic engagement through government 
transparency, increasing tax credits for families, and establishing safe communities. 
Limited government funding has led to slow implementation of the program.693 
Former Governor of New Jersey Christine Todd Whitman is most well known for her 
economic policies, which gained her both praise and criticism throughout the United 
States. Facing a $1.1 billion state budget gap in 1994, Whitman eliminated both the 
Department of Higher Education and the Department of the Public Advocate, and 
reduced New Jersey’s pension fund and retiree healthcare contributions by $1.3 billion 
over two years. In addition to cutting the size of the state government, she also instituted 
a 30% decrease on state income taxes, to be carried out over three years.694 
Noticing that the economy was shifting away from manual labor toward knowledge-
based labor, former Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm established the No Worker 
Left Behind (NWLB) program in 2007. The main focus of NWLB was to train 
unemployed and low-wage workers for the emerging technologically driven job market 
by offering up to two years’ worth of free tuition at Michigan universities and community 
colleges. The program was initially well received across the state; however, as the 
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economic downturn known as the great recession of 2007-2009 began to hit Michigan 
particularly hard, the cost-benefit of NWLB was highly contested.695 
Upon beginning her term as the current Governor of New Mexico, Susana Martinez took 
measures to help balance the state budget. She started by looking toward her own office 
to cut expenditures. Governor Martinez found ways to reduce her office’s budget, 
including a 10% salary reduction for employees within the governor’s office and the 
cabinet. The salary reduction also included a provision that prohibited current cabinet 
members from earning more than their predecessors. Governor Martinez’s official 
website also includes an email address through which citizens can submit their 
suggestions on how the state government can continue to downsize on spending.696 
The Innovate NH Jobs plan, created by current New Hampshire Governor Maggie 
Hassan, takes a multifaceted approach to strengthening the state economy by targeting 
workforce development, small business growth, and renewable and efficient energy 
strategies. The plan also aims to minimize government waste. The specific action items 
of the plan range from increasing funding for higher education scholarships and job 
training programs, to aiding unemployed workers in starting their own businesses, to 
creating a commission tasked with finding ways the state government can become more 
innovative and efficient.697 
The Public Sector Services Continuation Act, also known as Bill 45, promoted by the 
government of former Premier of Alberta, Alison Redford, has caused widespread 
opposition throughout Alberta. Worker strikes by provincial public sector employees, 
which have been outlawed in Alberta since 1977, would be certified as illegal in this bill. 
Bill 45 also increases the financial penalty for illegally striking and includes a provision 
stating that nonemployees who are found to promote striking or engage in strikes may 
also face the same penalties as employees.698 The largest labor union in Alberta is 
continuing to actively fight against the bill due to this provision, even after Redford’s 
resignation as Premier.699 
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In an exceedingly contested move, in 2005, during her governorship of Louisiana, 
Kathleen Blanco met with then President of Cuba Fidel Castro in Cuba to discuss a trade 
agreement; after four days of discussions, the agreement was ultimately signed. This was 
during an era in which the United States had no formal diplomatic relations with that 
country. In the agreement, Cuba pledged to purchase $2 million worth of milled rice and 
powdered milk from companies in Louisiana, and also guaranteed increased Cuban 
shipments through the Port of New Orleans.700 
Governors Jan Brewer and Nikki Haley both advocated for controversial immigration 
policies during their time in office. Jan Brewer is the current governor of Arizona. In 
April 2010, Brewer signed into law SB 1070, the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act. SB 1070 was enacted to deter undocumented immigrants from 
entering and becoming employed in the United States.701 The most disputed segment of 
the bill was the provision that required police to determine the immigration status of 
persons arrested or detained when there was “reasonable suspicion” that they were illegal 
immigrants. The United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit alleging that SB 
1070 was unconstitutional. In April 2011, the court blocked the enforcement of four 
provisions of SB 1070, including the highly disputed segment.702 In June 2011 South 
Carolina Governor Nikki Haley enacted a bill modeled after Arizona’s SB 1070. Haley, 
the first female governor of South Carolina and the current youngest governor in the 
United States, praised the Arizona bill during her campaign.703 As with SB 1070, the 
constitutionality of Haley’s illegal immigration reform bill has been debated by civil 
rights advocate groups including the American Civil Liberties Union. Haley defended the 
bill to the press by stating that the state has a right to enact legislation that ensures “they 
no longer support people that don’t come here [to the United States] the right way.”704 
Haley contended the bill was merely a mechanism to ensure the state could enforce 
existing immigration laws. 
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In addition to her economic policies, New Hampshire’s Shaheen enacted legislation 
focused on energy efficiency. In 2002, Shaheen signed into law the Clean Power Act, 
which was the country’s first state law enacted to reduce power plant emissions. 
Additionally, she created the state’s first comprehensive energy plan.705 
Former Governor of Alaska Sarah Palin introduced and eventually enacted the Alaska 
Gasline Inducement Act, which called for bidders to submit proposals to win a contract to 
build a natural gas pipeline from Alaska’s North Slope, through Canada, and into the 
continental United States.706 The contract was awarded to a Canadian company, 
TransCanada.707 By introducing the concept of an Alaskan natural gas pipeline and 
pushing for its realization, Palin hoped to bolster the Alaskan economy in the long term 
and encourage the exploration of new fields and discovery of new reserves in the rich 
lands of the North Slope.708 
Symbolic Representation 
Introduction 
This section analyzes the symbolic representation of female governors in the United 
States and female premiers in Canada. As this case study has already noted, the women 
examined are a diverse and politically varied group, and the symbolic observations are a 
reflection of this diversity.  
Transformational Leaders: Canada 
A number of the women previously analyzed in this study are key examples of female 
leaders who have not only transformed the population’s view of women as leaders, but 
also of the view of members of marginalized groups as leaders. Nellie Cournoyea, 
Canada’s first aboriginal premier was heavily involved in the struggle for aboriginal civil 
rights prior to pursuing a political career. She cofounded the Committee of Original 
Peoples’ Entitlement (COPE), a political organization dedicated to advocating for the 
                                                 
705 Cat Lazaroff, “New Hampshire Passes Nation’s First CO2 Cap,” Environment News Service, April 22, 
2002, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2002/2002-04-22-06.html. 
706 “Governor Palin Unveils the AGIA,” The Office of Governor Sarah Palin, March 2, 2007, 
http://wayback.archive-it.org/1200/20090726180436/http://gov.state.ak.us/print_news.php?id=170. 
707 “Alaska Governor Signs Natgas Pipeline License Bill,” Reuters, August 29, 2008, 
http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=2e84b1e8-9a4a-4558-ad05-21b517c50fae. 
708 “Governor Palin Unveils the AGIA.” 
 
247 
Inuvialuit.709 She also directed the Ingamo Hall Friendship Centre, a federally funded 
program providing cultural programs to aboriginal youth. After serving as premier of the 
Northwest Territories, Cournoyea received the highest honor in the country: she was 
appointed an Officer of the Order of Canada.710 She has also been awarded honorary 
doctorates in law from Lakehead University, Carleton University, and the University of 
Toronto.711 Receiving these honors illustrates the respect she has gained as a Canadian 
leader. 
Early on in Kathleen O’Day Wynne’s career, the media labeled Wynne, the first openly 
gay premier in Canada, an “extremist lesbian.” She has stated that this negative media 
attention only emboldened her to pursue a higher political position. She said, “To have 
somebody say. . . you are ‘other’ and we can marginalize you. I was indignant. . . I 
wasn’t going to let that stop me.”712 Wynne became the first female premier of Ontario in 
2013. A few months before her election, the Toronto Star newspaper published an 
editorial on Wynne. The article ended with a brief narrative intended to illustrate young 
Canadian girls’ excitement at the prospect of Wynne’s election: 
At the Tim Hortons in Grand Bend, Wynne meets sisters Abby and Emma 
Maguire, ages 10 and 9. She was out of earshot as the girls trilled about the 
prospect of Wynne becoming the province’s first female premier. “There’s more 
population of girls in the world,” Abby says, knowingly. Both girls are working 
toward their junior black belts. Wynne makes her approach, takes a seat, and 
explains to her new fans just what a minority government is all about.713 
A recent article featured in the Huffington Post gauged Wynne’s impact on Canada’s gay 
community. In the article, Helen Kennedy, executive director of Egale Canada, a national 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer (LGBTQ) human rights group, described 
Wynne’s election as a significant historical moment. Kennedy explained the important 
message the moment has sent to LBGTQ youth in Canada: “It sends a strong message to 
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those young kids who are cautious and nervous about their own journey with respect to 
their sexual orientation and gender identity, that you can do it if you’re true to yourself. . . 
. It’s also important for the parents of LGBT children to know that their kids can be and 
do whatever they want, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.”714 
Wynne’s willingness to be open about sexuality has made her a hero to many members of 
Canada’s gay community.715 
Transformational Leaders: United States 
As a result of their political careers as governors, many of these women have gained a 
national presence as important leaders. The national attention they received allowed a 
number of the women to pursue higher political positions following their governorship or 
premiership. The first elected female governor in the United States was Wyoming 
governor Nellie Tayloe Ross, elected in 1925; this election was followed by Miriam 
“Ma” Ferguson of Texas, also in 1925.716 However, both of these women were the wives 
of previous governors and their victories are perceived to have been influenced by their 
husbands’ former titles. It was not until 1974, with the election of Ella T. Grasso in 
Connecticut, that a woman won a gubernatorial seat without this male connection. Ella 
Grasso’s election started to change the American public’s view on women as viable 
candidates in their own right. 
In recent decades other female governors have been making progress in changing the 
public perception of women in power in the United States, and giving future candidates a 
more level playing field. The second female governor of Texas, Ann Richards, was 
elected to the position in 1990 after delivering a striking keynote address at the 1988 
Democratic National Convention. During her time as governor, Richards used her ability 
to appoint individuals to state positions to increase the representation of both women and 
people of color in such roles. In addition, the United States Congress passed the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—a vital trade agreement between Canada, 
the United States, and Mexico—while Richards was in office.717 When uncertainty arose 
in Congress about whether NAFTA would pass, Richards’s leadership was integral in 
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rallying Democratic support for the agreement.718 Though she accomplished a great deal 
while in office, it is said that the popularity of Richards, both during her tenure as 
governor and after, was due more to “her style . . . and who she [was],” suggesting that 
she was a figure with whom people could easily identify. Richards embodied the values 
that many Texans cherish most, regardless of political ideology. Richards had been a 
schoolteacher, a mother, and a fiercely proud woman in a state where there was never a 
shortage of individual or state pride.719 Furthermore, her public struggle with and 
eventual triumph over alcoholism prior to her election as governor illustrated to Texans a 
willingness and determination typically reserved to describe only male politicians.720 
Sarah Palin, governor of Alaska from 2006 to 2009, made headlines during the 2008 
presidential election when Republic presidential candidate Senator John McCain named 
her his vice-presidential nominee. Openly conservative, Palin was prolife, supported 
abstinence-only education, and stood in favor of the war in the Middle East—plus she 
was an outspoken gun advocate. This made her a woman who stood out against what 
Americans had previously viewed as a “female politician.” Typically, women in politics 
were expected to be feminist, prochoice, and socially liberal. Palin did not fall into any of 
these categories. She was a mother, a wife, and also an avid hunter, sportsman, outdoor 
enthusiast, and social conservative. She was quite popular among voters on the right, both 
male and female, and changed the way both sides of the aisle viewed what a woman in 
national office could mean. 
Kathleen Sebelius served as Kansas governor for two terms. In 2003 she was named one 
of Governing Magazine’s Public Officials of the Year, and in 2005 Time Magazine 
named her one of the Best Governors.721 In 2008 she was the Democratic respondent to 
the State of the Union Address. Soon after, she accepted President Barack Obama’s 
nomination for the position of Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services and continued to serve in this position until her resignation in April of 2014, 
officially ending her tenure in June of the same year.722
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Assessing the symbolic representation of female Governors and Premiers reveals several 
important findings. First, that their time in office had a significant impact not only on 
their female constituents, but also on other historically marginalized groups in their 
constituencies. Also, a number of the female leaders analyzed in this case study have 
received national recognition for their leadership achievements. This has allowed them to 
move on to more prominent positions after their governorship or premiership. Overall, 
the female leaders have demonstrated that women are diverse in their leadership 
ideologies and styles.  
This discussion of female executives shows that the gender of the official has little effect 
on the type or success of her policy agenda. Many external factors shape an official’s 
policy agenda, such as prior work history, educational background, type of office held, 
geographical location, and economic climate; gender does not appear to be among these 
noted factors. This lack of inclusion implies that it is not the ability of women to govern 
that is stopping women from holding office, but perhaps the perception of how women 
will govern that needs to change.
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Chapter 11: Conclusion: Finding the Common Themes 
In the twenty-first century, the world has seen the emergence of women into positions of 
power around the globe. Each of the case studies in this report seeks to analyze the 
countries, their respective female leaders, and political processes through three lenses: the 
descriptive, the substantive, and the symbolic. This chapter explores the common threads 
found across the case studies in these three areas. First, the descriptive analysis examines 
how the structure of the democratic governments can impede or encourage women’s 
political participation and what influences bring these women into executive roles across 
the case studies. Second, the substantive analysis assesses the commonalities and 
differences in the policymaking agendas of the women studied in the report. Third, the 
symbolic section evaluates the impact of having a female leader in the executive, in terms 
of their transformational power and their effect in dominant societal discourses. The last 
section contains a discussion of the main conclusions extracted from each area of the 
common themes analysis and emphasizes the major findings from the report. 
Descriptive Representation Analysis 
As described throughout the report, a descriptive representation analysis examines the 
institutional and contextual factors that have an impact on the number of female 
representatives and the attributes of women elected or appointed to decision-making 
positions.724 This descriptive analysis first looks into the specific political, social, and 
cultural structures of each examined country, including their differences, to understand 
how these structures impact women’s presence in decision-making positions. Next, it 
explores the specific nuances of each country’s election structure, power and influence of 
political parties, use of electoral quotas, and the role of women’s movements to examine 
the impact these factors have in a country’s success or failure at promoting women to the 
highest level of elected office. Finally, this analysis discusses the impact that previous 
women in power and the personal history of the women who have been elected has on the 
future of women seeking high office in the countries studied.  
Typically, women have entered the political arena through election to positions in the 
legislative branch before seeking to hold titles in the judiciary and executive branches; 
the case studies covered countries in this report are no exception. By linking the common 
themes from the individual descriptive analyses of the case studies in this report, we 
begin to see various ways in which different country’s characteristics interact to hinder or 
facilitate women’s access to executive office. By taking a cross-country look into the 
specific political structures, roles of women in social movements and in power, female 
presence in national cabinets, and the personal backgrounds of female leaders, the 
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question remains: how does women’s presence in the executive branch impact the nature 
of representation in modern democracies? 
Democracy and Government Body 
Democracy and the electoral process are crucial factors in the examination of female 
executives in the Americas. Our case studies explore the female executives, their political 
actions, and the governments of Canada, the United States of America, Mexico, Costa 
Rica, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. Across the seven countries the report examines, each 
one is practicing its own version of a democratic electoral system. In addition, each of 
these countries formed their democracy under different circumstances, at varying points 
in history, and with different structures of power within their government. Canada stands 
out because it is the only constitutional monarchy that was examined. In 1867, Canada 
enacted its constitution, making it an independently governing territory of the monarchy 
of Great Britain (the Crown). The monarchy remained intact for mostly ceremonial 
purposes, while the people formed the government that consists of a Parliament, House of 
Commons, Supreme Court, Governor General, and Prime Minister. The United States of 
America, established in 1776, possesses a similar democratic structure within its 
democratic republic. The government’s power is divided into three branches: the 
legislative (Senate and House of Representatives), the judicial (Supreme Court), and the 
executive (the President). The other countries we studied have a similar structure, with 
separation of powers and checks and balances, based on a Constitution that forms 
separate governmental branches and levels of government, and elects its representatives 
through direct elections.  
The most important commonality in these democracies is that the entire population of 
eligible voters elects each political executive—the country’s President, Prime Minister, or 
head of state. The key characteristic of a democracy as a structure of government is that it 
does not discriminate in its function. All of the examined democracies share the virtue 
that an official is elected solely as a representative of the needs, interests, and agenda of 
its constituency, not as a representative of the individual characteristics he or she 
possesses. Since the goal of this type of election is to choose one individual to represent 
an entire spectrum of peoples that are of different genders, races, and religious 
backgrounds, it is not possible for the chosen individual to possess all of the 
characteristics of each of its constituents at one time. Though a representative should 
share the political goals, ideals, and values of their constituency, they cannot represent all 
of the physical characteristics of the electorate. This electoral practice implies that each 
vote from a member of the constituency has equal weight to any other member’s vote. In 
addition, it is assumed that each member has equal access to seek a representative 
position. Yet, historically, men of the majority race and religious background have 
dominated the representative positions in the legislative and executive branches of 
government in the seven examined countries. 
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Electoral Formats and the Executive  
The way a country formats elections can play a significant role in what the path to power 
for women looks like. Certain systems, such as proportional representation, can provide a 
clearer path while others can produce a more difficult path for a minority group, such as 
women, to negotiate. While the governments of many of the countries discussed are 
structured in similar ways, the regulations for electing officials to power vary in small, 
yet significant, ways. Though voters elect the executives in each country, the process for 
deciding the winner of an election varies. Primarily, national direct vote is the most 
popular form; Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, and Brazil all determine the winner by popular 
vote, where each voter receives one vote and the candidate with the majority of votes 
wins, regardless of the margin. However, the United States and Canada each have 
variations on national voting standards in an effort to have a more representative election. 
The United States holds a national election but distributes a proportion of points to each 
state based on the proportion of the US population residing in that state. The candidate 
who wins the popular vote in each state is awarded all of the points for that state. The 
winner of the presidential election is decided based upon which candidate garners a 
majority of the points. Canada has the most unique proportional representative election, 
as each province elects its own representatives to the House of Commons by popular 
vote, and then the party with the most seats in the House nominates an elected party 
member to hold the Prime Minister’s seat. 
The differences in the type of representation that each country employs have been shown 
to impact the ease of access for a minority group to win an election. Studies show that the 
percentage of women in national parliaments can be traced back to the electoral system, 
with countries that employ proportional representation having a higher percentage than 
countries with majoritarian representation.
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 The differences in female representation in 
the United States and Canada serve as a fitting example for these conclusions: Canada’s 
parliament employs proportional representation and has seen female representation in the 
legislative branch increase at a pace significantly greater than that of the United States, 
which practices majoritarian elections. Proportional representation “is also associated 
with effective implementation of gender quota policies aimed at increasing the number of 
female candidates”
726
 and representatives. Thus, one would assume that increasing the 
number of women in Parliament would increase the number of the women chosen as 
Prime Minister, since the only candidates for the position are chosen from within the 
Parliament. However, this assumption has not proven true. While women have increased 
greatly in number in the Canadian House, only one woman—Kim Campbell—has been 
selected from this pool as a candidate for Prime Minister. She was appointed by a retiring 
Prime Minister and only held the office for less than four months until a new election was 
                                                 




called. The limited timeframe of her administration left little room for her to have a 
substantive impact on the country.  
Political Parties and Campaigns 
The final, and most intricately varied, component of the governmental structure and 
electoral format to consider is the power and regulation of political parties and the 
structure of campaigns. Not all seven of the countries studied allow political parties the 
same amount of power and influence. The countries examined fell into one of two 
categories: governments that were dominated by a small number of powerful parties and 
governments that had many, weak political parties. In countries where political parties 
have substantial influence, the diversity of candidates in terms of gender is greatly in the 
hands of the parties, as is the success of a specific candidate. Prominent party members 
are often responsible for choosing a candidate for the ballot that best represents the needs 
and interests of members themselves, often above the greater needs and interests of the 
party and its constituency. 
The United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Chile are all countries that have 
long histories of two or three strong, ruling parties or coalitions that have dominated 
elections. This type of party structure means that the groups of individuals behind the 
parties themselves retain most of the selection power in determining the candidates who 
appear on the ballots. However, in Canada and Brazil, the political parties are plentiful, 
often passing off majority power from one to another in each election. As evidenced by 
the significant rise of female representation in the Canadian parliament, but a much 
slower increase in female representation in the United States, the influence of the political 
parties is apparent. Canada’s parties are individually weak and thus are easier for women 
to “break into” and make a name for themselves, while the parties in the United States are 
few and strong, making rising through the ranks much more difficult.  
Traditionally, political parties have been composed of wealthy, powerful, privileged men, 
especially in the upper echelons. These “boys’ clubs” are the powerhouses that decide 
whose name appears on the ballot, determine where the money flows, and decide how 
much media support a candidate receives. As within the international business sector, the 
prominence and power of men in political parties has created a “glass ceiling” that 
women, as well as other minority groups, must break through to become a part of these 
important discussions. However, unless a powerful party supports gender diversity and is 
therefore more likely to have gender diversity, the most common way to become a 
member of such a “club” and to be invited to the important discussions is to win an 
election and become a powerful political player. Yet, without the support of a major 
political party, winning the seat is significantly more difficult. As a result, female 
candidates are largely stuck in a situation where they cannot win. Gaining election will 
typically require the support of a political party, however that support is not likely to be 
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provided unless a female candidate can prove her potential to the party by winning 
election.  
This male-dominated party structure has an impact on the way candidates are funded and 
viewed by the public. In a country like the United States, where party is power, funding 
can come to a candidate through multiple channels: individual donors, the party 
campaign funds, and large donations from corporations and organizations that give 
blanket support to all candidates of one party. In these cases, national political power can 
have an impact on even small, local elections because of the involvement of the party’s 
national agenda (which can also be driven by the political agenda of nationwide donors). 
Conversely, countries like Canada have many parties vying for funding which enables 
individual donors to have a more noticeable influence on elections by donating to their 
chosen candidates. 
Funding distribution impacts women who choose to run, as the likelihood of being 
outspent in an election by a male counterpart increases significantly if the women are not 
supported and backed by a major political party. Consequences of being outspent include 
the better-funded candidate having more access to media outlets, screen and print 
advertisements, national endorsements, and expansive campaigns that include increased 
Internet presence, polling, and fundraising from private donors. These campaign 
advantages often result in the public being more familiar with the better-funded 
candidate, who can easily overshadow another candidate without access to comparable 
funds. Women who run on independent or lesser-known party tickets are also less likely 
to be capable of matching the spending capability of a top national party. Thus, in 
countries dominated by strong political parties, women must rise to the top of one of the 
more influential parties to have access to the necessary funds to win an election, while in 
countries with more competitive political parties funding is more evenly distributed and 
women can find a position more easily.  
Women’s Movements 
Women’s movements in the case studies varied between and within each country. While 
at times influenced by international events such as the Beijing Conference in 1995, the 
struggles of each movement were marked by specific political, social, and economic 
contexts that made each of them unique. Yet, the case studies illustrate some salient 
common themes regarding women’s movements in the Americas such as their dynamism 
and diversity, the tensions between and within these movements, and their relations with 
“formal” politics. 
Women’s movements did not start with suffrage and did not stop after obtaining it. For 
example, during the 1880s and 1890s, women in Canada formed the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union to demand the prohibition of alcohol, and in Chile women were 
fighting for inclusion in the political system. Furthermore, after the right to vote was 
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granted to women in almost every country in the Americas, some women’s movements 
continued to fight for the betterment of society in times of economic distress (Central 
America and Mexico) and against human rights’ violations (Argentina, Chile, and 
Brazil). Now, women’s movements have become more concerned with diversity along 
social classes and ethnic lines (Brazil). What the case studies show is that women’s 
movements go beyond formal politics and that they fight for and against several causes. 
One of the most important lessons provided by the cases in this report is the assessment 
of women’s movements as heterogeneous and dynamic rather than uniform and static. 
The case studies in this report illustrate that the increase of women’s participation in 
“formal” politics has not lacked tensions and conflicts within the movements. Such 
conflicts were especially evident in South America, where the redemocratization 
processes brought the institutionalization of women’s movements. In Chile, such 
institutionalization provoked a sharp division between women fighting inside the 
“formal” political structure and those who decided to stay away from it. Similarly, in 
1982, Brazil’s redemocratization process institutionalized women’s movements and 
brought feminist activism into the new state, such as with the creation of women police 
stations. As in Chile’s case, the institutionalization of women’s movements generated 
tension between individuals “inside” the system, and those who chose to stay “outside.” 
Women’s movements that decided to act within the larger political structure pushed for 
the institutionalization of women’s issues and to position their demands on the agenda. 
Women’s movements that endured “outside” the political structure remained independent 
from the state, and thus maintained their critical view of state policies. Ultimately, these 
tensions reflect a larger philosophical and political stance on whether women’s 
movements should remain independent from the state to better advocate for and denounce 
women’s issues, or whether women’s movements’ agendas should be taken into the state 
to advance women’s rights.  
Finally, the case studies identified several factors of underrepresentation that go beyond 
the institutional and formal granting of rights within the legal structures. What this 
reflects is that there are larger political and sociocultural contexts, including societal 
roles, inflexible workplace structures, inadequate policies, cultural norms, and religious 
beliefs that impede women’s access to power. Ultimately, the case studies in this report 
reaffirm not only the absolute need to have strong women’s movements to advance 
women’s living conditions, equality, and access to both elected and appointed positions 
in the political arena, but also the need to strengthen democracy, to have more equal 
societies, and to guarantee that gender issues are included in the policy agenda.  
Personal Histories 
The case studies analyzed women’s careers, mentors, socioeconomic and educational 
backgrounds, and their political ties. While the female leaders’ trajectories vary widely 
(from Chinchilla’s experience as a well-known international consultant, to Bachelet’s and 
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Rousseff’s opposition to dictatorships in their respective countries), a look into their 
personal histories allows for a better understanding of how their personal experiences and 
background have impacted their priorities while in office and the way they govern. 
Dictatorships in the Southern Cone profoundly marked the lives and administrations of 
the female Presidents on ideological grounds. Their convictions regarding human rights’ 
violations, their countries’ relations with the United States, and their positions regarding 
social and economic policy also appear to have been impacted by these leaders’ 
experiences with dictatorship. 
In our analysis of the “mentors” of the female leaders, we found through the case studies 
that the significance of the “mentors” and even the term itself might not be appropriate. 
While most of the women had a strong relationship with their predecessor and served in 
their predecessor’s administrations before becoming presidents themselves, most of these 
relationships changed when female leaders came into power, with the exemplary case 
being that of Chinchilla with Óscar Arias in Costa Rica. But, is this experience different 
from what men have done to get to power? To achieve power, female leaders must have 
political connections, just as their male counterparts do. The term “mentor,” then, does 
not always apply as much as the concept of a supporting political connection or group. 
That being said, what stands out is that all of the so-called mentors in the report were all 
male figures. On the one hand, this trend could raise the question of why more women 
are not supporting other women’s access to power. On the other hand, the trend is more 
likely to be a reflection of a continuing lack of female figures in key decision-making 
positions. 
Critics of female leaders have highlighted the fact that the majority of women in power 
come from privileged backgrounds, with access to education and informal and/or formal 
political ties; thus, the critics have questioned the capacity of these female leaders to 
represent women in their respective countries. While the women in the case studies do 
predominantly come from such backgrounds, it is also true that the same can be said 
about male leaders in power. Women getting to office might share the same social and 
economic backgrounds as men; however, men’s capacity to adequately represent the 
societies they govern is not frequently pointed out or addressed. 
When looking at women’s histories across the case studies, one overarching conclusion 
related to the nature of the political system and how to address representation emerges. 
Women must be included in decision-making positions and processes because they are 
part of society, just as their male counterparts; if female leaders only come from upper 
and upper-middle classes, or have had male “mentors,” the problem does not lie on the 
kind of women being elected, but on the unequal sociopolitical context that continues to 
prevent equal and full access for all citizens into the political systems.  
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Women in Power and Quotas 
While the various countries studied appear to be in quite different stages of progress in 
regards to electoral gender quotas and women holding political power, a few overall 
themes can be drawn from the research. These themes range from discussing the point at 
which women’s representation in politics began to rise, to the overall numbers of women 
holding office.  
For the Latin American countries especially, the transition to a democratic form of 
government can be identified as the point at which women’s political representation 
begins to increase. The understanding of a democratic form of government is that it 
should be reflective of its citizens, whereas no such premise exists under a dictatorship. 
As a result, citizens in a democratic society possess the ability to raise concerns when the 
promise of representation that is reflective of the people is not kept. In Chile, for 
example, women played critical roles during the dictatorship but were not fully integrated 
into the politicalsystem, where the norm was for men to hold political office. With the 
creation of Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM) in 1988 and the transition to 
democracy in 1990, however, women were able to channel their demands through formal 
institutions (like SERNAM) and force the government to address the issue of few women 
holding elective office, ultimately leading to more women becoming elected officials. 
Though women have faced barriers to being elected, women’s representation in politics 
appears to be on the rise overall in each of the countries studied. As previously noted, 
democratic forms of government are at their best when the individuals holding elective 
office reflect the general citizenry across varying dimensions, including gender. This rise 
therefore not only provides encouragement to women seeking office, but also improves 
government—a government for the people is one that is run by the people. The inclusion 
of electoral quotas, the deployment and systems for which varied significantly across the 
countries compared, has had a great impact on the trajectory of women as government 
representatives in the democracies examined. Quotas have been established in some 
democracies around the world in different forms in an effort to achieve parity (equitable 
gender representation) in elected bodies. The implementation of these quotas, in many 
cases, has led to greater female representation in elections, but not always in greater 
representation in the outcome of these elections. One definitive finding regarding gender 
quotas is that countries that have chosen not to implement any form of formalized gender 
intervention have seen much slower growth in female representation than those that have. 
Regardless of what stage a country is in with regard to electoral quotas, it can be 
observed that when a woman holds the executive position, an increased presence of other 
women in her cabinet has been noted when compared to male executives. For example, in 
the first term of President Bachelet of Chile, more women were appointed to the 
presidential cabinet than ever before. Moreover, Bachelet appointed women to 
traditionally masculine positions, including the portfolios of Defense, Economy, Labor, 
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and Mining. The effects of these appointments are of significance, regardless of the 
intention behind appointing a larger number of women to cabinet positions than male 
executives typically do. The result is that the representative aspect of a democracy has 
pervaded a part of government that is usually dominated by the person in the executive 
position. This extension of representation into the executive cabinet serves to ensure 
these bodies remain reflective of the general population, not of the elected individual. 
Overall, however, more women tend to occupy second-tier cabinet positions in countries 
where they exist, such as in Canada, where 62% of women who have ever served in the 
Ministry of the Crown have held Minister of State positions. Ministers of State are not the 
heads of specific portfolios; instead, individuals with this title serve underneath 
Secretaries of State and are subsequently less prestigious positions. By relegating women 
to these lower-level positions the majority of the time, Prime Ministers appear to send a 
message that women are unfit to hold more prominent positions in executive cabinets 
despite increasing numbers of women in high-level elected office. As the first-tier cabinet 
positions also comprise most of the masculine portfolios like finance and defense, women 
remain confined to so-called feminine portfolios such as health and education, reinforcing 
gendered notions of the necessary qualifications for being appointed to certain cabinet 
positions. With gendered notions in place, women will continue to be analyzed first and 
foremost by their gender, instead of in the broader context of skills and experience. 
Substantive Representation Analysis 
According to Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo, in the study of women’s representation, 
substantive research refers to “whether women seek or are able to promote women’s 
issues once they are elected to political office.”
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 In other words, substantive 
representation examines if women in power try and are able to make a difference in the 
lives of other women. Therefore, in its essence, substantive representation is related to the 
construction of policy agendas. This section seeks to highlight common themes in women 
leaders’ social, economic, and foreign policies. Additionally, the section considers 
whether or not these policies promote women’s issues. 
The methodology of this section brought about certain challenges. The themes follow the 
approach laid out in Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter’s Leftist Governments in Latin 
America.
728
 In the book, Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter focus on the rise of leftist 
governments in Latin America, examining several countries as their case studies. Their 
gender-neutral analysis of each country’s administration is divided into three policies 
areas: social, economic, and foreign affairs. Utilizing this framework, the information for 
this section is drawn from the case studies we researched in this report. In the case 
studies, if a country had a female chief executive, the study focuses on the executive; if a 
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country did not, the study focuses on a selection of governors. Because the Mexico case 
study focuses on governors, there was no significant foreign policy material. The United 
States and Canada have also only had governors and premiers; consequently, there is a 
limited amount of foreign policy material available for those case studies. Despite this, 




The 1990s mark a pivotal period for gender policies. International attention to gender-
focused issues, combined with domestic pressures from female voters, propelled the need 
to incorporate women’s issues into public policy. This movement required governments 
to publicly acknowledge women’s issues and find ways to integrate these in their policy 
agendas.  
The United Nations spearheaded strategies to promote gender equality at all levels of 
government. The concept of gender mainstreaming, which embeds gender equality issues 
into all policies, was introduced as an instrument to promote gender equality in the 1995 
Beijing Platform for Action. Gender mainstreaming provided practical ways for 
governments to consider women in their policies. The primary goal of gender 
mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.  
A majority of the female leaders studied utilized this strategy to integrate gender equality 
issues into broader social policies and programs that target women. Interestingly, it was 
these leaders’ male predecessors who first implemented these policies. Thus, gender 
mainstreaming is not distinctive of the way in which female leaders incorporate women’s 
issues into public policy; male leaders also utilize this strategy. At this point, it is clear 
that government leaders, whether female or male, are obligated to include gender issues 
in their agendas, and gender mainstreaming has proven a feasible strategy to do so. 
Early female leaders focused on promoting women’s rights through social policies. The 
case studies demonstrate that this is still the case. It is important, however, to discern that 
there are inextricable links between social and economic policies. The female presidents 
studied have made poverty reduction, violence against women, and family-oriented 
programs key aspects of their respective social agendas. As mentioned before, their 
predecessors first implemented many of these policies, but the fact that female leaders 
subsequently promoted them may have been the reason why they were continued, or in 
some cases, even expanded. In addition, some female leaders chose to incorporate more 




Poverty reduction has been a focal point of social policies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, and the United States. Unfortunately, women are disproportionately affected by 
poverty. Women represent about half the world’s populations yet constitute 70% of the 
people living in poverty.
729
 Because of this, the United Nations has urged governments to 
implement poverty reduction programs into social and economic policies. The female 
leaders studied have sought to combat poverty through the implementation of policies 
focused on unemployment, cash transfers, affordable housing projects, and other social 
development programs.  
Poverty reduction programs can positively impact women’s lives, especially when they 
contain explicit gender-equality components. In Argentina, Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner implemented by presidential decree the Universal Child Allowance (Asignación 
Universal por Hijo, or AUH) in late 2009. Specifically, it was created for children and 
adolescents from unemployed families, from families working in the informal sector, or 
whose parents are domestic workers earning less than the minimum living wage. The 
AUH provides a monthly cash allowance, subject to health and school attendance checks. 
Beginning in May 2011, coverage was further extended to pregnant women (after 
reaching the third month of pregnancy) working in the informal economy. President 
Bachelet has also integrated gendered elements into employment policies. Bachelet 
passed legislation to guarantee that women and men receive equal wages for the same 
jobs. Reducing poverty through cash transfer programs was a key component of the 
social policies in Argentina and Brazil. Jefes y Jefas de Hogar, Familias, and the AUH in 
Argentina as well as Bolsa Familia in Brazil are cash-transfer programs that provide 
welfare services to low-income families. Female leaders, such as Governor Barbara 
Roberts of Oregon and Presidents Rousseff and Fernández de Kirchner, also tend to 
integrate affordable housing programs into their social policies. In Mexico, female 
governors have supported poverty-mitigating measures through a variety of 
unemployment and infrastructure projects. 
These policies have clear benefits for women, but they also have implicit and profound 
effects on families in general. The poverty-reduction programs implemented by the 
female leaders help women provide the basic necessities for their families. Often, we 
observed that these poverty reduction and economic empowerment policies were 
complemented with education and family-oriented policies. 
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Education and Family Policy 
Scholars have noted that educating women is “instrumental in raising the health and 
educational standards” of communities.
730
 Recently, scholars studied the effects of 
maternal education on children’s outcomes. They concluded that mothers that achieved 
higher levels of education had healthier children that performed better academically than 
children of uneducated mothers.
731
 This research resulted in scholars pushing politicians 
to center their family-oriented policies on maternal literacy and education. Despite this 
research, a number of family policies focus primarily on early childhood development. 
Both female and male politicians argue that ensuring every child has equal access to 
health services and education will guarantee that mothers are able to provide adequate 
support to their children regardless of their class background.  
The leaders used a combination of policies focused on educational access and economic 
programs to increase positive outcomes for children. Canadian Premier Christy Clark’s 
administration recently implemented the Families First program, which focused on 
increasing job creation, civic engagement, and tax credits for families. Former Governor 
of Oregon Barbara Roberts concentrated on helping low-income families, by increasing 
the number of children enrolled in Head Start and the number of welfare-to-work 
transition programs throughout the state. In Chile, Bachelet implemented Chile Crece 
Contigo, a program centered on early childhood development and physical education for 
children up to fourth grade. Additionally, former Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco 
expanded prekindergarten access to all children. And, as mentioned above, President 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner implemented the Universal Child Allowance (AUH), 
which provides monthly cash benefits to mothers on the condition that their children 
attend school and meet health requirements.   
Explicit Gender Agenda  
Although a majority of female leaders used gender mainstreaming to promote gender 
equality, a number of the leaders studied also advanced explicit gender agendas. As 
females, these leaders gained the trust of their constituents especially because of the 
unique gender lens they bring to gender issues. Women can also have higher repute, and 
therefore can have more success, in driving explicit gender agendas. Female leaders with 
explicit gender agendas took on issues primarily faced by women or the LGBTQ 
community. The areas they tend to focus on are violence against women, sexual 
orientation, and reproductive rights. 
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Violence against Women 
Violence against women is a global phenomenon and is prevalent in all the countries 
examined in the case studies. Although violence against women has always been an 
issue, it wasn’t until recently that it began to be included explicitly on public policy 
agendas. A recent report published by the UN contends that because there are 57 million 
more women than men in the world, it is important that their issues become the priorities 
of politicians worldwide.
732
 A policy implemented to reduce the incidence of violence 
against women is one example of an explicit gender agenda used by politicians, be they 
female or male.  
Preventing and eradicating violence against women is a key social policy area for many 
of the female leaders studied, such as those in represented in the Mexico and Chile case 
studies. Mexican governors Griselda Álvarez, Amalia García, and Ivonne Ortega 
advocated for measures to be taken to reduce violence against women. García was an 
active proponent for increasing criminal penalties for perpetrators of violence toward 
women. In Chile, Bachelet’s Proyecto de ley sobre Femicidio has introduced criminal 
penalties for perpetrators of women’s homicide. Additional services, such as domestic 
abuse shelters and medical attention, are provided to victims of violence in these 
countries. Female leaders in Mexico and Chile have raised awareness of issues 
concerning domestic violence and sexual assault. As a result, governments have been 
prompted to increase resources dedicated to preventing violence and providing services 
to victims. 
LGBTQ and Reproductive Rights 
The majority of the explicit gender agendas utilized by female leaders in the case studies 
focused on LGBTQ or reproductive rights. For example, in the United States former 
Governors Christine O’Grady Gregoire and Jeanne Shaheen added “sexual orientation” 
and “sexual identity” as protected classes for antidiscrimination laws. Gregoire also 
granted gay and lesbian couples marriage rights in 2007. President Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner implemented similar policies. In 2010, she passed a law that legalized same-sex 
marriage and gave same-sex couples inheritance and adoption rights. Additionally, she 
enacted a law that granted individuals the right to choose their gender and have that 
gender legally recognized in official government documents.  
Abortion is considered the banner issue of reproductive rights and was a controversial 
policy issue in Costa Rica and Mexico. In Mexico, former Governor Rosario Robles, a 
self-proclaimed feminist, implemented “Robles Law,” which decriminalized abortions on 
the grounds of congenital defects and required district attorneys to approve abortion for 
                                                 




cases of rape. In Costa Rica, President Laura Chinchilla publicly opposed abortion. She 
strongly supported Costa Rica’s restrictive abortion laws, which stipulate that abortions 
are only legal when the mother’s health is at risk.  
Chinchilla took a different approach than the majority of women studied who 
implemented social policies focused on women’s equality. In addition to opposing 
abortion, she also opposed same-sex marriage throughout her presidency. Chinchilla 
contended that her stance on these issues is based on adherence to Catholic Church values 
and public opinion. Chinchilla illustrates that gender agendas do not always advocate for 
increased rights for women.  
The female leaders’ decision to concentrate on LGBTQ rights is one example of scholars’ 
argument that female politicians are more likely than their male counterparts to prioritize 
issues of concern to marginalized groups. As a result, some scholars stated that electing 




Overall, we found that female leaders were not more likely than men to advance gender 
agendas in the area of social policy. Female leaders were more likely to attend to the 
needs of marginalized groups. The increased awareness of the correlation between 
adequate access to social services and education for women and positive outcomes for 
children has led to all politicians regardless of gender, concentrating on women’s issues.  
Economic Policy  
Political portfolios including enterprise, finance and economic affairs have historically 
been reserved for males as they rely on traditionally held notions of hard, or masculine, 
leadership skills.
734
 After examining the economic initiatives of the female leaders 
studied it is clear that gender is not, by itself, indicative of the type of policies 
implemented or their success.  
Of the female leaders studied, most of their fiscal policies addressed the delicate interplay 
between maintaining healthy financial conditions and providing adequate support and 
assistance to citizens. It should be noted that because the female leaders studied assumed 
office in differing economic conditions, finding salient common themes proved difficult. 
Whereas some of the countries were enjoying economic prosperity, others were working 
diligently to control national debt and inflation and manage limited resources. Even still, 
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we were able to conclude that many of these executives used economic policies to 
catalyze social change and remained committed to their economic initiatives despite 
public criticism. In addition, almost invariably across all of the case studies we found a 
strong commitment to transparency and to decreasing national corruption.  
Achieving Social Progress through Economic Initiatives  
Across the case studies, a deep connection existed between social objectives and 
economic initiatives. Many of the female leaders utilized economic policy to drive social 
change. In particular, Dilma Rousseff’s implementation of policies such as Minha Casa 
Minha Vida, which built more than 1 million homes for low-income families, and the 
creation of the More Jobs Portal, which created 1.2 million jobs in 2012, helped alleviate 
poverty in Brazil. She contributed a sizable portion of the domestic budget toward social 
welfare programs. In Chile, during her first administration, Michelle Bachelet utilized 
economic growth to protect citizens from the negative consequences of international 
economic crises and advancing social programs, thereby creating a better state-citizen 
relationship. Likewise, Mexican governor Rosario Robles focused on funneling economic 
gains in order to meet the needs of citizens in the Federal District and to improve overall 
quality of life.  
Is the connection between social progress and economic initiatives gendered? The 
women leaders in this report developed a relationship between social progress and 
economic initiatives, clearly—does this seem surprising? Again, though economic policy 
is largely dependent upon the state of the economy when a leader comes to power, we 
have seen the women leaders carve out resources to help those marginalized, specifically 
through creating new policies similar to the one described above by Rousseff. 
Nonetheless, further research is needed in order to conclude if the prevalence of this type 
of connection is higher when women are in office. 
Addressing Controversy  
Other elements of the economic agendas of the women we studied proved more 
controversial. In Argentina, one of the primary foci of Fernández de Kirchner’s economic 
policy was controlling Argentina’s growing inflation problem. She implemented strong-
armed policies aimed at freezing current good costs while severely restricting the 
purchase of international goods. Even though her economic policies were controversial 
and hurt her approval ratings, she showed no signs of altering her agenda. In a similar 
manner, former Governor of New Jersey, Christine Todd Whitman, made headlines when 
she eliminated entire government departments while implementing massive tax cuts. 
Amidst harsh criticism, Whitman also remained unwavering. 
Do women typically remain resolute when faced with such criticism? Is a gender 
difference in leadership style present? In the past, research has found women tend to have 
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a “soft” leadership style that consists of “cooperation, influence, and empowerment,” 
whereas men focus on “hierarchy, dominance, and order.”
735
 Our research on women 
leaders appears to negate those claims. The women leaders studied displayed an 
unwillingness to compromise when their economic policies came under fire. Their 
resolution is proof that there are women leaders who display hard leadership skills that 
have historically characterized male leadership. Moreover, the research indicates women 
take on a wide array of leadership styles and that they cannot be pigeonholed into a 
single, gendered dimension. 
Anticorruption Efforts 
Across almost all of the administrations studied, decreasing corruption was a high 
priority. Scholars have found through empirical research that women are less likely to 
condone corruption and less likely to become entangled in bribery, and that the presence 
of women in government leads to lower levels of corruption.
736
 Other scholars have 
qualified this notion, implying that context and feasibility concerns are the primary 
indicators of corruption levels.
737
 While researching the female leaders’ economic 
policies, we found that several of them employed varying strategies to decrease 
governmental dishonesty and increase transparency.  
In the case of Brazil, the efforts to decrease corruption were widely effective. Rousseff 
separated herself completely from corruption. She avoided becoming involved with the 
allegations surrounding her predecessor and even fired cabinet officials who were 
accused of bribery and fraud. In addition, Rousseff implemented several successful 
anticorruption initiatives including the Freedom of Information Act and the Clean 
Companies Act. Rousseff’s commitment to transparency sharply contrasted with previous 
Brazilian presidents who were mired in scandal.  
In Chile, Bachelet implemented the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law, 
which has a strong emphasis on accountability and increased public participation in 
government, while garnering international praise. Conversely, in Costa Rica, Laura 
Chinchilla’s efforts at increasing transparency were largely unsuccessful due to the 
scandals in her administration. In addition, other economic reforms created by 
Chinchilla’s administration failed to pass because of distrust surrounding her character. In 
essence, from the leaders studied we have seen myriad approaches and outcomes in 
dealing with corruption and transparency. But what would we expect to see from these 
women leaders? 
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Historically, women have been thought of as paragons of purity and honesty, essentially 
devoid of corruption. These stereotypes have played out in history, and many women 
have used them to their advantage; Chinchilla constantly referred to her feminine traits 
and how they would make her a solid leader. Nevertheless, she did not rule in a one-
dimensional manner, solely exhibiting traditionally feminine characteristics. Juxtaposing 
the results of these anticorruption and transparency efforts across Brazil, Chile, and Costa 
Rica showed that gender is not closely tied to levels of corruption. Instead, our analysis 
indicates power has the ability to corrupt any leader, and women are not immune to that 
corruption. 
Foreign Policy 
Reviewing the leaders’ foreign policy initiatives, there are two main conclusions. The 
first is that the leaders often pursued trade agreements to foster more economic 
opportunities. The second is that the leaders acted as strong advocates in contentious 
international disputes. Ultimately, with both trade agreements and international disputes, 
there was no discernible difference between how a male leader would have acted and 
how the female leaders acted.  
Trade 
The female leaders of this report successfully used trade agreements to further their 
countries’ or states’ growth. This can be seen in the United States, Brazil, Chile, and 
Costa Rica. In the United States, for example, Governor Kathleen Blanco met with 
former Cuban President Fidel Castro to negotiate a trade agreement in 2005. Cuba 
ultimately agreed to purchase $2 million worth of goods from Louisiana companies. 
Although Blanco was a governor and not a national executive, she pursued a 
controversial trade agreement for economic development purposes. In Brazil, despite a 
tense economic situation, President Rousseff focused on trade policies to ensure that 
there was a trade surplus. To do so, Rousseff increased trade with the European Union. 
Clearly, both Blanco and Rousseff had distinct goals with their trade initiatives. 
Female leaders in Chile and Costa Rica focused on boosting trade as a whole. In Chile, 
Bachelet signed a number of agreements on free trade with regional neighbors as well as 
partners abroad. Between 2006 and 2010, Chile signed ten free trade agreements to 
pursue Chile’s growth strategy. In her quest to expand and diversify Costa Rica’s 
economy, Chinchilla focused on trade. Currently, Costa Rica has the most foreign direct 
investment in Central America. Chinchilla signed an Association Agreement with the 
European Commission as well as a declaration of intent to join the Pacific Alliance (a 
trade bloc including Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). These four leaders focused on 
trade to increase economic development, whether it was by focusing on an issue or 
agreement or trying to increase levels of trade overall. 
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From our conclusions thus far, we found that female leaders often used economic policy 
initiatives to fund social policy. If the pattern of using economic initiatives to fund social 
goals holds with respect to international trade, how would we expect that to become 
manifest? First, leaders could incorporate social aspects in the trade agreements. This 
could determine requirements about what type of firm was eligible to participate. 
Secondly, we could see the leaders pursuing trade agreements for certain industries that 
would benefit domestic social initiatives. However, there is no indication of either of 
these in the trade agreements. Likely, this is due to the international dynamics. With 
domestic policy, there is the opportunity for intertwined objectives as the leaders have 
authority to enact policy on any number of issues. With trade agreements, the leaders 
have no authority over the other country involved. Given this, leaders do not seem to be 
using trade agreements to fund social policies in the same way that they use domestic 
economic initiatives to do so.  
Another area that we would expect to differ for female executives is related to cultural 
perceptions about women and their roles. When these female leaders’ structure and sign 
trade agreements, they are representatives of their respective countries. As these 
representatives interact with different cultures with varying expectations about women, 
what can we observe? Our research has not shown that cultural expectations were a 
barrier to successfully engaging in long-term, collegial trade relationship. The women 
were able to implement a great number of trade agreements with a variety of partners. 
Overall, trade was an area of great success for the leaders. 
Ultimately, we would expect to see male leaders engage with trade in a similar way. 
Leaders of both genders pursue trade agreements in order to further economic 
development goals. This is logical, considering that most countries’ leaders strive to 
increase economic opportunity for their citizens and trade is a primary way to achieve 
that goal. Even years after the recent financial crisis, many countries are still recovering. 
Increased economic activity, and the increased jobs that often come with that prosperity, 
are vital in policy agendas across the board. We conclude that women and men are both 
likely to pursue trade as a means to further economic prosperity.  
International Disputes 
The female leaders have also steered their countries through contentious international 
issues and acted as advocates on the international stage. In these cases, the issues have 
been longstanding, but the female leaders have responded to them strongly. In Argentina, 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has been a vocal advocate of Argentina’s 
sovereignty claim over the Falkland Islands (a British territory). After her election, she 
sent an open letter to the British Prime Minister stating that Britain was violating a 
United Nations resolution, and sought negotiations to hand over the islands back to 
Argentina. This is a long-standing and contentious dispute, but Fernández de Kirchner 
has actively pursued Argentina’s interests. While the issue is not resolved, she has 
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ensured that the Falklands/Malvinas issue receives constant media coverage and 
Argentina’s claim is not forgotten.  
In another example, Costa Rica and Nicaragua have an enduring land dispute, regarding 
an area on the Atlantic Coast called Isla Calero. After Nicaraguan troops were sent to the 
area in 2010, Costa Rica gave Nicaragua forty-eight hours to leave the area and put their 
police force on the border. Chinchilla referred the issue to the United Nation’s 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). She argued that Costa Rica was acting to preserve the 
ecosystem of the area and wanted the issue resolved without violence. In the end, the ICJ 
ruled in favor of Costa Rica. Chinchilla was successful at handling the dispute; she acted 
quickly and decisively. 
It is interesting to examine these leaders’ actions in light of traditional assumptions about 
female leadership. In this report, we have referenced Michael Genovese’s traditional 
notions of leadership. The female style of leadership is “characterized by a soft style of 
cooperation, influence, and empowerment.”
738
 In negotiations, we do not see the female 
leaders exhibiting traditional female characteristics of leadership; in fact, they are 
aggressive, resolute, and do not recoil from using force.  
In addition to traditional gender assumptions about leadership, women are not as often at 
the table in international negotiations. In a Harvard Law Program on Negotiation piece, 
one author notes that in the non-Western world, “women face the daunting challenge of 
winning a place at the negotiating table in the first place.” UN Women has noted that 
women are underrepresented in major negotiations worldwide.
739
 The women in this 
report are at the negotiating table due to their elected executive position. Likely, there are 
many different assumptions about how the leaders’ behavior will be different due to their 
gender. However, we see no indication of a different response due to gender. 
Overall, gender does not seem to play a major role in the foreign policy arena. With 
trade, leaders of either gender do not have the opportunity or authority to integrate 
agendas as they do domestically. Therefore, leaders of both genders pursue economic 
goals that are not integrated with social goals. In major dispute negotiations, the issues 
are largely determined by circumstance. Leaders’ decisions are about how to respond to 
issues that rise to prominence or are revived. Given this, leaders of both genders respond 
in similar ways. 
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Symbolic Representation Analysis 
The election of a woman as the head of state is typically surrounded by considerable 
fanfare. Pundits predict that the event signifies a paradigm shift in which women and 
other minorities will be treated more fairly and have better access to opportunities. There 
is a gleeful and resounding sentiment that the election of a woman means something for 
women and other minorities. Implicit in this meaning are two key assumptions: First, that 
women in power will cater specifically to the needs of women and other minorities and 
will build a policy agenda that focuses on equality; and second, that the sheer symbolic 
power of a female leader, regardless of an equality-centered agenda, will have a positive 
impact on the daily lives of women, girls, people of color, the poor, and other 
marginalized groups. Put more simply, there is a well-worn assumption that women in 
power will actively and symbolically transform the social and economic structure of 
society to make it a better place for all minority groups. This section of the report 
evaluates the validity of that sentiment. 
Beyond her sociopolitical context, party background, personality, career, and agenda, an 
analysis of female leadership adds the gender element in order to show a more complete 
picture. This “gender” lens overlays all other characterizations of all female leaders. As 
Sykes suggests, the archetypal leadership of the “Iron Lady” brings into question the role 
of gender in leadership.
740
 Do “Iron Ladies” have “masculine” leadership techniques 
because we need to see female leaders as masculine in order to better imagine them as 
leaders, or is it because women with more masculine leadership attributes are more 
successful leaders? If the latter is true, then how do we assess female leadership that is 
characterized broadly in “feminine” language? More to the point, how do we typify 
leadership like that of Angela Merkel or Dilma Rousseff, which have been characterized 
as both masculine and feminine but not necessarily androgynous? 
Gendered Notions of Leadership  
This report addresses the question of whether women govern differently. In this 
endeavor, the authors of this report have attempted to establish how a selection of 
powerful women has governed. A significant obstacle during this process has been that 
women’s leadership continues to be analyzed according to a gender binary that is more 
informative of culturally constructed expectations of femininity than it is about women’s 
leadership. A gendered concept of leadership implies that a leader’s styles and strategies 
of management, negotiation, and problem resolution are all related to whether that leader 
is male or female. There is an assumption that male and female leaders have different 
leadership styles that correspond to traditional notions of masculinity and femininity. 
Given that political leadership is traditionally designated as a masculine sphere, this 
gender lens is invisible in the analysis of men’s leadership style precisely because it is 
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normative. It is only when women subvert this norm and assume leadership positions that 
gendered leadership analysis enters political discourse.  
As a result of the increasing number of female political leaders, feminine adjectives have 
been added to the dialogue of leadership analysis. Because feminine adjectives, such as 
“maternal,” already have marginalizing connotations, female leaders are analyzed with 
descriptive words that echo their historically depoliticized social positions. While some 
women in politics fit comfortably and consistently in this “feminine” box, others 
challenge the expectations of how women should lead, and commentators use the 
classifications “androgynous” and “style-flexing” to explain these behaviors. Female 
leaders who are perceived to combine feminine and masculine styles are described as 
androgynous.
741
 Those who display masculine notions of leadership and continue to 
display femininity through style of dress or behavior, or vice versa, are considered to be 
engaging in style-flexing.
742
 Political analysts suggest that female leaders feel compelled 
to cultivate a leadership style that mimics traditional notions of male strength in order to 
gain respect from their political peers and confidence from their electorate.
743
 Implicit in 
this discussion is the idea that these characteristics are inherently male, and that a woman 
is transgressing a natural expectation by exhibiting them.  
A key example of this gendered notion of leadership is the “Iron Lady” trope that has 
been used to describe any female head of state who exercises power and authority, 
ranging from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. This characterization identifies these 
female leaders as anomalies. An “Iron Lady” is not the personification of a woman that 
society regards as appropriately feminine. The term implies that the female leader is 
inherently different from her electorate, and therefore must explain why she among all 
other women is capable of holding high political office. Male leaders are not described as 
“Iron Gentlemen,” or “paternal,” or any other type of man. Instead they are categorized 
using words associated with executive leadership like “decisive” and “powerful.” The 
authors of this report hope that one of the symbolic effects of increasing numbers of 
women holding high political office will be to normalize the notion of female leadership 
and thereby remove this pervasive sexist frame.  
This report highlights female heads of state who have prioritized the interests of women, 
as President of Chile Michelle Bachelet did during her first term. However, this criterion 
alone does not make her a successful leader, nor does it mean that male leaders that 
preceded her were failures because they did not prioritize women’s and minority issues. 
Additionally, this report shows that Dilma Rousseff’s choice to appoint nine women to 
her presidential cabinet in Brazil has not made her a transformational or successful leader 
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on its own. Instead, it argues that female heads of state in Latin America have advanced 
the political representation of women in high political office, and those actions stand 
alone to have a symbolic impact on the population. Those actions should be understood 
apart from their leadership style. Considering the advancement of democratic ideals of 
equality in the world today, all leaders should be analyzed equally, and without a 
gendered lens. Continually holding female leaders to a separate standard than male 
leaders is antifeminist and antidemocratic.  
Measuring women’s political performance against gendered standards not only reflects 
socially cultivated traits but also reaffirms them. Thus, the field of women and politics 
would benefit from integrating approaches used for studying leadership in a normative 
context. In other words, when scholars evaluate male leadership, gender is an invisible 
factor, so the discussion is forced to focus on other dimensions of leadership. Given that 
“male” is no longer the sole gender of political leadership, a new framework is needed to 
analyze a diversifying political landscape where women and men lead cities, states, and 
countries. This framework should also allow for political leaders who identify outside of 
the gender binary.  
The fields of political science, leadership, and management do not lack theories and 
frameworks for examining political leadership, but that body of work is rarely applied to 
the study of female political leadership. The authors of this report do not advocate an 
analysis grounded in any particular framework: Functional Theory, Situational Theory, 
even Great Man Theory may be appropriate for different researchers.
744
 It remains 
important to consider barriers to power and strategies for leadership that may be unique 
to women, but moving beyond the context of a masculine/feminine dichotomy will enrich 
this conversation too. Ultimately, our contention is simply that in order to evaluate how 
women govern (and implicitly, how women govern compared to men), we must begin by 
analyzing actual dimensions of leadership and by challenging gendered assumptions, not 
reinforcing them.  
Transformational Leadership 
Defining Transformation  
To assess whether the female leaders studied in this report have been transformational, 
we must first establish a common understanding of a term that has a broad range of 
interpretations. Here, we conceive of transformational leaders on a spectrum that runs 
from a soft criterion of influencing society’s perceptions of women and their capacity to 
lead, to a stringent, Marxist standard of shifting the power relations between groups and 
institutions within a nation. Patricia Lee Sykes collapses this whole spectrum into a 
succinct definition when she states, “transformational leaders seek to change individual 
                                                 
744 Ortiz Ortega, Poder, Mujeres y Liderazgo: Guía Incluyente en un Contexto Global, 109–10. 
 
273 
citizens, their states, their societies and the relationship among these.”
745
 Soft 
transformation may take place in the minds of the citizenry or in interpersonal 
interactions, while hard, more revolutionary transformation would take place in the 
interactions between the state and the individual, between different groups in society, or 
through restructuring a country’s systems and structures of power. 
In an analysis of women in power, one of the metrics of transformation must be the 
impact of female leadership on gender relations and the state of patriarchal power. In 
Women As National Leaders, Michael A. Genovese states that in a patriarchal society 
“any woman who aspires to the top is potentially subversive of the established order.”
746
 
In cultures where the public sphere and positions of authority are designated for men, and 
supportive roles and familial tasks are designated for women, a woman who seeks and 
gains a nation’s top political position is directly challenging accepted notions of gender, 
whether she is conscious of it or not. Due to its unique level of power, visibility, and 
prestige, the seat of presidency occupied by a woman is of unparalleled symbolic 
importance.  
It is fairly easy to conclude that the female leaders examined here have been softly 
transformational and have shown their respective nations that being a woman is not 
antithetical to holding political power. However, this observation must be qualified 
because the more characteristics a female leader shares with the traditional political elite, 
the narrower her transformational potential in facilitating marginalized groups’ access to 
power. For example, a wealthy, white, heterosexual female leader presents a challenge to 
the gender aspect of power but not to any of the other privileged identities that are 
synonymous with national leadership.  
To determine whether any of these leaders has been transformational with regard to 
systems, institutions, or structures of power we must evaluate them individually. When 
Genovese judged the impact of female world leaders in 1993, he concluded that not one 
of them had “challenged, in any fundamental way, the patriarchal power structure of 
society. To do so would have been political suicide.”
747
 In the following section we 
discuss whether the same conclusion is appropriate two decades later. 
Are These Leaders Transformational?  
Throughout the case studies presented in this report, a certain degree of transformational 
power is identified in female leaders, particularly from the softer perspective of going 
beyond the traditional limits of politics that placed women outside of the higher spheres 
of power. The leaders analyzed in this report occupied high-ranking positions in the 
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executive branch, at the national or state level, further opening politics to a traditionally 
underrepresented group as women. The election of Fernández de Kirchner, Rousseff, 
Bachelet, and Chinchilla marked the election of the first female president in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica, respectively. Similarly, some states in Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada had never before had women occupying governor or premier 
positions. In that sense, women holding office affected societal perceptions of a woman’s 
ability to be an effective leader. However, this is a double-edged sword because women 
who perform well can open more spaces for other women in the political sphere, as in 
Bachelet’s case in Chile, or they can taint women’s image as effective political leaders, as 
with Chinchilla in Costa Rica. A gendered assessment of female leaders emerges 
particularly in the case of women who are not judged as performing competently. By 
contrast, in the case of competent female leaders, the ability to govern is not evaluated 
from a gendered perspective. Women who are generally perceived as highly effective 
political leaders, even when criticized, tend to be evaluated based on the content of their 
actions and policies. Criticisms of Dilma Rousseff’s management of the issues 
surrounding the World Cup and of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s government’s 
economic policies are not associated with their ability to govern as women but with their 
management of specific situations, regardless of their gender. 
Beyond social perceptions, some of the female leaders studied in the report have been 
transformational with respect to their policies. Rousseff has concentrated her 
administration’s efforts on poverty alleviation programs that aim to improve 
disadvantaged groups’ position within society. Bachelet’s first administration emphasized 
social protection, particularly targeting vulnerable groups such as low-income families, 
the elderly, and women. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s administration emphasized 
social protection as well, particularly targeting vulnerable groups such as low-income 
families, the elderly, and women. She also passed a same-sex marriage law, thereby 
advancing sexual minorities’ rights. Canada’s premiers Cournoyea and Wynne advocated 
for aboriginal and sexual minorities’ rights, respectively. These efforts can be interpreted 
as attempts to drive social transformations by confronting the power relations within 
society and improving the conditions of underrepresented or underprivileged groups. 
In terms of political transformation, the progress of the women analyzed in this report has 
been limited. Bachelet’s first administration attempted to include more women in the 
higher spheres of the executive. Despite the number of women in cabinet positions being 
comparatively high by Chilean standards, female representation then decreased under her 
successor Sebastián Piñera. This decrease in women’s cabinet representation is evidence 
of the lack of a profound transformation within the political system. Bachelet’s second 
administration intends to formulate a new Constitution, which would represent a deep 
political transformation, defying the legacy of dictator Augusto Pinochet. However, it is 
too soon to assess whether her efforts will be successful. 
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The female leaders analyzed in this report ignite transformational efforts in micro areas, 
being less successful in challenging traditional political structures and relations at a 
macro level. Even when these leaders make progress in improving marginalized groups’ 
conditions in society, their political behavior and platforms follow traditional political 
patterns in their respective countries. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that the 
lack of transformational power is not a unique characteristic of female leaders. Their 
male counterparts habitually fail in creating the conditions to achieve profound changes 
in the structure of power.  
Scholarship on women as transformational leaders points out that women who do not use 
their power and position to “alter the place and perception of women in the state or 
society,” diverge from the traditional expectations of a woman’s duty in political 
office.
748
 Conversely, society does not expect male political leaders to advance the 
interests of all men, and leave out the interests of women, children, and minority groups. 
The expectation of a head of state, regardless of gender, should be one of comprehensive 
political representation.  
Symbolic Impact and Political Discourse 
Women in the executive tend to look like their male counterparts in every way but 
gender: they come from within political institutions, they tend to be white, upper-middle 
class, well-educated, and deeply connected (professionally and personally) to male 
leaders. How then, does their leadership impact women, beyond gender-agenda policies? 
Despite a widely held assumption that women in elected office will enact policies that 
positively impact other women, the cases presented here show that this is not necessarily 
true. Female leaders do not drastically transform political and economic power structures 
while in office. Like their male counterparts, women in the executive produce complex 
agendas in all policy areas; the inclusion of equality-based policy as part of a larger 
agenda is not necessarily transformational. Regardless of substantive transformational 
impact, there is significant cultural value in the ascendance of a woman to the executive 
level. That symbolic impact translates into a shift in political discourse, which 
mainstreams female political participation. The shift translates into a real substantive 
change in the way party officials view female candidacy at more localized levels.  
Media coverage of “first female heads of state” implies that the sheer symbolic impact of 
their election will change the way in which women lead their lives, the way young girls 
imagine their futures, and inequality in general. Female leaders studied in these cases 
have had varying levels of commitment to fostering political aims in young women, 
although all leaders studied imagine themselves to be role models to young women in 
general. Some leaders have seen their role as a voice for the marginalized as at the 
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intersection of other marginalized identities. Kathleen Wynne, who was elected as 
premier of Ontario in 2013 and is the first openly gay premier in Canada, has become an 
icon for the Canadian LGBT community. She often speaks about the importance of 
acceptance in youth communities, and her election has sparked a national conversation 
about the marginalization of LGBT youth.  
Symbolic Effects of Female Heads of State in the Americas 
No female heads of state have been elected in the United States or in Mexico. However, 
the Mexican case shows that female governorship is associated with increased favorable 
opinion of state government. It should be noted, however, that the correlation between 
approval ratings and female leadership does not necessarily signify causality.  
Perhaps most importantly, when women are elected to the executive branch, there 
appears to be a rise in the number of women participating in local government. Popular 
demand for female candidates means that parties will foster female leadership on the 
local level. For instance, in the Brazilian 2010 elections, forty-eight women ran for 
mayoral office, almost twice as many as the last election.
749
 In 2014, Chile’s Bachelet ran 
for her second presidency against another woman. As more and more women enter into 
higher levels of government, both party officials and the general public tend to be more 
receptive to female candidates. 
Perceptions of Democracy  
Perception of democracy varies across countries, and is highly contextual to historical 
and political conditions. Perceptions of democracy can be used to analyze the effects of 
presidents on political interest and satisfaction across Latin America. Data from 
Latinobarómetro shows that people in countries such as Argentina and Chile, which were 
governed by authoritarian regimes from the 1960s to the 1980s, significantly prefer a 
democratic government to other types of government.
750
 The variation in a population’s 
satisfaction with democracy may be associated with the public opinion of the current 
political leader in office. For example, in Chile, satisfaction with democracy increased 
after President Bachelet’s first administration. In contrast, data gathered after Dilma 
Rousseff’s first year in office (2011) showed that Brazilians had an increased 
dissatisfaction with democracy from 2010 to 2011.
751
 However, public responses to 
survey questions may only portray some effects of each leader’s symbolic representation. 
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Other effects are still to be determined as leaders such as Bachelet, Rousseff, and 
Fernández de Kirchner have yet to finish their terms.  
Critical Data Analysis to Measure Symbolic Effects  
Data collected by Latinobarómetro from 1995 to 2010, shown in Figure 17, suggests that 
public perception of politics fluctuates over time, regardless of the leader’s gender.
752
 The 
United States and Canada are not included in the data analysis because Latinobarómetro 
does not collect data from those countries. According to time series data from 
Latinobarómetro depicting the public’s interest in politics, it can be observed that when 
the general perception of the current leader is negative, interest in politics and satisfaction 
with democracy decline.
753
 It can be assumed that positively evaluated leaders will 
trigger favorable responses from the public to questions about their satisfaction with 
democracy and level of political interest. Latinobarómetro did not collect data from Costa 
Rica in 1995 on the level of political interest, nor were time series data available for all 
countries selected in 1999, 2002, 2006, or 2008. At the time of this report, data from 
Latinobarómetro was not available for all countries’ level of political interest for 2011–
2014.  
Figure 17: Interest in Politics of Both Genders Over Time 
Source: Latinobarómetro. Table created by authors with data from Latinobarómetro. 
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Data from Latinobarómetro, shown in Figure 18, shows that women were typically less 
interested than men in politics in the case study countries evaluated, regardless of the 
gender of the current head of state. The only exceptions were in Mexico in 2005, and 
Argentina in 2010.
754
 This variation from the group shows that women and men both 
have an interest in politics, and that an exogenous factor is responsible for the historical 
trend of women’s disinterest in politics. Factors for this disparity in political interest 
differs by country, but common themes across the case studies are delayed emergence of 
female suffrage, military regimes that marginalized women’s social and political 
participation, and the recent rise of democracy in many Latin American countries.  
It is possible that the results from Argentina’s 2010 survey represent a manifestation of 
the symbolic effects of Fernández de Kirchner’s candidacy and presidency on the female 
population. Likewise, a political transition was approaching in Mexican politics in 2005. 
It was the last year of Fox’s presidency and the election runoff between Calderón (PAN) 
and López Obrador (PRD), which turned out to be the most competitive presidential 
election in Mexico’s history. The high visibility of this contest may explain the rise in 
women’s interest in politics, as well as the overall highest interest in Mexican politics 
polled by Latinobarómetro. However, there is a possibility that both occurrences 
mentioned above, where women polled were more interested in politics than men, may be 
the result of a biased sample, exogenous factor, or error.  
Further research is needed to understand why men and women have different levels of 
satisfaction with democracy and political interest under different administrations. 
Moreover, additional research is needed to evaluate if the presence of female heads of 













Figure 18: Interest in Politics Divided by Gender Over Time 
Source: Latinobarómetro. Table created by authors with data from Latinobarómetro. 
Conclusion 
When analyzing the descriptive representation of women in power, the case studies offer 
evidence that the level of women’s political representation is largely a function of a 
country’s political system and institutional features. These features, such as electoral laws 
and political party structures, are important because they define who gets the most 
political power and how that power can be used to get a seat in office. Whether 
precipitated by women themselves, or a social or political movement, major changes to a 
country’s defining political elements have opened a space for women to fill. Unless a 
change such as quotas (backed up with placement mandates) or electoral reform occurs, it 
can be expected that men will continue to hold a much larger concentration of political 
power than their female counterparts. Even then, it is difficult to determine the long-term 
impacts of such reforms on women’s political representation. This begs us to begin 
examining not who is in office, but how and why they got there.  
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Latinobarómetro Very Interested and Somewhat 
Interested in Politics by Gender Over Time 
 
280 
The analysis drawn from the countries examined supports these inferences, but is limited 
by a number of factors that prevent definite conclusions from being drawn. The 
observations in these case studies are just scratching the surface of what further, deeper 
research could reveal and address. At this time, the sample of female executives that can 
be studied is miniscule compared to the vast pool of male executives across the history of 
these countries. This sample is so small because women have only just begun to emerge 
onto the executive stage. The larger this sample becomes, and the longer the length of 
time stretches that we can study, the more reliable these conclusions will become.  
In terms of substantive representation, there is a wide array of social, economic, and 
foreign relations policy perspectives, in line with the diversity of countries and years 
studied in the report. Nevertheless, a few salient themes emerged across the case studies. 
The social policies of the women studied utilized gender mainstreaming to promote 
women by a policy emphasis on poverty and combating violence against women. A key 
strategy of the female leaders was to put families at the center of social policies. With 
regards to economic policies, several of the women used their economic policies to fund 
these broad sweeping social initiatives. We also found evidence of various efforts to 
decrease corruption and increase transparency and trust. Lastly, the foreign policies of the 
women studied centered around liberalized trade and strong positions in international 
disputes. While common themes did emerge, the research did not indicate that the women 
leaders as a whole focused on the promotion of women through their policy agendas. 
The case studies demonstrate that both men and women have realized the importance of 
incorporating women’s issues into policy agendas. This is reflected in the policies that 
were spearheaded by male presidents, including Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva and Ricardo 
Lagos of Brazil and Chile, respectively. Their gender-targeted policies were continued by 
their female successors. This was clearly the case in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, where 
female presidents promised continuation of their predecessors’ social, economic, and 
political agendas. In some cases, like in Chile, gender-specific agendas were even 
expanded. For example, Bachelet increased SERNAM’s budget and enacted gender 
parity in the cabinet. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Chinchilla’s approach to 
women’s issues breaks the mold altogether on what we would expect from a female 
leader. In the United States, Canada, and Mexico, female leaders seem more likely to 
have explicit gender agendas than their male counterparts. Across the board, however, it 
has become apparent that governments are obligated, by domestic and international 
advocates, to consider women in their public policy decisions. 
The number of women elected to office increased over the last several decades. As the 
political representation of women continues to increase in countries, what implications 
will this have for policy? Scholars predict that it will eventually lead to increased 
attention to women’s issues in the political arena. However, our findings suggest that the 
presence of a female leader in a country does not necessarily result in the advancement of 
a gender agenda. Our analysis finds that female leaders are more likely to concentrate on 
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the needs of marginalized groups, and this is even more true when the female leader 
personally identified with the group.
755
 The main finding regarding the substantive 
analysis is that increased women’s representation has the capacity to lead to more diverse 
policy agendas that include issues that concern a variety of marginalized groups.  
With regard to the symbolic representation of female leaders, this report raises the issue 
of the uneven expectations towards elected women in comparison to men. Female leaders 
are expected to be transformational, to focus on particular policy issues, and to have a 
specific management or leadership style. However, all these elements of change and 
policy depend on other factors that go beyond gender. Gender is only a visible factor in 
the study of female politicians but it goes unnoticed in the analysis of men’s 
representation. The women studied in this report are located along the entire spectrum of 
transformational leaders—many being highly transformational in some areas while 
maintaining the status quo in others—just like men.  
The examples discussed in this report show a complex portrait of gender in the executive 
branch. In some cases, female leaders are amenable to creating and implementing policy 
agendas which address issues that disproportionately affect women: domestic violence, 
reproductive rights, equal representation, and fair pay. Largely, however, this is not the 
case. Defining the substantive success or failure of female leadership by this metric 
dismisses the complexities of leadership and female leadership in particular. Furthermore, 
evaluating or describing female leadership in a limited masculine-feminine binary 
restricts understanding of the impact of gender on leadership style and ability. Both the 
expectation of societal transformation and the narrow characterization of leadership as 
gendered have prevented an assessment of the actual significance of female leadership, 
both in terms of policy development and symbolic cultural power. Further research is 
needed to develop a more complex framework for assessing the particular value of 
female leadership in the executive branch. There is a symbolic value attached to female 
leadership, one which will be revealed as the next generation of women rise to the highest 
level of government.
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